Anti-Utopianism and Fredric Jameson’s
Archaeologies of the Future

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It is most tempting to think of Fredric Jameson’s Archaeologies of the Future (2005) in utopian terms, as a contribution to the history of utopian philosophy represented by Theodor Adorno, Louis Marin and Herbert Marcuse, if not Hegel, Marx and Jameson himself.¹ To trace the line of utopian ideas in their works is to be seduced by Jameson’s own project, which has, since Marxism and Form (1971), mapped the utopian continuities that exist between an assortment of Marxist writers.² Marxism and Form stands as a seminal beginning to Jameson’s utopian project, introducing the work of untranslated German writers, including Walter Benjamin and Herbert Marcuse, to a generation of Anglophonic scholars. One reviewer went so far as to recommend the book to English-speaking Germans to clear up the muddy phrases of Gyorgy Lukács and Ernst Bloch, claiming that Jameson presented a much more articulate version of their ideas!³ There is no better demonstration of the recognition effected upon the Marxist corpus by Jameson’s intellectual clarity than the conclusion to Aesthetics and Politics (1980), in which the hostility between Lukács and Bloch is transformed into two sides of the same politics.⁴ Indeed, the very meaning of Jameson’s Marxism comes about from just such theoretical sublimations as these, as disparate European projects are unified both intellectually and politically. The sheer synthetic power of Jameson’s writing makes it difficult to think
about his writing in terms that aren’t Jamesonian, the range of his project transforming Marxist literary criticism into a totality.

Thus it is that in *Archaeologies* Jameson addresses the disputed terrain of the utopian imagination, and more particularly the anti-utopian situation of our own times, a situation that leads him to argue for an “anti-anti-Utopianism.” If there is a precedent for this manoeuvre it is Lukács, whose shifting positions were constantly negotiating with the hard line Soviet left in his native Hungary. Those things that many readers find repugnant in Lukács, including the appeal to a popular front position and the unveiling of the cognitive processes of capitalism in more and more areas of cultural life, Jameson has turned on his own historical situation. The rhetorical use of “we” in both Lukács and Jameson is exemplary of their unitary projects, the reference to some imagined unity beyond the fragmentations of capitalism serving to build an alliance not only between themselves and their readership, but also within the fragmented array of subject matter they treat in their writings. From a utopian point of view, the “we” is an invitation to collaborate with the author in building a shared platform from which a better world might be glimpsed. From the other side of the utopian barrier — from the point at which the contradictions of capitalism have resolved themselves — these contradictions assume their place in the struggle for social change, and even become a necessary part of the renewed struggle for totality. This is the temptation that *Archaeologies* offers to its reader, not only as a work that oversees the history of work on utopias, but as a kind of summary of Jameson’s own oeuvre, offering a fundamental and faithful key with which to unlock his interpretive practice. As Perry Anderson notes, “No intellectual thread has been more continuous in his work” than utopianism, and it tempting to think of *Archaeologies* as the work of a major theoretical figure who has at last put his methodology on the table.

To visualise Jameson’s utopianism, it is necessary to take a step back. Some of the best critiques of Marxism, after all, have come from beyond Marxism. Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida’s respective works on the libidinal and spectral qualities of Marxism are exemplary, subjecting it to a critique from beyond the popular front. It is without such ambition that I want to proceed here, but instead I want to begin to unravel some of Jameson’s utopian project by interrogating its methodology. Many contemporary readers will be familiar with Jameson’s *Postmodernism: The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1991), a book whose long influence has been due to its making sense out of a diverse array of cultural practices. The methodology at work here was called “cognitive mapping,” an experimental yoking together of texts that would render insights into the unconscious of their historical moment. *Archaeologies*, however, harks back to an earlier theo-
retical strategy in Jameson’s career, that of “metacommentary,” whose aspirations to complexity and totality well prepared its author for his subsequent work on postmodernism. Metacommentary employs the dialectic to think its literary and theoretical subjects onto a higher, more complex plane of historical meaning. It is possible to divide Jameson’s oeuvre in two and along the lines of these different methods for building textual histories. Both metacommentary and cognitive mapping appear first in articles of the same name, but are most comprehensively employed in Jameson’s book-length works. So it is that, after the first appearance of the “Metacommentary” essay in 1971, it is possible to detect its operation, “a kind of mental procedure that suddenly shifts gears, that throws everything in an inextricable tangle one floor higher,” in the books that followed it, including *Marxism and Form* (1971), *The Prison-House of Language* (1972), *Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist* (1979), but most especially in *The Political Unconscious* (1981). Cognitive mapping, meanwhile, is the declared method of *Postmodernism* (1991), to which *The Seeds of Time* (1994) reads as an addendum, and his works on cinema, *Signatures of the Visible* (1990) and *The Geopolitical Aesthetic* (1992), are companions. During this latter period Jameson also produced metacommentary, writing through the 1990s on theoretical as much as cultural subjects in *Late Marxism* (1990), *Brecht and Method* (1998), and *A Singular Modernity* (2002). While within the flow of his sentences the distinction between the two may sometimes blur, and tactics differ from the overall strategy of these books, it is possible to make such a division within Jameson’s oeuvre on the basis of their content, which is either literary-theoretical or visual-cultural, and thus an instance of metacommentary or cognitive mapping.

The literary-theoretical content of *Archaeologies* makes it an example of metacommentary, as its chapters range from the utopian philosophy of Bloch to the high science fiction of Stanislaw Lem and Ursula Le Guin. It also lies in the reading experience of the book itself, which, in the manner of Jameson’s other late metacommentaries, in particular *Late Marxism* (1990) and *Brecht and Method* (1998), tends toward complexity on the level of the sentence. If cognitive mapping is an attempt to clarify, to historicise in the face of cultural surplus, then metacommentary resists reductive explanations, its complexities instead produced from within theory’s infinite self-reflexivity. The sheer range of material addressed by *Archaeologies*, from theory to fiction, from Freud to Greimas, from spatial to historical utopianism, can only complicate the individual texts and topics to which it addresses itself, weaving a tangle that the “Metacommentary” essay of 1971 argues should reveal the conditions by which its own interpretation is taking
place. The reading experience is vertiginous, a potentially infinite regress that only finds its feet again by virtue of a dialectic that appeals to history and politics as its ethical order. The debris of the last century is systematized with a view to the ongoing utopian struggle for social change.

It is not so much to this programmatic 1971 essay that we should turn to think through this system, but to its most ambitious realisation in *The Political Unconscious*. While today *Postmodernism* looms as Jameson’s most famous and relevant text, in the 1980s *The Political Unconscious* was just as influential on American literary studies. It made spectacular use of metacommentary, co-ordinating what appeared to be every contemporary movement of interpretive practice within itself, and thus raising them to another level of interpretive practice that Jameson famously declared to be the ultimate horizon of Marxism. *The Political Unconscious* was contemporary with several other works attempting to co-ordinate the different theoretical schools competing within the American academy at that time. Books such as Michael Ryan’s *Marxism and Deconstruction* (1982), Frank Lentricchia’s *After the New Criticism* (1980), Stanley Fish’s *Is there a Text in this Class?* (1980), as well as the influential work of Hayden White, Edward Said and Terry Eagleton addressed the fragmentation of the humanities that had been brought about by the impact of French poststructuralism. *The Political Unconscious* was by far the most influential of these works, testifying to the success of metacommentary as an interpretive practice, even if it may have only been Jameson who possessed the eidetic quality of mind to put it to work.

For it is the quality of metacommentary not so much to argue with previous interpretive methodologies but to preserve them within the greater argument that metacommentary makes, to encrypt them like antique computer codes that have been surpassed by new levels of machinic intelligence. In the 1971 essay, Jameson argued that it was “wrong to want to decide, to want to resolve a difficulty.” Instead, it was better to shift these difficulties to a new theoretical level, to transform them dialectically into a means for further thought. *The Political Unconscious* demonstrated how to manage these levels of making meaning, co-ordinating three moments of interpretive practice. The first of these moments is the bibliophilic, in which author and text are placed in biographical and historical contexts that flesh out the intended meaning of the work. The second is interpretation, in which the representations of a text are reduced to what Jameson calls the ideologeme, the smallest possible formation of class struggle. It is in this moment that Jameson places those multiple means of reading texts that have preceded him, including New Criticism, structuralism, poststructuralism and even previous versions of Marxism itself. The metacommentary
succeeds these moments not only in the chronological development of literary theory itself, as it comes to self-consciousness (and this especially after poststructuralism), but in its capacity to both preserve and absorb these earlier methods as moments in its own interpretive practice.

The ideologeme of metacommentary is the mode of production. While in our own day the mode of production is predominantly capitalist, this dominance does not exclude other modes that may well be simultaneous with it. Nor is this mode historically inevitable. The immense shifts in Europe from agrarian production to feudalism and capitalism are, then, not so much exclusive of each other, but take place as a series of overlapping and interpenetrating paradigms of economic organisation. Jameson’s fascination with the transitions between these modes of production turn in metacommentary into the simultaneity of historically contingent interpretive practices. In *The Political Unconscious* such practices that were current in the 1970s are both simultaneous and successive, as New Criticism gives way to and is the condition for poststructuralism in American universities, which is in turn the condition for the coming to maturity of Marxism. The dialectical sublation that Jameson puts to work here, assimilating now one and now the other interpretive practice, is also at work in *Archaeologies*. The historical transitions between modes of production once again become a means of thinking through the appearance of spatial utopias, which describe the possibilities of radical change just when such a change appears historically immanent. Not only utopian fiction writers but utopian theorists are read against the historical cusps upon which they sit, whether this be Thomas More living amidst the rise of a humanism that reacted to an early modern capitalism, or Bloch and Adorno, whose move from Nazi Germany to the US gave them insights into the culture of monopoly capitalism in the twentieth century. Similarly, the novels of Le Guin and Samuel Delany come to stand for different interpretive possibilities for utopianism that revolve around their own political situations. From its dialectical appearance amidst the throes of early modern capitalism to the haunting of twentieth century popular culture, from spatial to heterotopic narrative structures, the figure of utopia comes to co-ordinate the metacommentary at work in *Archaeologies*.

If *Archaeologies* seems more heady than Jameson’s other works, more obscure in its aims, this is because the utopian methodology of metacommentary is identical to the utopia of its subject. Utopia interprets utopia, in a doubling that can be difficult to disentangle. In *The Political Unconscious*, the utopian realisation of history was the absent totality to which metacommentary aspired, and to which the interpretive modes of Althusserian Marxism, New Criticism and poststructuralism were subject. In
Archaeologies, metacommentary coordinates a series of utopian positions, threatening to regress into an unreflexive duplication of utopian ideas. The seduction of Jameson’s utopianism, the utopian space from which it mounts its critique, is identical to the object of this very critique. This doubling of the utopian premises of Archaeologies is nowhere more evident than in its Introduction, where Jameson proclaims his “anti-anti-Utopianism.”\(^{18}\) This dialectical doubling has the effect of a reversal as the utopian subject is placed at a greater and greater distance, lost in the complexity of a metacommentary that is itself predicated on the complexity of the historical situation. Utopia is no longer identical to utopia because it must occur twice, it must become the utopia within utopianism. The doubling takes several forms throughout Archaeologies, whether the spatial within the libidinal, the heterotopic within the systemic, or the personal within the social. Such complicating manoeuvres are typical of the metacommentary, within which contraries are both preserved and placed in dialectical relation to one another. Yet here utopia occupies all positions, stands against and above itself, in a movement that is as irreconcilable as an identity is with itself. The doubling of the utopian wants to move dialectically into a movement of cancellation, in which the synthesis of terms would arrive at some higher plane, yet it is prevented from doing so because its synthesis would only be more of itself.

To make sense of Jameson’s doubling of the utopian, in a metacommentary that attempts to respond to those “structural ambiguities” of the capitalism that created utopia to begin with, it is only necessary to re-read critiques of The Political Unconscious.\(^{19}\) While this book appeared to great acclaim, those who made the most sophisticated critiques of it were not, as one might expect, poststructuralists or New Critics, but Marxists themselves. John Frow, for example, accused Jameson of being a structuralist in Marxist clothing, while Carl Freedman argued that The Political Unconscious was a bourgeois intellectual history.\(^{20}\) These criticisms follow Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ criticisms of utopian fantasy in The Communist Manifesto (1888), which constructs a popular front for the struggle against capitalism, and almost incidentally takes an anti-utopian position against the doodling of socialist fictions.\(^{21}\) Jameson’s attraction to a future that had not yet been realised is too impractical and allows the imaginative faculties too much freedom from historical realities.\(^{22}\) As Cornel West argues, the utopianism of The Political Unconscious “rests upon no specifiable historical forces potentially capable of actualizing it or upon the notion that every conceivable historical force embodies it.”\(^{23}\) West accuses The Political Unconscious of having no political consequences, no praxis to accompany its theory. Such a critique would rarely be launched at any other literary critic,
yet politics is the very terrain that Jameson stakes out for metacommun-
tary, the revolutionary imperative shared by utopian and anti-utopian Marx-
ists alike. For West, it is not only the form of utopianism that is at fault, it is
also Jameson’s choice of critical object, this being a history of philosophy
and a bourgeois literature that is a poor substitute for actual history.
Jameson’s attraction to an immaterial history of philosophy, whether in
Hegel, Marx, poststructuralism, or in the novels of Balzac, Gissing and
Conrad, are for West seductions to be resisted. In adopting formalist strat-
gies Jameson is “breathing life” back into old, bourgeois texts.24 Eagleton
echoes this critique of Jameson’s lack of praxis, arguing that the working
class movement is missing from The Political Unconscious.25 For Eagleton,
Jameson’s style compensates for a utopian future that cannot yet be real-
ised. “Jameson’s style displays an intriguing ambivalence of commentary
and critique,” Eagleton writes, and “this springs from a similarly ambivalent
relation to bourgeois culture, at once over-appropriative and over-
generous.”26 For Eagleton this is symptomatic of a Hegelian Marxism that
subordinates the political to aesthetics.27

Jameson explicitly addresses the ambivalence of the utopian subject
in Archaeologies, as he turns through the book from antinomies of personal
and collective wish-fulfillment; to fancy and the architectonic imagination; to
the hobbyist and dictator; to finally arrive at the difference between the
Freudian subject and a Marxist equivalent. The ambivalence here lies in
the irreconcilability of these antinomies, which are in fact one and the same
– the chasm between one person’s vision of utopia and another’s reproduc-
ing itself over and over again. For Jameson this distance between the
dreamer and the dream is an invariable part of the utopian. For Marx and
Engels of The Communist Manifesto, such distance is a part of the utopian
malaise. West and Eagleton are similarly interested in returning to an older
Marxist class criticism so as to think utopia as part of the deterioration of
bourgeois culture. For these anti-utopian Marxists, Jameson’s declaration
of an anti-anti-utopianism only adds to the mystique of aesthetic culture, its
ambivalent subject symptomatic of the very problems it purports to solve.
This is nowhere more evident than in the chapters on incommensurable
worlds. Addressing the impossibility of thinking about a utopia that lies be-
yond the barrier of massive social change, Jameson turns to science fic-
tion. Example upon example of the obstacles put before utopia are taken
from Le Guin, John Brunner, Isaac Asimov and Lem, pointing as if directly
to the difficulty of social change. Jonathan Swift’s utopian Houyhnhnms are
perhaps the most extreme case described here, their utopianism constitu-
tionally unavailable as horses rather than people achieve the peaceable
life.28 The doubled function of such descriptions of a utopia that lies un-
available to human society is to reveal this structural limitation of utopia itself, and to mystify the utopian form.

The problem sketched here lies in this ambivalence of utopian forms, and in the metacommentary that encases this ambivalence in Archaeologies. It is only necessary to revisit the 1971 essay “Metacommentary” to discover Jameson’s own early refusal of ambivalence. The emphasis on interpretation in “Metacommentary” was a refutation of formalism for its own sake, represented by Susan Sontag, Russian Formalism and the French structuralisms. In 1971 Jameson embraces more of a materialist position regarding the imagination as a whole, directing his concluding paragraphs toward the fact of labour and its role in producing fiction. Freud’s wish-fulfillment offers a way of thinking through those compensations for a life of alienated and cognitive labour. The imagination of science fiction becomes a way of imagining oneself doing “libidinally gratifying” work, a wish-fulfillment that has its foundations in material life. Herbert Marcuse’s phrase helps to flesh out some of the changes in his position on utopianism since this essay was published in 1971. For, in the Archaeologies of 2005, Marcuse’s essay “The Affirmative Character of Culture” will become part of an argument about the “deep-structural rather than apolitical” undecidability of utopia and culture as such, this indecision being between its revolutionary potential and its ideological function in capitalism. For Marcuse, utopian culture was a kind of psychic compensation for the exploitations of working life, an argument that Jameson’s “Metacommentary” took up in its case against ambiguity.

If Archaeologies can be read as something of a meditation on the antinomy of Freud and Marx, of the bourgeoisie subject with all the complexities of modern psychic life and the loss of this life in revolution, it is to Marcuse that we can turn for an alternative dialectic. “The Affirmative Character of Culture” puts forward Nietzsche in place of Freud, proclaiming a nihilistic negation of culture in place of an ambivalence toward it. Here the affirmation is of a thought that moves away from bourgeoisie coldness and toward a life of passion. Marcuse’s version of Nietzsche points out the double-bind that culture presents to this life, happiness only being possible when it is freed of illusion. Marcuse finds an unexpected socialism in Nietzsche, for whom the social order offers happiness without fulfillment. Since this order in modern times is one of unhappiness, it demands its own transformation. The difference between Marcuse and Jameson’s Archaeologies lies in the degree to which Jameson allows the individual’s concerns to enter into a dialectic with radical social change. The irreconcilable place of Jameson’s daydreamer, tinkerer and creative artist is immersed for Marcuse in an illusion that can only continue to affirm bourgeois culture. “From the stand-
point of the interest of the status quo,” he writes, “the real abolition of culture must appear utopian.”

Utopia is that transformation of the libidinal will to affirm life into an appearance of affirmation, into affirmative culture as such.

It is in this sense too that the metacommentary, in which interpretation after interpretation aspires to a totalising vision of the conditions for interpretation itself, is not necessarily a revolutionary mode of thought. This is because the anti-anti-utopian position is for the radical Nietzschean or materialist Marxist the reactionary affirmation of a terrain already staked out by a culture of illusion. This is a culture in which differences are only ever partial from each other, while what Marcuse recognised in Nietzsche was the revolutionary affirmation of the absolute. Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars Trilogy (1992-1996), featured throughout Archaeologies, illuminates the relations between these differences and affirmations. In the first two books the new Martian colonists pursue their utopian fantasies for the planet in spite of each other, in activities that often place them in conflict with each others’ interests and in dispute with Earth. The relations of force at work in the multiplicity of communitarian and ecological projects describe the heterogeneities of Nietzsche’s famous will to power. In their differences, “active forces affirm, and affirm their difference: in them affirmation is first, and negation is never but a consequence, a sort of surplus of pleasure.” Life in these terms is not so much critical of other life, not a limit for another’s pleasure, but is in a relation of quality. This is the life pursued by Robinson’s early colonists on Mars, whose activities, from seeding Mars with invented life to creating new modes of architecture and sport, are both utopian and in a state of discord. The endless schemes thought up by these characters for the future are proximate to immediacy, as they turn to praxis on the planetary surface. As Gilles Deleuze writes of Nietzsche, “Modes of life inspire ways of thinking; modes of thinking create ways of living. Life activates thought, and thought in turn affirms life.” By the third book all this activity has descended into a dull constitutionalism, conflict turning into factions that submit to the need implicit in the totality of the planet to work together rather than independently. Those original schemers and anarchists of the first two books turn into the utopian tinkerers for whom Jameson reserves a certain sympathy in Archaeologies, their situation in life castrated by the supremacy of reason and governance. The older colonists look instead to the new colonists on Venus who are living the dream as they once did, utopianism always at the frontier, asserting an absolute rather than a relative difference. The victory of reactive forces on Mars is analogous to the submission of human life on Earth to capital, to which utopia stands now as a mirage that once was, or that can only be contemplated seriously
in youth. It is for this reason that Marcuse writes of the appearance of utopia rather than of utopia itself, and of a negation that is only ever contingent.

If Marcuse arrives at this distinction in a dialectic between Nietzsche and Marx, while Jameson’s *Archaeologies* constitutes itself in an antinomy between Marx and Freud, it remains to think through the utopianism of Nietzsche and Freud, whose combination may well rephrase the problem. In the latter part of *Archaeologies* Jameson describes these unresolvable contraries in terms of a break between utopia and the historical world, naming that uncrossable chasm by which utopia becomes a critical negation. After an era of revolutions, it is not so much Marx but Nietzsche and Freud who are able to make sense of the failures of these revolutions. For both of these writers attempted to think through the retreat from the abyss of total transformation in their theorisation of a civilisation that repeated its own sameness. They named this repetition nihilism and narcissism respectively, both anti-utopian tendencies that restrain the possibilities of the present. For Nietzsche the psyche’s descent into everyday nihilism was one half of the eternal return of the same, the other facing transformation with a leap into an awakened consciousness, only to return once more to the forgetting that condemns the everyday. In Freud’s writing, the death drive keeps civilisation bound to its repetition of the same, its narcissistic repetition manifesting an anti-utopian materialism of the living body that nevertheless wants to return to its unliving state of matter.35

The pessimism of Nietzsche and Freud stands in stark contrast to Marx’s own materialisms, which find instead that the human relation to matter is rich with the possibility of a certain liberation. Marcuse’s appropriation of Nietzsche is similarly enriched by revolutionary ideas. Ignoring the individuated nature of the eternal return, Marcuse turns instead to this philosopher’s earlier writings that critique the social order from which he eventually withdrew. On the other hand, Jameson side-steps the pessimism of the later Freud, who after witnessing the devastation of a modern war would re-inscribe his youthful model of wish-fulfilment into the pessimism of the death drive.36 Such is the nature of dialectical Marxism to appropriate the most optimistic of ideas with a view to social change. This, then, would represent the boundaries of a utopian thought that cannot assimilate the inevitability of human despair and unhappiness in the organisation of its societies. The later writings of Nietzsche and Freud, however, may well share more with the Jameson of *Archaeologies* than with the Marxist anti-utopians. Nietzsche, Freud and Jameson looked upon utopia from a greater and greater distance as their lives went on, the island of happiness receding from view. From the positivity of his call for interpretation in the “Me-
tacommentary” of 1971 to the ambivalence of the interpretive object in *Archaeologies*, Jameson’s criticism has become increasingly sophisticated, increasingly distant. After Nietzsche it is tempting to read this making difficult as a kind of retreat from the social order. Such would be the anti-utopianism of Jameson’s position here, the threads of hope increasingly entangled with the impossibility of utopia itself.

The emphasis on return in both Nietzsche and Freud, a return that was accompanied in their late writings by a sense of inevitability, brings another sensibility to Jameson’s own return to utopia. The nihilism and narcissism of Jameson’s predecessors may well be applied not only to the anti-utopian tendencies of their work, but to the anti-anti-utopian position. For here too lies an acknowledgement of the inevitable failure of utopia to effect social change, but instead to perpetuate the ambivalence that culture (and utopia) maintains toward the political. It also then stands for a certain compulsion toward the repetition that underpins both nihilism and narcissism. The return of utopian fantasy, whether in the subtexts of popular culture or in utopian fiction itself, is symptomatic of a forgetting and a self-gratification that maintains psychic stability in the face of that radical possibility that Nietzsche found in the abyss, Freud in the unconscious, and Jameson in revolution. Utopia once again reveals itself as a part of the defensive mechanisms of the civilised mind, rather than that which offers to break definitively with its complexities.

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**NOTES**

7. Jean-François Lyotard, *Libidinal Economy*, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Blooming-


14 It was The Political Unconscious that led Terry Eagleton to famously claim Jameson to be the “foremost American Marxist critic” in “The Idealism of American Criticism”, New Left Review, 127 (May-June 1981), p. 60. If a survey of references in the PMLA is anything to go by, Jameson’s was the most influential work of American criticism in the 1980s. John W. Kronik’s survey of 235 articles that appeared in PMLA between 1981 and 1990 found that, after references to Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Paul de Man, Fredric Jameson was the most cited author. Half of these references were to The Political Unconscious. See John W. Kronik, “Editorial”, MLA Newsletter (Winter 1991).


17 Jameson’s summary of Christopher Kendrick’s essay is significant here. See


24 West, “Marxist Hermeneutics”, p. 194.


27 Eagleton broke the ground for Stephen Helming’s work on Jameson, which is interested in the difficulty he presents to the reader. See especially “Jameson’s Lacan”, *Postmodern Culture*, 7.1 (September 1996).


34 Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*, p. 66.
