



orpheus

monash university magazine 1964

|dod'o, n. (pl. -oes. -os). Large extinct
bird of Mauritius. [f. Port. *douo*
simpleton]

edited for the src

by ken mogg

designed by ken mogg & graham stone

layout-graham stone





The boat was perhaps a quarter of a mile away. From the slow pulse of the twin diesels Bond guessed that every cranny of the coastline was being searched for signs of them. It sounded a powerful boat. A big cabin cruiser, perhaps. What crew would it have? Who would be in command of the search? Doctor No? Unlikely. He would not trouble himself with this kind of police work.

From the west a wedge of cormorants appeared, flying low over the sea beyond the reef. Bond watched them. They were the first evidence he had seen of the guanay colony at the other end of the island. These, according to Pleydell-Smith's description, would be scouts for the silver flash of the anchovy near the surface. Sure enough, as he watched, they began to back-pedal in the air and then go into shallow dives, hitting the water like shrapnel. Almost at once a fresh file appeared from the west, then another and another that merged into a long stream and then into a solid black river of birds. For minutes they darkened the skyline and then they were down on the water, covering several acres of it, screeching and fighting and plunging their heads below the surface, cropping at the solid field of anchovy like piranha fish feasting on a drowned horse.

Bond felt a gentle nudge from the girl. She gestured with her head. "The Chinaman's hens getting their corn."

Ian Fleming: *Dr. No.*



... Just exactly what a "good" life is is hard to say. It certainly is not an anthill existence where the total human mass is all that matters. No human life can be "good" without the values we call intangibles: beauty, space, self-fulfillment, and the opportunity to be an individual. Because these are the important human characteristics and human needs. These are the qualities that make humans human.

Lois and Louis Darling: *Bird.*

a bond's eye view?

Our face is immobile, its cynical expression mirrored accurately in the ethos of James Bond. And the mirror pleases us. Bond and Bondmanship are "in". The film of *From Russia With Love*, we are told, has broken all box office records in Britain. In Catholic Italy, "Mr. Bang-Bang, Kiss-Kiss" is the rage. Oxford University has its *007 Society*. At Monash, earlier this year, the Literature Club presented a James Bond paper amongst others on staidier topics like Bernard Shaw and the Virgin Mother.

Indubitably, Bond is a product of this age of disillusionment. Or, rather, of an age where the old illusions persist but are recognised as illusions with a thoroughness and precision not previously attained:

Bond shrugged. "That is only the illusion of power, Doctor No. . . . I tell you, your search for power is an illusion because power itself is an illusion."

Doctor No said equably, "So is beauty, Mister Bond. So is art, so is money, so is death. And so, probably, is life. These concepts are relative. Your play upon words does not shake me. I know philosophy, I know ethics, and I know logic — better than you do, I daresay."

Which is not to insist that human endeavour must needs lack nobility. Fleming may draw parallels between his characters' plight and the predatory nature of feeding cormorants, Siamese Fighting Fish or Doberman Pinschers devouring one of their injured number, but the behaviour of these creatures is always predictable in the habits of the group. And Fleming concedes that humans are at least "warm" or "cold" (though even *these* terms have connotations of the pure animal — Dr. No, of course, is frigid, like cold grey steel):

Whatever happened to dead people, there was surely one place for the warm and another for the cold. And which, when the time came, would he, Bond, go to?

The essence of the Bond predicament, moreover, is its lack of predictability. Bond's pursuit of the "intangibles" of life requires the mustering of all his courage, intellect and re-

sourcefulness. He is, surprisingly, very largely a passive figure, whose every action is forced upon him by the designs of others. Consequently, for all we may find distasteful in the Bond ethos, notably its complete unconcern and apparent contempt for society at large, there is still a certain nobility in Bond's obdurate clinging to life at the climax of *Dr. No* which must surely be respected. Then, too, it would be wrong to overlook that part of the Bond ethos which is demonstrably true.

Man *has* always been a "predatory" animal, and, unfortunately, still is. Not just in the various ecological senses — for instance, of a civilisation thriving to the limit of its food supply and then rapidly waning as the land becomes blighted and barren — but also in a sociological sense. Today, more than ever, our society is a competitive one, a seeming rat race. (James Bond, forever moving on the *periphery* of society, encounters a horde of fear-stricken rats in the ancient underground cisterns of Constantinople, but follows their passage over and around his body with the same indifferent eye which he affords to the inconsequential actions of the *human* mass). This idea of Man as a natural predator upon the ambitions of his fellows has always been a pre-occupation of Orson Welles, discussed elsewhere in these pages. And Hitchcock's black lines state,

. We're all in our private traps, clamped in them, and none of us can ever get out. We scratch and claw but only at the air, only at each other; and for all of it we never budge an inch.

If we find such views appalling or even flagrant, we must not shun the question of what prompted them. Like Bond in Dr. No's trap, we must face up to our plight with honesty — without self-pity, prejudice or irrational fear. *Today more than ever*. "Man with all his noble qualities," wrote Charles Darwin, "still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin", and must therefore expect to share the insecurity of other forms of life, yet he is also recognizably the highest, the most advanced, of all life-forms on this planet. Man alone possesses the qualities of sympathy, understanding and intellect which permit him to change his environment (if not its ultimate basis) for the better as well as for the worse. Civilisation is a real thing. A society exists for its own protection and convenience, and an advanced society such as ours serves no less a purpose. It is at this point (and this point only, I would say) that the Bond ethos becomes unconvincing. We must needs arrive at a position more actively concerned with the relationship of society to its members and of its members to one another.

Noted French sociologist Roger Caillois has sought to classify Man's games and forms of play in such a manner that they serve as an insight into the more general cultural contexts which produced them. The various kinds of play and games are subsumed under four categories: *agôn* (competition), *alea* (chance), *mimicry* (simulation), and *ilinx* (vertigo). Caillois makes some fascinating observations. He shows, for instance, that games involving competition, simulation and vertigo are characteristic of life in all sections of the animal kingdom. Of *agôn* he notes: "The most impressive example is without doubt that of the little ferocious 'fighting' willow wrens." Games of chance, on the other hand, would seem to be peculiarly human.

In sum, animals, which are very much involved in the immediate and enslaved by their impulses, cannot conceive of an abstract and inanimate power, to whose verdict they would passively submit in advance of the game.

In a similar vein, incidentally, are the findings of Otto Koehler whose remarkable experiments with various birds showed them to possess a "prelinguistic number sense" equal to that of the most gifted humans. Koehler concluded,

that men and animals may have a prelinguistic "counting" ability of about the same degree, but that man's superiority in dealing with numbers lies in his ability to use, as symbols for numbers, words and figures which have not the same, or indeed any, numerical attributes.

Caillois makes the further point that the road from a primitive society to an advanced civilisation is one of describable progress:

May it be asserted that the transition to civilisation as such implies the gradual elimination of the primacy of *ilinx* and *mimicry* in combination, and the substitution and predominance of the *agôn-alea* pairing of competition and chance? Whether it be cause or effect, each time that an advanced culture succeeds in emerging from the chaotic original, a palpable repression of the powers of vertigo and simulation is verified. They lose their traditional dominance, are pushed to the periphery of public life, reduced to roles that become more and more modern and intermittent, if not clandestine and guilty, or are relegated to the limited and regulated domain of games and fiction where they afford men the same eternal satisfactions, but in sublimated form, serving merely as an escape from boredom or work and entailing neither madness nor delirium.

Admittedly, the Bond ethos is one of *agôn-alea* (challenge, lack of predictability) rather than of *ilinx-mimicry*. For all its modernity, however, it has become static at a point preceding that which achieves "the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers". If, in an advanced civilisation, the combination of *ilinx-mimicry* is pushed to the periphery of public life, the Bond ethos is no less peripheral. By the same token, because it mirrors a deeply-rooted cynicism in the society from which it has divorced itself, the Bond ethos is symptomatic of a lack of real cohesion in that society.

We have not answered Dr. No's (or Orson Welles') assertion that everything in life is an illusion, nor will we attempt to do so. If life is an illusion, and Chris Smale's article herein strives to convince us of the validity of just such a proposition, we can only ask "Does it matter?" What is beauty, the most basic of the "intangibles", without its sense of unfathomed mystery? We have tried, though, to stress the nobility of facing life squarely, of seeking for a fuller awareness of its problems and complexities — a vital role of the University — and of striving always to better the conditions under which we must live together as a society. The Xanadu of *Citizen Kane*, and its demented occupier, serve as an admonishment to those who would have things otherwise.

If we *are* all in our private traps, anyway, and James Bond no less than anyone else, then our society today has a greater need for tolerance and understanding than ever before. For who amongst us believes that our present-day society has already achieved "the greatest happiness for the greatest number"? Logical thought and personal observation suggest that tolerance and understanding must come from a wider experience of the world, education in width as well as in depth. Peter Smart's prize-winning essay, reprinted herein, cites the case of Leavis's attacks on C. P. Snow as "an obvious example of a man locked up in his own discipline and unable to think very seriously beyond it". Education in width — at all levels — can help to foster tolerance for other disciplines and other cultural and sociological forms, while simultaneously reducing that lack of cohesion in our society which is itself largely a product of the culture rift.

If "all art tends to the condition of music" — which we might call the most sympathetic of art forms because so dependent upon the empathy of its audience — our society is clearly still a rather shoddy piece of work. Nowadays, it seems, our empathy is more readily assigned to James Bond novels. And Bond, it bears repeating, moves only in a twilight world. A twilight world at the edge of the real world, which is society at large.

contents

peter smart	8	<i>the purpose of a university</i>
ken mogg	28	<i>citizen kane</i>
john ritchie	34	<i>five poems</i>
damien broderick	39	<i>mirrors of the sea</i>
philip martin	41	<i>poems</i>
chris smale	42	<i>I, the solipsist</i>
h. boyne-anderson	50	<i>the oreichalch lady</i>
peter barry	51	<i>in a style we know of</i>
paul marriott	52	<i>his dated aesthetics</i>

acknowledgments

The editor expresses his gratitude to all those who assisted in the production of this year's Monash magazine.

Printing was in the capable hands of the staff of Peter Isaacson Pty. Ltd. The cover blocks were produced by the Pictorial Department of "The Age".

Business manager Mike Hull secured advertisers, for whose support we are most grateful.

Graham Stone took upon himself the arduous job of doing the lay-out.

Thanks to Mrs. Gantner and to Mr. Clunies-Ross for making available the Gantner essay.

And, finally, a collective "thank you" to all others who played a part in the production of ORPHEUS '64.

peter smart

***what should be
the purpose
of a university
in Australia
today?***

***the prize-winning
essay
of the 1964
vallejo gantner
memorial
scholarship***

There seems nothing unusual in a man writing that his one ambition is,

. to have at least one son whom I could spend the rest of my life bringing up according to my own ideas, cultivating and arming him with the completed education that one can get in this age, and whom I could see become a famous engineer, powerful and rich through Science. 1.

Perhaps such crude materialism is distasteful to us. Perhaps he seems to overestimate the position the technologist enjoys in our

society. At least, he puts it too bluntly. Nevertheless, we feel that, in general, his ideas are ordinary enough.

However, once we realise when, and by whom, this statement was produced, it becomes extraordinary. It was written towards the close of the Nineteenth Century by Arthur Rimbaud — the poet who is better known for an earlier, and quite different attitude to Science.

Oh! Science! Everything has been revised.
For the body and for the soul — the viaticum — there is Medicine and Philosophy — old wives remedies and popular songs rearranged. 2.

What inspired the change of heart? A brief glance at Rimbaud's life will give us more than a prophetic comment on the contemporary controversy labelled "The Two Cultures." It will give us an insight into some of the most fundamental problems which confront our civilisation today. They are problems which, I believe, our Universities must take account of when they seek to define their purpose.

Rimbaud wrote his first major poem at the age of sixteen. At nineteen he abandoned literature and never returned to it. In three years, he produced the works which make him generally regarded as the greatest French poet since Baudelaire. His poems deify the irrational. He believed that the poet should be more than an artificer in words. He should be a seer. He put this doctrine into practice by leading a debauched life, seeking to derange his senses, and so tap the unconscious depths of his being. The result is a poetry of absolute rebellion — rebellion against his family, his country, and ultimately, his civilisation. Then, simultaneously, he gives up literature and flees from civilisation. He goes to Africa and becomes a man of action — an explorer, a trader, and a gun-runner. Perversely, he spends the rest of his life cultivating the values he had previously rejected. He had

despised money. He becomes a miser. He had derided Science. He sends requests for scientific instruments and tries to have a paper published in a geographic magazine. He had abused respectability. He boasts of how highly he is regarded in the community. He had been the great blasphemer. He is converted to Catholicism.

What are we to make of this series of paradoxes, contradictions, and complete reversals? One false conclusion would be to see in Rimbaud's life the final confirmation of the failure of literature and the supremacy of Science in the modern world. The truth is almost the opposite, for Science failed him just as surely as literature. There is, however, an essential unity in Rimbaud's life. All the contradictions spring from a single source. What is illustrated is a frantic search to find something which will give meaning to a life bereft of all direction. Rimbaud tried in literature, in science, in naked action, in the most crassly bourgeois morality, and, finally, in religion, to discover some value by which he might conduct his life. We may think that some of his attempts were mistaken, but we must admire his absolute dedication. He tried everything, and each time he committed himself completely. They all — with the exception of religion, which he did not have time to test — failed him. Nevertheless, Rimbaud's life remains one of the most heroic quests which anyone has ever carried out, in an endeavour to find personal fulfillment in a world bereft of any acceptable solution to the problem of life. What Albert Camus has said of the Russian nihilists is equally true of Rimbaud.

The greatest homage we can pay them is to say that we would not be able, in 1950, to ask them one question which they themselves had not already asked and which, in their life or their death, they had not partially answered. 3.

The poets, philosophers and historians of the Twentieth Century have indeed found

themselves in the same predicament, and few, if any, have come any closer to the answer. (Their diagnosis of the disease is always more impressive than their remedy.) Consider the titles of two of the most important works of our Century — *The Decline of the West* and *The Waste Land*. Many others are in agreement with Spengler and Eliot when they say that our civilisation has run itself out. Yeats symbolised it in the inexorable turning of the gyres. He prophesied a period of violence and anarchy which would issue in a civilisation the values of which would be the antitheses of those of the last two thousand years. We do not feel he was too far wrong when we remember two world wars and the emergence of totalitarianism. The moral poverty of modern life has usually been connected with the decay of religious faith. Sartre's words sum up the plight of man without God.

Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. 4.

Toynbee's exhaustive analysis of world history has confirmed that the fall of a civilisation is the result of an inner spiritual failure. External factors such as material prosperity, political strength and technological advance are no indicators of a healthy civilisation. We agree with Toynbee that it is now too late to try and resurrect Christianity. Few of us, however, can place much hope in his belief that the salvation of the West could be achieved through an amalgam of the higher religions.

The greatest art always mirrors the times in which it is produced. What is the image of man reflected in the art of the Twentieth Century? I shall only consider literature, although the corresponding tendencies can be observed in music, painting, and so on.

Firstly, we might note some general trends and characteristics — the prevalence of the semi-autobiographical novel for example. This takes us back to what I was saying about Rimbaud. The artist is unable to find, in the world about him, any ready-made system of order. Consequently, he attempts, through his art, to give pattern and meaning to his own experience. The notorious obscurity of modern poetry is another instance of the introversion of our art. The poet is retreating further and further from reality into a world of personal symbols and images. Obscurity is also a patent sign that the poet does not expect to be understood. It shows that the artist feels his experience to be either incommunicable, or even not worth communicating. There is a strong sense in the modern artist of the futility and impotency of his work. So many of Yeats' poems set up an opposition between art and life, with emphasis often being on the static, deathly, qualities of the former. He, himself, was very much aware that the contemplative life of the artist is in many ways inferior to the life of the man of action. Kafka, who has been rightly described by Auden as the most representative writer of our age, illustrates these tendencies in their most extreme form. All his work is the symbolic projection of the neurotic conflicts and anxieties of his own personality. He was ashamed that he should only be a writer and not a success in the world as his father wanted him to be. He carried the retreat into silence to its logical conclusion. He published practically nothing. Much of his work he never finished. His dying request was that everything he had written should be burned.

Despite the subjectivity of their themes and their feelings of inadequacy, the great modern writers have captured the spirit of their age. We see in their protagonists our own problems. Eliot's early poetry remains,

to a large extent, the most complete and precise portrait of modern man. Prufrock, like so many shrunken heroes after him, is terribly aware of the futility of his life. He lives in loneliness, cut off from the rest of humanity by his inability to communicate. Stephen Daedalus is another of these inhibited, insecure beings, desperately searching for some real and lasting human contact. He possesses a keen and powerful intellect but it has usurped its position and dominates his almost atrophied emotions. Kafka's heroes live in a nightmare world. Obsessed by an inexplicable guilt, they are threatened and frustrated by an inhuman society. Nowhere can they find a place for themselves, or any relief from fear and anxiety in a world indifferent to their condition. K. dies like a dog. In what is Kafka's most horrifying image, in *Metamorphosis*, man becomes a disgusting insect who must be rejected by his fellows to live and die in solitude.

Perhaps all this seems far removed from the problem of the University. You do not have to be in one long to find that there is a great distrust of all this talk of spiritual crises. The University likes objective truth. It likes facts. Its ideal is the precise, lucid statement which is strictly aware of its limitations. The University is wary of grand generalisations, particularly if they seem to be the product of introspection, and do not seem to take sufficient account of all the facts. It tends to reject any method of arriving at the truth which is different from its own. I suspect that this is partially true of universities everywhere, but it is certainly the case in Australia. What will the academics make of what I have said?

The philosophers will not respect me for quoting Sartre. Sartre's propositions, they will say, are "metaphysical." They have no content. They make no sense. The historians can easily dismiss Toynbee. His

wild hypotheses are highly objectionable. His work is not scientific and empirical. It is based on standards of entirely personal moral judgment. Even the literary critics will be embarrassed by the mention of Yeats' "philosophy." A poet's philosophy is never profound. It should never be deducted from his work and Yeats is a particularly bizarre example, in spite of which he managed to write some good poems. C. P. Snow would say on behalf of the technologists (and he probably does, in fact, represent a large proportion of them) that what I have been saying is just another instance of that unhealthy defeatism, that completely unjustified pessimism, which is so typical of "literary intellectuals."

In this way, mention of any moral crisis in civilisation can be disregarded. The conscience of the University remains untroubled; but the University cannot afford to ignore that our civilisation is in a period of trouble. We can easily show that the disease has already infected the best minds in the University. It may often seem to wish to exist in a vacuum, but it must surely come to terms with a problem once it has pierced the vacuum. I will glance at one figure who proved himself in an academic discipline, who resembles in many ways the people I have already mentioned, and whose attitude to the University suggests that there is something lacking in the way it is meeting the spiritual challenge of the times.

Ludwig Wittgenstein is considered one of, if not the outstanding philosopher of the Twentieth Century. His first achievement was to solve the problems that had arisen out of Russell's attempt to reduce mathematics to logic. There is a remarkable preface to his first book, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. He, like the artists I have mentioned, did not expect to be understood.

Perhaps this book will be understood only by

someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it - or at least similar thoughts. ⁵

Secondly, he felt that what he was doing was really of little consequence. He says that he is certain of the truth of what is stated in the books, but then,

And if I am not mistaken in this belief then the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved. ⁶

Wittgenstein's conception of the triviality of his book did not prevent Logical Positivism, the philosophical movement which was derived from it, from calmly dismissing as "metaphysical" all philosophy, past and present, except itself. This is not the only way in which the message of the *Tractatus* was distorted. The book falls into two parts. The first is concerned with solving the internal problems of logical philosophy. It is indeed trivial in the sense that it has no application whatsoever to life or reality. The philosophers have universally admired it. The second section deals with "mysticism" — that is, questions of the meaning of life, which are of the most profound importance. The philosophers, from Russell onwards, have rejected it. In this section we find some familiar themes. Man is separated from God.

6.432. How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. ⁷

He also points out the limitations of science.

6.52. We feel that when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. ⁸

This last statement is all the more amazing when we recall that Wittgenstein did not begin as a philosopher. First of all he was a qualified engineer and mathematician - a Technologist!

Wittgenstein excelled in one of the most rigorous of all intellectual disciplines - the philosophy of logic and linguistic analysis. For this the Academic world respects him, although as we have seen, it has chosen to

ignore, or is incapable of appreciating, what appear to be the most significant aspects of his work. He, himself, hated and despised the Academic world. The Academic world has not hesitated to return the compliment, for if Wittgenstein was alive today he could hear his life paraded in lectures and morning tea rooms as a list of inexplicable eccentricities — a suitable object upon which to pour ridicule.

His major eccentricity (apart from his constant threats of suicide) seems to be that he was continually giving up his position at the University to do menial work or live in seclusion. In 1913, depressed by the life of the University, he went to live on a farm in Norway. He fought in the war and then spent the next six years teaching in remote villages. During this time he appears to have lost all interest in the problems of logic. He did not return to Cambridge until 1929. He loathed the artificiality of the life. In particular, he could never understand how his fellow philosophers could content themselves with intellectual problems entirely devoid of any relevance to life. For Wittgenstein, a problem necessitated the involvement of the whole man; his emotions as well as his intellect. Whilst at Cambridge, his teaching methods were extremely unconventional. He would often interrupt himself in the middle of a lecture to berate himself on his stupidity. He forbade his students to print or circulate the notes from his lectures. When the Second World War broke out, he found his chance to leave the University. He took a job as a porter in a hospital. (This indifference to his own material benefit, combined with a desire to relieve human suffering, showed itself at other points in his life. In 1919 he gave away the considerable fortune he had inherited. He also considered the idea of taking up medicine). In 1947 he went into seclusion in Ireland. He died in 1951, leaving his final work, the *Philosophical Inves-*

tigations, unfinished. It remains a series of notes and aphorisms.

The loneliness of Wittgenstein's life is most striking. Like Rimbaud, he endured a terrible solitude. Also like Rimbaud, he could not be content with his natural genius. He was very much aware that the life of the University is, in many ways, an escape from the harsher aspects of the world, and that intellect cannot supply the whole answer to the problems of life. He has questioned some of the most fundamental assumptions of the University. After Wittgenstein, it should no longer be able to pretend that it is facing up as fully as it might to the demands of the Twentieth Century. In many ways it is turning its back on them.

The explicit and implied criticisms of our civilisation which I have introduced so far, have come from within it. For a final comment, I will turn to one who regarded the West from outside. There is a series of essays by the Indian poet, painter and philosopher, Rabindranath Tagore, collected under the title, *Towards Universal Man*. They were written over the period from 1892 to 1941. They show a progressive disillusionment with the West. In the first essays he is very sympathetic to Western values and confident that Western technology will be the salvation of his country. The last essay, written on his eightieth birthday is an indictment. All humanism has gone out of England,

Meanwhile, the spectre of a new barbarity strides over Europe, teeth bare and claws unconcealed in an orgy of terror. From one end of the Continent to the other the fumes of oppression pollute the atmosphere. The spirit of violence dormant perhaps in the psychology of the West has roused itself and is ready to desecrate the spirit of Man. ⁹

He sees in the Second World War the ultimate sign of the collapse of civilised values in Man's lust for power over other men, and to conquer nature for his material advantage.

We cannot say that things are much better in 1964. We have affluent societies and rockets to the moon, just keeping pace with alcoholism, neuroses and suicide - sure signs that even if materially we are satisfied, spiritually we are not. Politicians preach peace and prepare for war. We are, if anything, more harassed than the men I have already mentioned, and we saw that they, with the most sensitive and intelligent minds, despaired of finding any worthwhile reason for living in their civilisation. They turned back into themselves to find the values that are lacking. Some were so overwhelmed they retreated into silence. Things were so bad it was no use speaking out against them. Rimbaud thought he could beat the system by carrying it to its absurd and terrible extreme, but he, like the others, was beset by a sense of failure. Truly, we live in an age where, as Yeats has said,

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere

The ceremony of innocence is drowned.

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity. ¹⁰

It may seem that I have devoted too much space in an essay on the "Purpose of the University in Australia" to discussing the moral atmosphere of the age. I believe, however, that is has been absolutely necessary for several reasons. I believe that the first thing to be done in study of higher education is to clearly define the essential characteristics of the times. The University, like no other institution, should be fully aware of the spiritual context of its times. As I have indicated, I believe the University is failing in this. On the whole, the University refuses to admit that our civilisation is in crisis. At least it refuses to accept any genuine responsibility for trying to effect a remedy, and we may well ask ourselves from what other institution, but the University, is any rejuvenating spiritual force going to come, in a world where the

Churches have lost their power over mankind.

Later I will consider, much more fully, the ideals of, and demands on the University, and see if they exclude an attempt of this kind. However, we can note at this point that even if the University does not want to become involved, we are afraid that it must. The University is made up of people, and in particular, it is made up of young people. They are aware of, and they feel, the anxieties of their time. Nor should we imagine that all I have been saying does not apply in Australia. Australia is not the carefree land of sun-bronzed youth that the tourist brochures would like to suggest. It shares the disorder of Europe and America. We do not have to look further than the student writing at Monash for proof of this. We find the same themes of futility and despair and the same harried, frustrated protagonist I mentioned earlier. His writing is partly self-pity and self-dramatisation, and partly a literary fad, but at the core of it there is a real sense that there is something wrong with their lives and their entire society. If the University continues to remain indifferent, it will continue to have many of the same problems which plague it now. The University may not realise that practically every student who enters it is bitterly disappointed, but it is aware, for instance, that failure rates are far too high. It might discover if it went fully into the problem, that overloaded courses, difficulty in adjusting to University after school life, and so on, are not the only causes of this. It might discover that many students are not satisfied with their studies and come to consider them not worth doing. Their courses stimulate the intellect, but leave untouched the problems with which they are most deeply concerned. There is a huge gulf between their education and the realities of their lives.

So far I have tried to suggest what are the important characteristics of the spiritual nature of our times because I think the University must define its purpose in relation to them. I have suggested the University is failing to do so. The next step must be to see what the purpose of the University actually is. What are the principles of the Australian University? What are its assumptions? What are the immediate problems with which it is faced? Along what lines is planning for the future being conducted?

*

All of a sudden it seems everyone is talking about education, and in particular, higher education. Almost every day there is an article in the newspapers about it. Everyone agrees that there is a crisis in education in Australia, comparable only with the period between 1870 and 1914, when the educational system we have now took shape. This time, however, we will not have forty years to work out a solution. The problem is much more urgent.

This sense of urgency has communicated itself even to the Government. The Government realises that it can rise or fall on the issue of education. This morning, Mr. Bolte's platform for the next election was printed in the newspapers. It contains a clause promising to confer degree status on certain technical colleges. The Governments have not only thought about the problem; they have done something about it. They have appointed committees to investigate the situation and make recommendations for the future, and they are prepared to act on these recommendations.

The committees have gone into the subject very thoroughly. They have considered

all kinds of suggestions and possibilities. They have considered whether Junior and Community Colleges such as there are in America should be introduced here. They have considered whether or not fuller use should be made of University facilities. Should there be shifts of students? Should we make use of the University buildings in vacations as well as the present term periods? After looking at all these suggested solutions, they have made their recommendations. Firstly, more money must be spent on education. New universities must be built and the existing ones must be expanded. The growth of universities must be accelerated. University colleges should be set up. More students should be encouraged to take up Honours work, with a view to becoming academics. The Australian Universities' Commission has been set up to constantly review the situation and recommend how the Government's money is to be spent. We could go on for a long time, listing the proposals that have been put forward, and in many cases, realised.

What has inspired all this discussion and activity? The main reason, though not the only one, is, of course, the vast increase in the number of students that the universities have to accommodate. There is an unprecedented demand for tertiary education. The crisis of numbers is immediate, although it will have passed its peak by 1966, and after that the expansion of demand will be significantly slower.¹¹

There are, however, other factors at work and these are of more interest to us here. As one commentator has put it,

A social and educational revolution is under way, an essential feature of which is that, for the first time in our history, schooling is becoming important for a substantial section of the population as a means of vocational preparation and an avenue of social mobility.¹²

More people want to be educated, they rea-

lise that they are not going to be able to advance themselves without it. This affects education right along the line: More people are going further with their secondary education and more want to, and are eligible to go to the University. Government assistance and higher incomes combine to enable more parents to be able to afford the cost of long schooling for their children, and there is no doubt that education is now becoming necessary for social status. Many parents who received only the minimum education themselves, wish to see their children at the University, not only because they, naturally, want to give their children the best opportunities, but also because they feel it is "socially" desirable. A final factor we might note is the increase of students in science and technology.

Two reasons can be singled out for the willingness of the authorities to accommodate all the students they can. The first is that the nation can use all the graduates it can produce; the second is that it is believed that everyone has the right to as much education as is available. The motto of Australian education might well be this statement of Sir Walter Moberly's:

If industrialism and democracy are the outstanding and significant forces in the modern world, no philosophy of life or of education which gives to them only a secondary place and a subsidiary function can hope to convince.¹³

Of all the reports one reads, it is "industrialism" which is always stressed when they speak of the purpose of the University in Australia, and "democracy" is always assumed as a matter of course. Let us examine them more closely, one at a time.

We can quote no less an authority than the Prime Minister on what the fundamental aims of education are.

... to train as many students as possible in bodies of knowledge which will make them more competent to deal with the practical affairs of life. We must train and equip more

competent workers in every branch of every industry; more and better scientists and technologists; more and better administrators, engineers, doctors and lawyers; more trained and dedicated educators . . . 14.

The Prime Minister does not see this as the only task of education. He adds the wish, for instance, for,

more and more equipped and responsible electors . . . 15.

He also warns that the modern advances in applied science are not, in themselves, signs of an advancing civilisation, but merely the mechanical aids to it. I am sure he is sincere when he says that knowledge and skill can be used properly or badly, and that education should direct itself towards instilling moral responsibility. Nevertheless, the overall impression that one must get from his address is that the most urgent requirement of the universities is for graduates to enter technology and the professions. Similarly, the Murray Report, the Ramsay Report, and so on, do not fail to consider the various traditional functions of the University, but they return again and again to the necessity of satisfying the demands of industry and business. They say that the community atmosphere of the University must be preserved. They recognise the importance of personal fulfillment. They feel that,

University education has to be a preparation for a vigorous life in a free society 16.

but it cannot be denied that prime importance is attached to more practical matters. We continually come across statements such as,

The technical and specialist requirements are without doubt in themselves no less than a matter of life and death to the Nation; 17.

and,

The fortunes of the community will depend increasingly upon the excellence of scientific and technical manpower and the skill of professional men and administrators. 18.

Discussion of most of the problems of the University is viewed in this light. We must

utilise student talent, for instance, as fully as possible. We cannot afford any wastage because, ". . . human talent is a nation's most valuable asset . . ." 19. Education is regarded as an investment. We must invest as much "human capital" as possible, to ensure the future good of the community.

I have stressed this point because I want to make sure that it is accepted as a fact. Whatever our views may be on the subject, it is necessary to realise that this is the way things stand. It is not, of course, only an Australian phenomenon. The rise in material wealth and increased productivity, which demand more trained workers, is common to other highly industrialised countries. The Robbins Report makes it clear that this is the case in England; but in Australia, the growth of industry has been particularly rapid, and we might also note that this attitude towards education is very much in line with some typical Australian ideals and traditions. The Australian does not greatly appreciate that of which he cannot see the immediate practical application. He tends to regard all else as unnecessary ornament. Consequently, the community at large is likely to be most sympathetic to a philosophy of education which emphasises utility. It is a common experience to be picked up, hitch-hiking, by someone who realises you are a student. He asks you what course you are doing — you say Arts — then try to explain the difference between Art and Arts. (The average Australian is also extremely ignorant about what actually goes on in a University.) The next question will always be — what will you do when you finish? Where is all that study going to get you? What sort of a wage are you going to get? If you tell them you are not sure, or you do not care, or you value the education in itself, they will smile disbelievingly, or pityingly, and tell you about their son who

is still only an apprentice, but is already earning a reasonable "wage."

It would be foolish and completely unreal to maintain that professional education should not play a part, even a major part, in the function of the University. It is certainly true that many students would not come to the University if their studies had no relevance to the careers they were going to take up when they left. The number of students who do not feel this way is often underrated, I feel, but it remains true that many, perhaps most, do. Also, as the Robbins Report points out, the universities need not be ashamed of the part they play in vocational training. It has always been one of the traditional purposes of the University. The Faculties of the Medieval University — Theology, Medicine and Law — were all vocational. When History was introduced in the Nineteenth Century, it was because it was felt to be essential for the training of statesmen. As we will see later, the Medieval University also had something that the Modern University lacks, but the latter does not have to feel that it is betraying some ancient and venerated ideal when it allows professional training into its syllabus, even though today the emphasis is slipping more and more to technology.

However, there have been some who thought that utility should be extremely limited or even banished from the University. The classic and strongest statement of this case comes from Cardinal Newman. Newman believed that the fundamental purpose of the University was to teach people how to think. We will examine his views in more detail later, but his major concern is apparent from the following.

A habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom; what in a former discourse I have ventured to call a philosophical habit. This then I would assign as the special fruit of the edu-

cation furnished at a University as contrasted with other places of teaching or modes of teaching. 20.

University education is directed towards a certain training of the mind — the "philosophical habit" — without any attention whatsoever to its practical, vocational, applications. Knowledge is its own end. Those who have had a liberal education will indeed be able to take up any career they wish,

... and the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyse, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgement, and sharpened his mental vision, will not indeed at once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings I have referred to, or any other for which he has a taste or special talent, with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger. 21.

but he is not educated with this in view. One can easily differ with Newman's optimism in liberal education. One wonders, for instance, to what extent an Arts graduate is assisted in a business career by his period at the University. However, a major objection to anyone today holding a view such as Newman's is the tremendous expansion of knowledge that has occurred. Now there is such a huge accumulation of detail in each particular field that the aspiring engineer or chemist or lawyer must begin to become acquainted with it as soon as possible. Besides, we have seen that the Government wants more professional men and it is here expressing a genuine need in the community. It is the power of state and society which sustains the University, and the University must satisfy their requirements in this respect.

All this is not to say that we can be completely satisfied with things as they are. The University must not become a mere

factory. Professional training is just one of the University's functions, and ideally, a secondary one. It should be fundamental that,

The University is a community of scholars and students engaged in the task of seeking truth.²²

The University must not be allowed to suffer, either as a community or in its quest of pure knowledge, through the demands of industry. If it is so interfered with, we shall see that the professions themselves, and the community in general, will suffer in their turn.

We will leave this subject for the time being and turn to the democracy of Australian education.

In the first reports of the Australian Universities Commission we find,

University education in Australia today has a greater vocational and technical content than could have been envisaged by the early settlers, but the conviction persists that the advantages of higher education are the natural right of every child of ability.²³

The Ramsay Report sets it down as a basic principle that,

The community can use to advantage every person who qualifies in a university, and restrictions on entry cannot be justified on grounds of quality of students or overproduction of graduates.²⁴

There is a violent protest against the imposition of quotas. The demand for places must be met by providing university facilities. Students should not be shuttled off into other institutions. The raising of entrance standards is opposed. Democracy demands the development of every individual to his fullest capacity. The universities no longer cater for an intellectual elite, but for a broad section of the community. Once again, the principle is universal in the West, but it touches feelings particularly close to the Australian heart. Equal opportunity in education is supported in Australian traditions such as "mateship" and the hatred of privilege.

Democracy in education has not been without its opponents. One of the most violent attacks has come from Kingsley Amis, who claims (to use his own typography),

MORE will mean WORSE.²⁵

He believes that the flood of students will bring an inevitable lowering of standards. Education will have to gear itself to the lowest common denominator. The gifted will be held back by the not so gifted. A further problem will be the shortage of academic staff. Already the percentage of professors to total staff is much lower here than in Britain. To maintain the present student-staff ratio, staff numbers will be required to double between 1960 and 1966, and in fact, this ratio needs to be improved. Australia cannot hope to rely, as it has done, on recruitment from overseas. Overseas countries will need their own graduates. It may well be that lack of staff, rather than lack of finance, will curb the growth of Australian universities. One cannot help but be astounded by the apathetic attitude of the authorities, the A.U.C. in particular, to this problem. Vague suggestions are made. Staff should be attracted by higher salaries and better conditions. Honours students should be encouraged and so on. However, too often feeble expressions of wistful hope are the best they have to offer.

The Commission is confident that academic staff will do their best to meet these special difficulties, and that universities will introduce quotas only as a last resort.²⁶

Amis's gloomy prediction need not come true. However, while we recognise the right of every individual to higher education, there are some distinctions which should be made, and some warnings which should be considered to ensure that more will not mean worse.

Except in broad physical characteristics men are not uniform. They all want education, but they do not all need the same kind of education.²⁷

People have different kinds of abilities and some who come to the University would, in fact, be better suited by other institutions. Frustration and failure are usually the lot of those who make the wrong choice. This brings up the whole question of selection, and here, surely, the responsibility lies with the University itself. It must at least realise the limitations of the methods of selection it uses. The matriculation examination is not an accurate indication of how people are going to perform at the University. The University should remember that while memory, and ability to learn, may be tested, intelligence is much more difficult and some qualities such as creativity cannot be measured at all.

Democracy must also respect differences in quality as well as in kind. Facts such as the high percentage of children with superior intelligence who come from middle or upper class homes must be faced, however much the idea of privilege may be obnoxious to our temperament. Above all we must not allow what Barzun, in *The House of Intellect*, calls "philanthropy" to be confused with egalitarianism. "Philanthropy" is the attitude which, for example, shields a student from failure in case he should develop a dislike for learning. It wishes to coddle the student, protect him from criticism, and save him from the need to compete. It concentrates on getting everyone to conform to the group ideal. It emphasises adjustment to the social conventions. It is disturbed by the different, and the outstanding, and tries to reduce them to the common level. Barzun claims that at the present — at the very time when the United States is realising the deficiencies of this approach to education — the remainder of the West is taking it up.

The flood of students has caused one phenomenon which I believe to be absolutely essential to consider. The problem of the size of our universities cannot be

ignored. Obviously, it is more economic and more simple, from the point of view of organisation, to build one large university than a number of small ones. The concentration of population in the capital cities, which is a peculiarly Australian feature, also encourages this arrangement. Nevertheless, the cost to the student may be incalculable. At Monash we have been able to observe an incredible change in the community atmosphere of the University as its numbers have increased each year. At first there was complete solidarity among the students and considerable communication between the staff and students. Even now, when numbers are far below what they will eventually be, the student body has fallen apart into isolated groups. The disillusionment with the University is contributed to by the feeling of anonymity, of being confronted by an indifferent mass, that one experiences in a large university. One feels caught up in a tangle of bureaucracy, almost an impersonal machine. Students enter the University insecure, seeking guidance and encouragement. It can be one of the most valuable experiences of their lives to receive this by being able to form friendships with members of the staff. This becomes increasingly difficult as the Institution grows larger. I suppose that it is inevitable that the latter must occur, but every effort must be made to facilitate mixing between different groups of students, members of different faculties, and most of all, between the students and their teachers. Teaching must not become impersonal. As Sloman says,

The real impact of teaching comes in the small group with a close contact between a teacher and his students. . . There is no substitute for this delicate mechanism of inquiry and response, quest and discovery; no substitute for this personal contact, particularly in a big university. 28.

The University is also threatened in its

autonomy. We have seen that the nation is making great demands on it. It is a fact that it is materially dependent on the Government. There is a danger that it will be reduced to nothing more than a public utility, subject to the dictates of the state. The only responsibility to the state should be to provide the professional men that are required. Apart from this, the University must be free to govern itself and decide its own aims. It must be free to appoint its own staff, determine its curricula and standards, determine the extent and direction of its research, and so on. It should not become another branch of the Public Service. If it fails to maintain its independence, it will become incapable of carrying out its proper functions. It will suffer the loss of one of its most precious possessions — academic freedom. This must, at all costs, be preserved. The individual teacher must be permitted to express whatever social, political or religious views he may have, however unpopular they may be. Karl Jaspers has had personal experience of what happens when this freedom is taken away, and while we do not expect the same situation to occur in Australia, his words are worth keeping in mind. (We might let what has happened in the U.S.A. be a warning to us).

The state guarantees the University the right to carry on research and teaching uncontrolled by party politics or by any compulsion through political, philosophical or religious ideologies. ²⁹

If academic freedom is lost, not only intellectual progress within the University, but also the moral health of the community will be affected.

If the University does not want its autonomy and freedom to be eroded, it is the one that is going to have to do something about it. It will have to look to its own administration. The academics are not to be solely responsible for the spending of the

taxpayer's money, but they will have to take more initiative in University government. They must run themselves more flexibly and more democratically. Australian University government has been too authoritarian, and the pattern of control by the Vice-Chancellor and the professors is being followed in the new institutions. It is a notorious fact that professors in Australian universities have far too much power and responsibility. The rest of the staff should have more say in the administration of their University. The experience of the senior, and the new ideas of the younger, members, can only have a beneficial effect.

Authoritarianism is not the sole trouble. The universities are far too complacent and apathetic. Not only are the academics far from being critics of, or leaders in their societies, they are not even actively engaged in their own internal problems. We began the discussion by saying that everyone is talking, thinking and acting about education. Perhaps we should have excepted the universities. Almost all the initiative has come from the Government. The University has only itself to blame if it finds its interests pushed into the background and it is made into a tool of the state. Academics seem unwilling to criticise themselves or really try to solve the problems that face them. The Murray Report had this to say of the Vice-Chancellors' Committee (my italics).

While governments have inescapable duties in relation to the universities, it is just as important that the universities should keep clearly before their minds the consideration of those wider interests which are bound to weigh with governments.

We feel that there has been a weakness here in the past and we think that it might be remedied to a great extent by the Vice-Chancellors' Committee taking more responsibility and initiation in the formulation of a national policy for universities than it has done in the past. ³⁰

The Murray Report recommended the set-

ting up of a University Grants Committee. This body should have provided co-ordination and leadership at a national level, but in fact, it considers its role to be only a financial one. It states some problems, and makes financial recommendations, but never does it offer solutions, or attempt a full analysis of the whole problem. We have seen one instance of its dynamic approach, and its overall attitude could be summed up in these words,

Considerations of these new issues are urgent, but because of their importance acceptable solutions are likely to be found only after the most careful and detailed examination by all concerned. This will take time. ³¹

None doubts that "careful and detailed examination" is necessary (in this respect the A.U.C. reports compare very badly with the Robbins Report, for example) but this must not be used as an excuse for evading the problems. The Federal Council has, it is true, made a report, but there is little that is radically new in it. ³² One suggestion which it does make, which as far as I know has not been acted upon, is the setting up of a unit, similar to the Canadian Universities Foundation, to investigate problems connected with education. It is essential that this should be done. Professor Sloman includes in his plans for Essex — one of the new English universities — a research unit that will not only observe his university's development, but also examine more general national and international units.

We hope also that our research on ourselves may enable us to keep pace with changing needs and circumstances. We are well aware that our research unit will uncover from time to time uncomfortable, even painful facts. Self examination is never pleasant, but it can be salutary. ³³

A primary requisite of a university should be that it is continually examining itself and everything that is related to it. This examination should not be confined to immediate

problems. The University is also constantly in need of re-defining the fundamental principles on which it is based. Partridge has pointed out that some discussion of ideals is required in Australia today.

Even though we may in the end be compelled to bow to financial and other practical necessities, it is still valuable to work out in our own minds what would be the ideal alternatives: at least we remind ourselves of what it is that we are losing by yielding to circumstances. ³⁴

I have already tried to show what I believe some of the purposes of the University should be. It should cater for all those in the community who want professional training. However, we have seen, too, that other ideals of the University — autonomy, community life and the search for truth — may be threatened by this. It is time now to make clear all our highest desires for the Australian University and propose its ultimate purpose.

*

The intellect . . . the intellect . . . the intellect. *That* is what universities exist for. Everything else is secondary Even the awakening of a sense of beauty, or the life-giving shock of new experience, or the pursuit of goodness itself — all these are secondary to the cultivation, training and exercise of the intellect. ³⁵

Earlier we mentioned the limitations of intellect, and we will return to them, but for the moment we will set them aside. There is an almost universal agreement among writers on the University that one of its major tasks is to train intellect. We saw that Newman rejected vocational training on this ground. He sets forward the qualities of intellect and the aim of education in these words,

To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, eloquent expression . . . 36.

The intellect is the faculty in man which analyses and synthesises, collects data and makes generalisations, etc.

Newman is careful to say what the University does not do. It effects a permanent change on the mind but it does not have a moral effect. It does not instill virtue. It,

. . . gives no command over the passions, no influential motives, no vivifying principles. 37.

There is a popular misconception that a university training does have this effect. People are as shocked when a university professor is accused of immorality as they would be by the same charge laid against a priest. Student rags bring cries of derision about "out future leaders." Professors are no more immune to sexual desire than anyone else, and like political leaders, come from every section of the community. This is not to say, however, that the University has no role to play in the community, that it is self-contained and isolated. There is a very real sense in which academics can give leadership in problems that come within the sphere of intellect.

Jaques Barzun states that,

They (the master virtues of intellect) are, once again: concentration, continuity, articulate precision, and self awareness 38.

and he says that because these values are being taken out of our civilisation at present, intellect is of the utmost importance, and,

. . . its chief business is cultural criticism. 39.

This gives the universities which are, or should be, the strongholds of intellect, a very significant social function. Barzun analyses the forces at work against intellect in the United States, and it is quite plain that many of them are beginning to operate in Australia.

In particular, the University could pay some attention to the mass media that are more and more dominating the public mind and forming its opinions. The mass media are fast becoming the major spiritual force of our time, subtly conditioning all our values and attitudes. Barzun says of journalism,

. . . the daily writer is sure that readers respond, not to truth, but to a few of its incidentals, exposure, sentiment, jocularly, and whatever can be described by superlatives. 40.

Academics are in the position to point out the fundamental laws and principles underneath the disconnected series of reports with which the press presents us. The decay of language which is contributed to by journalism must concern the universities. Clear, precise statement is becoming more and more difficult to achieve, and without the intellect is doomed. While intellectual training does not instill moral responsibility, intellect is the instrument which can dispell confusion and combat prejudice on all kinds of moral, political and social questions. It may be true as Barzun says, that,

Rigorous reasoning could not manage a parish vestry, much less a great nation 41.

but intellect must constantly scrutinise the policies of the Government and come out against fanaticism or insincerity. It is an excellent sign to see an academic on a committee of censorship, but it is all too rare for the University in Australia to adopt such a position. The issue of Scientology is a recent and deplorable instance of the failure of the University to interest itself in community affairs, particularly when a number of students had become involved in the cult. The University is so apathetic that it stands back even when its own special sphere is encroached upon and the public is deluded with encyclopedias and "Great Books of the Western World," and so on. One of the functions of the University should be to maintain the intellectual standards

and integrity of the community, and in Australia we are certainly failing.

As well as teaching and training intellects, the University must engage in research. Some have not agreed. Once again we can quote Newman for the strongest dissension,

To discover and to teach are two distinct functions; they are also distinct gifts and are not commonly found united in the same person. 42.

He recommends separate Academies and Universities. There is some truth in what he says. New discoveries may require long periods of solitude without the burden of teaching, and there could be no objection to some separate research institutes, if they are in some way associated with a University. However, in general, I think research and teaching should be combined in the one institution. The advance of knowledge requires an atmosphere of exchange of ideas. Teaching stimulates research, and is, in its turn, sustained by research. The student should also be brought into contact with the spirit of enquiry. We mentioned earlier that the professions must not be allowed to swamp the other functions of the University. They are dependent on the discovery of new knowledge for their advance and vitality. Research also permits the University to collaborate with industry. The University must be careful, however, that it does not allow its research to be dictated by either the Government or Industry because it receives financial support from them. Nor should research in the humanities be disregarded because scientific knowledge has more direct practical application. Finally, teaching must not suffer at the expense of research. Research should not, for example, be the only, or even the prime consideration in selecting and promoting staff. Teaching and research are, as Newman says, distinct functions, although I feel they are intrinsically connected. We must not leave the situation where research

is carried out, not from love of knowledge, but from hope of advancement. The result will be lifeless triviality, pendency, an accumulation of useless, uninspired detail, which as we will now see is the last thing we can afford.

Rapidly expanding knowledge competes with expanding numbers as one of the chief problems the University has to overcome. The expansion is occurring in two directions. Firstly, new knowledge is piling up in the established disciplines. Secondly, new disciplines are being established. The first is causing overloaded and congested curricula. It also necessitates large departments. Ortega has suggested the present conglomeration, this "fabulous profusion of studies . . ." 43, should be subjected to two tests: what is strictly necessary for life and what the student can learn with thoroughness and understanding. Also, while the professions depend on the advance of pure knowledge, they can often be overburdened with detail that is not necessary to them. Curricula should be cut down to what is absolutely essential. On the other hand, new disciplines need to be encouraged. They are often most eagerly sought by students because they have the most relevance to their own lives and contemporary problems. Consider how popular Sociology and Anthropology have been at Monash. Universities could co-operate to relieve the strain by making sure that they do not unnecessarily duplicate courses amongst themselves.

The expansion of knowledge intensifies specialisation. This is one of the great problems of our age and is leading us back to the issues with which I began the essay. As Jaspar says,

Could it be that there is some connection between the growing emptiness of modern life and this growth of diverse specialised schools? 44.

Certainly, within the University itself, faculties grow further apart, and even departments within faculties lack cohesion with

one another. This separateness is bolstered up by the use of pedantic jargon. The disciplines become more isolated.

People who know one branch of learning think that all knowledge conforms to their particular brand and they tend to denigrate other disciplines.

What is urgently required is a reunification of knowledge, for as Jasper says,

The essence of the University is concerted yet unregimented activity, a life of diversity yet inspired by the ideal of wholeness, the co-operation yet independence of many disciplines. 45.

All branches of learning must be reintegrated within the University. We must once again emphasise the fundamental unity of human knowledge. The problem is not confined to the universities. Civilisation is crumbling and flying apart in fragments. Earlier we saw so many figures unable to find a place for themselves, unsure of the part they were playing in the whole context of human life, and obsessed by the feeling that they were cut off and unable to communicate with their fellows. The University can here take the lead in coming to grips with the spiritual crisis in their time, by seeking to give coherence to life and knowledge.

Although specialisation has occurred within the humanities and within the sciences, the most spectacular division has been between the two main branches. Thinkers have been aware of this for some time but it has most recently been discussed under the heading of the Two Cultures. The controversy began when C.P. Snow's *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* was followed by Leavis's *Two Cultures: The Significance of C.P. Snow*. It is not an impressive controversy. It does not give one great faith in men of intellect. Snow's lecture is vulgar and sloppily thought out, as Leavis says, but the latter's own contribution is written so spitefully and is such an obvious example of a man locked up in his own discipline and unable to think very

seriously beyond it, that it is scarcely more impressive. The people who followed them are even less worthy of attention. Abuse, not argument, is the main feature of their writing. Boothby's comment on Leavis was typical. He described him as "... spewing out the reptilian venom ..." 46. It is a depressing affair and makes us wonder about the supposed "intellects" amongst us.

Snow states,

I believe the intellectual life of the whole of Western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups. 47.

On one hand we have the scientists and technologists, on the other the "literary intellectuals." They regard themselves with hostility and incomprehension. Snow's ostensible purpose is to call for a reunification of the two groups. He cites himself as a living example of the possibility of this. In fact, his purpose is quite different. He wants to attack the "literary intellectuals" for their failure to assimilate science. He wants to show they are selfish and pessimistic, while the scientists are practical, optimistic and humanistic. The scientists have "the future in their bones." 48. The "literary intellectuals" made no attempt to understand the Industrial Revolution and they are not trying to understand the Scientific Revolution. While they bewail the tragedy of their individual fates, the scientist has hope in social progress. The latter is improving material conditions, and, if given the opportunity, has the ability to transform the underdeveloped countries. Snow's hopes for the underdeveloped countries are admirable, but they are expressed with incredible vulgarity and equate material well-being with human fulfillment.

Yet they (the Russians and Chinese) have proved that common man can show astonishing fortitude in chasing jam tomorrow. Jam today, and men aren't at their most exciting: jam tomorrow, and one often sees them at their noblest. 49.

"Jam" we have seen is no guarantee of personal happiness or fulfillment.

The danger that Snow ignores is that the "literary", "traditional" culture will die out, overrun by technology and materialism. Leavis points out that it is the imaginative writers who question the ultimate values of life, and infuse civilisation with life. We have seen that at the moment the best minds are being overwhelmed. This has disastrous results for civilisation. Technology is not an end, it is only a means; it is limited. If its source of values, the humanistic studies, dies or is debased, science will suffer. Snow's glowing description of the confident scientist is not accurate. Science students at this university, anyway, suffer from the same aimlessness, the same feelings of futility, as Arts students. The former have the knowledge but lack the moral sense of how it may be usefully applied.

Neither side must be neglected. We must achieve a synthesis and manufacture a culture — culture in Ortega's sense which, "... is the vital system of ideas of a period."⁵⁰ The transmission of culture is exactly what the University is not doing at the moment. We saw that in the Middle Ages the University was vocational, but, as well, it passed general culture on to its students and the community as a whole.

It ("general culture" in the Middle Ages) was not an ornament for the mind or a training of character. It was, on the contrary, a system of ideas concerning the world and humanity, which the man of that time possessed. It was, consequently, the repertory of convictions which became the effective guide of his existence.⁵¹

We have seen that precisely what we need today is a guide to existence. Religion and the traditional morality have collapsed. The world seems formless and even hostile. The University has it in its power to assist in the regeneration of civilisation.

Life is a chaos, a tangled and confused jungle in which man is lost. But his mind reacts against the sensation of bewilderment: he labours to find "roads", "ways", through the woods, in the form of firm clear ideas concerning the universe, positive convictions

about the nature of things. . . . Culture is what saves human life from being a mere disaster; it is what enables man to live a life which is something above meaningless tragedy or inward disgrace.⁵²

How well "tangled", "confused", "inward disgrace", "meaningless tragedy" sum up the lives of those I studied earlier. The University has the beginning of the solution.


The University is conservative. It does not like change. It is suspicious of what is new or what is different to its way of thinking. This is particularly true of the Australian University. Now we are asking it to do something new. We have seen that its purposes are to be of service to the community by training professional men, accompanied by intellectual training and the enquiry after truth. We have seen that in a sense it lacks purpose. It is loath to criticise itself or to play an active part in the community. The Australian University has high academic standards, but it seems unable, or unwilling, to apply intellect. This is because it has no driving, animating, moral force behind it. Australian students are dissatisfied with their universities because they do nothing more than train their intellects. Partly this is because of the growing impersonality of the University. Newman's words are relevant here,

A University is, according to the usual designation, an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint or a treadmill.⁵³

Mostly it is because the Australian University has no sense of the major spiritual problems of the world, or of its position in the world. Intellect cannot supply this. It is the instrument that will be used when this is realised. The Australian University is too far from life. If it is to become the major force that it should be, it must be aware that,

. . . it needs contact, likewise, with the public life, with historical reality, with the present . . . The University must be open to the whole reality of its time. It must be in the midst of real life and saturated with it.⁵⁴

1. Quoted in *Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Verlaine*, ed. Joseph M. Bernstein. (U.S.A., 1962.) P. xxi.
2. Ibid. "A Season in Hell," Trns. Louise Varese. P. 175.
3. Albert Camus. *The Rebel*. Trns. Anthony Bower. (London, 1959.) P. 138.
4. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufmann. (U.S.A., 1959.) P. 295.
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Trns. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. (London, 1961.) P. 3.
6. Ibid. P. 5.
7. Ibid. P. 149.
8. Ibid.
9. Rabindranath Tagore. *Towards Universal Man*. (London, 1961.) P. 358.
10. William Butler Yeats. *The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats*. (London, 1955.) P. 211.
11. See, for example, the table in the *Second Report of the Australian Universities Commission*. P. 33.
12. A. Barcan, "The Educational Revolution," in *Meanjin* No. 3, 1962.
13. W. Moberly. *The Crisis in the University*. (S.C.M., 1949.) P. 98.
14. R. G. Menzies, "The Challenge to Education," in *The Challenge to Australian Education*. (Australia, 1961) PP. 11-12.
15. Ibid. P. 12.
16. *Report of the Committee on Australian Universities*. (Australia, 1957.) P. 9.
17. Ibid. P. 8.
18. Op. Cit. A.U.C. Second Report. P. 34.
19. Ibid. P. 32.
20. John Henry Cardinal Newman. *The Idea of a University*. (New York, 1959.) P. 129.
21. Ibid. PP. 181-182.
22. K. Jaspers. *The Idea of the University*. (London, 1960). P. 19.
23. *Report of the Australian Universities Commission*. (Australia, 1960.) P. 1.
24. *The Development of Tertiary Education in Victoria*. (Australia, 1962.) P. 1.
25. Kingsley Amis, "Lone Voices," in *Encounter*. (July, 1960.)
26. Op. Cit. A.U.C. Second Report, in the foreword to the Prime Minister.
27. Op. Cit. Menzies. P. 4.
28. A. E. Sloman, "A University in the Making" — III. *The Listener*. (November 28, 1963.)
29. Op. Cit. Jaspers. P. 141.
30. Op. Cit. Murray Report. P. 124.
31. Op. Cit. A.U.C., in the foreword to the Prime Minister.
32. "Report on the Future of Tertiary Education" in *Vestee*. (June, 1962.)
33. Op. Cit. Sloman in *The Listener*. (December 19, 1963.)
34. P. H. Partridge. "The University System," in *Melbourne Studies in Education*, ed. E. T. French. (Australia, 1962.) P. 55.
35. N. Annan. "The Universities" in *Encounter*. (June, 1960.) P. 7.
36. Op. Cit. Newman. P. 146.
37. Ibid. P. 144.
38. Op. Cit. Barzun. P. 261.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid. P. 44.
41. Ibid. P. 149.
42. Op. Cit. Newman. P. 10.
43. Jose Ortega-Y Gasset. *Mission of the University*. Trns. H. L. Nostrand. (U.S.A., 1944.) P. 63.
44. Op. Cit. Jaspers. P. 104.
45. Ibid. P. 97.
46. Lord Boothby in *Spectator*. (March 16, 1962.)
47. C. P. Snow. *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. (C.U.P., 1961.) P. 3.
48. Ibid. P. 10.
49. Ibid. P. 41.
50. Op. Cit. Ortega. P. 57.
51. Ibid. P. 56.
52. Ibid.
53. Op. Cit. Newmann. P. 165.
54. Op. Cit. Ortega. P. 96.



Orson Welles' "Mr. Arkadin" (1962) is considered his worst film by most English critics, his best

film by many French critics. All agree, however, that Welles has an unmistakable genius for the

film medium. "Citizen Kane" represented Welles' debut as a director. It is universally admired.

ken mogg dissects

CITIZEN KANE

Orson Welles' **CITIZEN KANE** had its premiere in New York, on Thursday, May 1st, 1941. Its release date had been set back by several months while press-baron William Randolph Hearst — to whom Kane was rumoured to bear a close resemblance — fought unsuccessfully to have the film shelved or destroyed. Actually, **KANE** tells us as much about Welles as it does about either Hearst or Kane himself. Moreover, Welles portrayed Kane with all the bountiful sympathy he could muster. This was a deliberate thing on Welles' part ¹, but it was a natural consequence of his immediate grasp of the visual medium . . .

The resonance and imprecision of the visuals — through which a film nevertheless communicates most forcibly — make it im-

perative for the director to set up some readily apprehensible frame of reference to which the viewer may relate his responses. Structurally, this may best be done by integrating the action with a *single* dynamic conception which is at no time veiled by the complexities of the plot. (Indeed, it has been argued that "pure cinema" involves the negation of any traditional kind of plot — which would doubtless make E. M. Forster very happy). A conception which is *not* dynamic, i.e., one not continuously reaffirmed and omnipresent in the film's evolving action, will tend to result in an uncinematic treatment ². Olivier's **HAMLET** is a case in point. "The tragedy of a man who could not make up his mind," though the film's sole embracing conception, is one unrealiz-

able until the last reel. Certainly there are intimations of impending tragedy in each purpose/passion/perception unit of HAMLET's classical structure, but intimations are not affirmations and are not continuous. In any case, the full meaning and significance of what is intimated still cannot emerge until Hamlet's death. Olivier's film, lacking a tangible frame of overall reference, is unable to meaningfully integrate its visuals with the vagaries of the action. The settings are reduced to mere expressionist reinforcements of the poetry, though even here there is conflict.³

But CITIZEN KANE also is the tragedy of a man's life. (John Cutts quotes one gushing partisan: "Don't you see, it's the screen's 'Hamlet'. It's a search for identity" 4.). Fortunately, Welles' cinematic sense stood him in good stead. Not only does CITIZEN KANE begin with Kane's death, thus permeating the ensuing flash-backs of his life with precisely that concreteness of perspective which Olivier's film lacks, but it is given a single, continuing and dynamic conception in the reporter's search for the meaning of Kane's last word, "Rosebud." Like a Hitchcock "magguffin"⁵, the Rosebud motif symbolises a quest, in this case a quest for the meaning of a man's life. The motif's continuous presence virtually forces us to seek the solution of the quest in each and every episode of the film. Simultaneously, we will tend to identify ourselves with Kane himself, for in our own reactions to each scene may be found the clue to Kane's own. Which is why Welles' sympathetic depiction of Kane, and his grasp of the cinematic medium, go together. The single dynamic conception of CITIZEN KANE is centred upon one man with whom we become increasingly intimate and involved. And such a familiarity breeds not contempt but sympathy (though moral reprehension is, of course, another matter).

KANE is far from being purely subjective in the sense that we see only what Kane

1. Welles has said, "I must make any character I play as sympathetic as possible."

2. Something like this may have been in Hitchcock's mind when he said, "The chase seems to me the final expression of the motion picture medium."

3. Dr. Kracauer writes on HAMLET: "The spectator's capacity being limited, the photographic images and the language images inevitably neutralize each other; like Buridan's ass, he does not know what to feed upon and eventually gets starved. HAMLET is a remarkable, if quixotic, effort to instill cinematic life into an outspoken dialogue film. But you cannot eat your cake and have it."

See Kracauer's "Theory of Film" (New York, 1960), pp. 105-106.

4. Cutts's article, in "Films & Filming", December, 1963, is typical of much English film criticism because so completely superficial about visual structure and cinematic language. Referring to the effectiveness of a particular scene in "deep-focus," he says admiringly, "Everything that is essential can be seen clearly." Which is to judge a book by its cover alone.

In fact, Welles uses the deep-focus to make significant dramatic points. Deep-focus delighted Andre Bazin for its simultaneous juxtaposition of objects and events to provide a one-shot montage (i.e., to show a relationship without the need for cutting), and Welles employs a similar technique on several occasions where a cut would actually destroy such a relationship. Kane is repeatedly entering upon some scene whose "feel" is thereby changed, usually to one of heightened intensity. Even in long-shot Kane's power makes itself felt, but the viewer's increased detachment and objectivity provide him with a means of judging the use of that power.

5. A typical "magguffin" of Hitchcock's English period was a missing joint of a man's little finger. Today, however, the device is far more carefully integrated into the structure of the film. Since VERTIGO (1958) the "magguffin" has been an aural/visual motif introduced in the film's credits sequence and later re-introduced as a counterpoint at significant moments. It is no accident that one reviewer of THE BIRDS has written: "Hitch's new film is his most abstract yet most tangible, since it communicates direct in an almost musical manner."

6. Which is a major reason why THE CABINET OF DOCTOR CALIGARI is so unconvincing. This idea of audience omniscience has important implications for the nature of

sees. On the contrary, audience omniscience is perhaps the sole means by which a film's dynamic conception can be realised⁶, and throughout *CITIZEN KANE* the audience is made aware of things that at the time Kane himself could not have known. Whilst being another reason for that compassionate sympathy which the picture generates so strongly, it also enables us to judge Kane's actions in the light of their ultimate consequences. (The breathtaking newsreel segment near the beginning of the film is something more than a clever "March of Time" pastiche; it represents the sum bequest to posterity — a shadowy legend and a gloomy palace — of this man who bid fair to become President of the United States).

Films such as *CITIZEN KANE*, *L'ATALANTE*, *UGETSU MONOGATARI* and *THE BIRDS* all have in common this element of audience omniscience, carefully integrated with a single, pronounced and dynamic conception which serves as a touchstone for our otherwise disembodied responses. In *CITIZEN KANE* our awareness of the brittleness of the Kane legend renders ironic the search for the meaning of his life. In *L'ATALANTE* the barge representing commitment to a pre-ordained course (or cause)⁷ is stressed, and lends a moral perspective and a certain sadness to the film's dynamic conception of the lovers' search for fulfillment. Similarly, *UGETSU MONOGATARI* establishes its characters' coexistence with the landscape⁸, and then employs this viewpoint as a mark of disapprobation integrated with the dynamic conception of the brothers' illusory aspirations beyond their village.

Such films acknowledge the primacy of the visuals and the fleetingness of isolated impressions. They leave the viewer with a coherent *pattern*, comprising and embodying these separate impressions, and tend to communicate ultimately by a process of extension and suggestion. But as well as the

parts supporting the whole, the whole helps to give meaning to the parts.

The pattern of *CITIZEN KANE* is that of a man's life, a man's undisciplined pursuit of his own self-satisfaction and power. Never less than a child, with all a child's perversity, wilfulness and sentimentality, Kane treated life as a game because it had never been presented to him as being otherwise. "If I hadn't been very rich, I might have been a really great man" observed Kane during a moment of rare insight occasioned by the Depression. It was the

cinematic expression and its characters. The maturity of Howard Hawks, for instance, may still result in his characters appearing immature (see "New Left Review," March/April, 1964). Hitchcock has said "actors are cattle." And Kracauer writes: "... Louis Delluc tried to put the medium on its own feet by stressing the tremendous importance of objects. If they are assigned the role due to them, he argued, the actor too 'is no more than a detail, a fragment of the matter of the world.'"

7. *L'ATALANTE* opens with a shot of the barge at its mooring, but the passing of another barge in the background suggests that the "Atalante" must itself be soon moving. A long-shot now reinforces this impression: in the upper half of the frame is the passing barge whose white smoke almost obscures the "Atalante" in the lower half. A third shot — of a church spire — introduces into this context the theme of the lovers' marriage as a commitment.

8. *UGETSU* opens on a shot of fields, the soil, the life source. The camera then pans slowly to the left, past a mass of vegetation, and in the heart of this vital landscape discovers the village. However, it keeps on panning past Genjuro and his wife preparing their cart for the approaching journey, and does not come to rest until husband and wife are located in the right of the frame. The effect is to reduce the characters to the status of objects in the general scene. Paul Mayersberg writes: "... Mizoguchi's heroes coexist with inanimate nature. When looking at a Mizoguchi film one gets the feeling of his characters being integrated with the landscape. In his medieval films, the Japanese feudal system acts as an objective correlative to the moral hierarchy in Mizoguchi's impartial view; everybody has a place on earth. The elements of Mizoguchi's universe are separate and in harmony."

closest to reality he ever came. And reality extracted a bitter revenge. Having outlived his power to make history, "alone in his never-finished, already decaying pleasure palace," Kane became a prisoner of his own self-centredness.

The "enthraling ambiguity" of KANE is such that even the above broad outline requires qualification. Had Kane actually succeeded in becoming Governor, his public role might then have overridden his lack of personal sufficiency. Instead, his affair with Susan Alexander, which evokes the most tender scene in the film, brings about his downfall and "sets back for twenty years the cause of reform in the U.S." One cannot begin to analyse Welles' film without encountering a succession of paradoxes, ironies and ambiguities. But a character's decision, once taken, has irrevocable consequences. Doorways play an inordinate part in Welles' film because their mocking permanence defines without compromise — though ultimately with the nostalgia of a snapshot — the passage of multifarious, irreversible destinies. (Which sounds rather wordy — when expressed in *words*).

George Orwell's essay "Why I Write" lists several motives for an author's choosing to follow his particular vocation. His analysis of "sheer egoism" — "the desire to seem clever, to be talked about, to be remembered after death, to get your own back on grown-ups who snubbed you in childhood, etc., etc." — seems closely to resemble Kane's own unbridled wilfulness:

Thatcher: "What would you like to have been?"

Kane: "Everything you hate."

And, of course, the idea of wanting to be remembered after death, and the almost tragic sense "of the impermanence of all that appears solid and substantial, and of the evanescence of all that is beautiful" — this is the single most important Wellsian theme. In CITIZEN KANE brightness is continually fading, lights are continually

going out. Even as Kane says, "I've got to make the New York 'Inquirer' as important to New York as the gas in that light," he reaches across and switches it off.

"The great mass of human beings", continues Orwell, "are not acutely selfish. After the age of about thirty they abandon individual ambition — in many cases, indeed, they almost abandon the sense of being individuals at all — and live chiefly for others, or are simply smothered under drudgery." Here again are certain obvious resemblances to the pattern of Kane's own life. For instance, it is clear that Susan Alexander — whom he once called "a cross-section of the American public" — becomes in Kane's hands something of a scapegoat; a scapegoat in place of his lost public, and a means of wreaking upon that public a manifestly unreal revenge⁹. A disastrous Susan Alexander concert concludes with Kane's trying to rouse the audience to a further sporadic round of applause; finally, in the rapidly-emptying theatre, his forced hand-clapping is the only sound to be heard. The contrast is obvious: clearly Kane is now fighting his audience where once he took his cue from its demands. At that memorable electioneering rally in Madison Square Garden — with its long tracking shot propelling us down the vast hall towards Kane's diminutive figure, and speaking to us quite literally of his "arrival" — a perfect empathy clearly united speaker and audience. Each fresh point in his speech being generated by the applause for the last, Kane adroitly swayed his listeners with thrust upon thrust directed against racketeer Boss Jim Geddes. As a Kane scapegoat, Geddes differs from Susan Alexander to the extent that he serves as an objective correlative of what the public wants and what Kane wants.

By the same token, the term "objective correlative" implies a desire to communicate, a "desire to push the world in a certain direction." Kane's "political purpose"

(being Orwell's all-embracing term for this desire) manifests itself in Geddes' case as a promise to "protect the underprivileged, the underpaid and the underfed." But when Kane's best friend, Jed. Leland, later tells him, "You just want to persuade people that you love 'em so much that they ought to love you back," the rationalization is already too apparent. Susan Alexander is no less a rationalization, though of an unreal (or unrealizable), more blindly egotistical desire.

"Looking back through my work," Orwell concludes his essay, "I see that it is invariably where I lacked a *political* purpose that I wrote lifeless books and was betrayed into purple passages, sentences without meaning, decorative adjectives and humbug generally." The analogy of Orwell's "purple passages" to Kane's grotesquely unreal Xanadu is an inviting one. For both are products of a languished concern for "the outside world," that sense of involvement with it, which is necessary to sustain the fertile mind. All those statues and jigsaw puzzles cluttering the Kane mansion are manifestations of a decadent, purely self-rewarding preoccupation — meaningless, though virtually uncircumscribed within its own dimension. Thus *CITIZEN KANE* defines "reality" in terms of society: to the extent that our thoughts and actions confirm and reinforce our bond to society they acquire meaning and, in that sense, reality. Conversely, whenever we retreat behind a sign marked "No Trespassing," our lives become as meaningless as an empty book. By creating his own private "reality," Kane was hoping to tell society what he had already remarked on another occasion: "I knew you'd see it my way." Instead, inevitably, his defeat is a crushing one. Kane's final exit, between the marshalled ranks of his servants, his stricken figure reflected and re-reflected in a chain of mirror images, is indeed tragedy.

The validity of *KANE*'s thesis is borne

out by its own enthralling realism. The relationship of film and audience being parallel to that of individual and society, our omniscience is the principal means of rendering Kane a three-dimensional figure. Actually our only completely objective view of Kane is the single shot of his lips whispering his dying word "Rosebud"¹⁰, and the ensuing flash-backs of his life are subjective to the extent that they represent the differing viewpoints of people who knew him, but because it is Kane with whom we are always mostly concerned these viewpoints appear as a more-or-less objective and integrated means of getting to grips with the meaning of Kane's life, which is the film's dynamic conception. Again we are reminded of Orwell, whose feeling of involvement with society and his concern for it — his fly-paper approach — can serve him equally well as a critical tool for analysing the works of Dickens or as a moral standpoint from which to criticise the supporters of Salvador Dali who want an artist "to be exempt from the moral laws that are binding on ordinary people." *KANE*, then, is a work whose realism springs from its acknowledgement of its audience, and whose meaning emerges the further it succeeds in implicating us.

Dr. Manvell's essay on *CITIZEN KANE* defines expressionism as "the use of symbolic forms of presentation to underline the universal significance of a theme"¹¹. *KANE*, unlike, Olivier's *HAMLET*, employs the expressionism of its visuals to add a

9. Welles comments explicitly in the scene where Kane and Susan Alexander quarrel in their tent at the Everglades picnic. A negro singer croons off-screen: "It can't be love, for there is no true love . . ."

10. Arguably, it is the most subjective: no moral detachment interposes itself between the "feel" of the shot and our response to it. Subjectivity is certainly the keynote of the birth/death image which follows: the death room, shot through the snow-filled paperweight lying on the floor.

whole new dimension to its dramatic form: it does not merely reinforce the symbolic meaning of plot and dialogue. For example, there is nothing in the dialogue to suggest that our lives are buoyed up solely by an illusion, nothing to suggest that moth-like pursuit of a light's illusory fulfillment which yet emerges so strongly from the film (whose visuals are constructed almost entirely upon a dialectic of white and black, affirmation and rebuttal). There is a strong undertone of sexual innuendo throughout the film, beginning with that title in the newsreel, "IN POLITICS, ALWAYS A BRIDESMAID, NEVER A BRIDE," and the word "Rosebud" itself. It would perhaps be too much to suggest that Kane's regimentation into long, straight ranks of his friends and audiences, over whom he then asserts his dominance, and the ever-recurring presence of unwavering forward tracking shots (notably the one above the heads of the audience in Madison Square Garden, and the final track into the re-reflecting mirrors in Kane's mansion) are deliberately conceived as phallic images, yet their immediate excitement asserts itself in a near-erotic way.

Mirror images recur not only physically but also conceptually. Kane's best friend, Jed. Leland, the only character in the film apart from Kane with whom the audience is ever invited to identify, is in some ways the mirror-image of Kane himself. Their upbringings are the exact reverse of each other¹², their characters diametrically opposed, but their lives follow a closely parallel course. If Kane never prepares for the "rainy day" which quite literally comes, and dies without friends, Leland is last seen in the impersonal surroundings of an Old People's Home being led off into shadow by two white-coated nurses. Kane was deserted by society, Leland by Kane. Leland's words to Kane, "You want love on your own terms," are clearly ironic.

Welles has been called, in a non-pejorative sense, the Great Distorter. But in CITI-

ZEN KANE, at least, this distortion is really only a magnification of a psychological reality. Welles magnifies reality to make it more real. Similarly, one of Welles' most basic themes is that all men are not equal *except* as men, though some are more unequal than others; moreover, positions of power have a way of magnifying this inequality for their own ends. His latest film, a version of Kafka's "The Trial", serves to confirm Welles' obsession with this magnification process. His characters seek to so magnify the importance of their otherwise circumscribed actions that they "tend to infinity," and thus to a state of permanence. However, if KANE has aptly been described as "a movie made in pursuit of a dream," the mature Welles is today psycho-analysing that dream. Which is probably why his recent work is so misunderstood in the "non-metaphysical", English-speaking world. True to form, Welles has deserted the "insularity" of America for the "society" of Europe.

11. It is time a critical distinction was drawn between "symbols" and "forms" in the cinema. The former are literary rather than cinematic, or at least should be. Bergman is uncinematic to the extent that he is a symbolist; the appreciation of his deeper meanings requires the contraction of our sensibility in favour of some abstract, intellectualized concept of parallel ideas or connotations. But Murnau, Eisenstein, Hitchcock are among the cinema's "greats" precisely because their meanings emerge naturally from their *mise en scène*. Welles, too, is included in the latter category. Think of his use of windows and doorways in CITIZEN KANE. Charles Barr refers to "Welles' extremely subtle handling of the Rosebud/snowglass paperweight imagery, which he often leaves naturally in the background of the shot for us to notice, and to make the connections."

12. Kane was raised in poverty, but inherited a fortune after a defaulting boarder of his mother's left her a supposedly worthless deed which later proved valuable; Leland's once wealthy father shocked his family when he died bankrupt.



5

poems

by john ritchie

the kite

I Mother

I cried to you from the train shunted in steam
but your face was hidden
in the dusk
And the pane was smattered with wet.
Nothing but the wave of the snivelling child who weeps
and the strife of the winds
hurling the dead leaves to the rain and the dawn.

II Nor home nor love

but that which wears the cloak
of lust, propped against a wall
Where sun and moon are one without end
And I am bound with fate
as some boat set adrift
upon the salt waste of the stars.

III Ever

this self-inflicted doubt
which sets me out of doors
to peer in, as through some glass,
at voices singing in a church,
at some poor father, caught by Time,
gravely witnessing his son's first steps.
Then, the screech of a dying kite
above the wildness of the desert
stops my dreams from choking
from fainting in contentment.
Poor twitching kite,
devoted to a fame that proved a dream,
be still.

IV Winter wears a lyrical mask

shattered by the Spring
which makes me hear the leaves
cracking the crust of earth's stiffened
left-to-die branches,
and see the brown rivers where the fish run
and feel the sunlight in Linda's hair.
Life is a baroque caravan.
moving as do gypsies.

asylum

- I "So I tell you, Charles, since you are the one
Who alone continues, through love, to come
Each Wednesday to this hell beyond grace
Of thinking men. You see, that was no place
Of buckets, spades and kids in tribes burning
Happily, of dogs and mothers paddling;
For mine was a beach with shadows shouting
Failure, its sky thundrous with the squarking
Of gulls and their drumming wings. Such weather's
Meant for mooching! What with moulted feathers,
Bones, moss-lined seaweed, and a land tormented
By wind and time, whatever prevented
Me ending it there God only knows. And
Have vanished like my footprints from the sand.
- II In a moment, bewildered and clumsy,
Without plan, unrehearsed, Time brought her me.
Where the dead blinded branches feel down for
The upreaching grass. Arranged high, she bore
Her chestnut sisal hair with unstartled
Bearing. She glanced up. Far off the bell tolled
Three; and, as she turned her head, the wind played
With the innocent knowledge she carried
In her smile. All this I noticed coldly,
Charles, coldly. Her sad Graecian eyes held me
Drowning, her claret-lipped mouth laughingly
Taunted me. Beneath her dress, grey and high-
Necked, she waited without guilt. We each
Gave our nakedness on the blistered beach.
- III Time took her. In seventeen months she may
Return to avoid me. You know the way
These things happen — I'd be slurched, fingering
Dirty love in pool-spilt beer. I'd bring
Her nothing. Faded love dries. Hear the calling
Of the Kite? Listen! His wings unmoving.
He rides the humming wind. He is my friend,
Though he comes to taunt me. Baying, I send
Him love by pressing myself to the bars
Of this window and weeping for the stars
I can never reach. Enough! There's the bell
which means it's time for you to leave. Farewell."

the kneeling conqueror

Is it then wrong to hope to soar
Master this world which is but clay?
If I deny him the virgin bore
With weeping, and beheld nailed to lay
Against a storm, let the footprints I wore
Wither, that grass blades may
Conquer me. Dressed a knight by law
I am by truth a slave confessed. On their day
Old men know wisdom is to rise
Through suffering. Bowed is the head
In quiet peace now come to pass.
The last flame and flickering cries
Knit the living and the dead
Like whispers in still glass.

come time

Night and beyond: God's image fades and pales
Before the girl propped against a wall,
Beneath a sky set throbbing by a bell.

Still would that note of love die
and rain wet its grave
grey as autumn's sombre.

I. "Well, Polonius! *You* introduced the fawn to me in a moment of weakness.

We allowed ourselves to smile at her startled eyes
and her frail diaphanous figure, remember,
was awkward before our ladies of court.

And I, so often surrounded by the heavy, brooding scent
of roses,

found her reed like throat —

I confess — attractive.

Before the yellow jonquils had bowed their heads,
our deeds, which I chose to veil in the dun of evening,
became the subject of confiding tales
whispered by the rain to the leaves."

II "It passed, you must be aware,
without hurting me.

I have grown used to these episodes.

Though, on this morning's walk, before I came upon you
in the grey windy dawn

I found myself looking with callous wonder
or dull heart of stone

at the tress of golden hair

I had once, so madly, kissed."

III "And dreaming, I turned from what is,

I looked through the glass

and entered the clouded world of what cannot be.

Do you know, Polonius,

above the matted autumn's fallen leaves

the oak by my window entwines its withered branches
like the fingers of her prayers?

Father, I have seen the fantastic shadows of birds in flight

And, trembling, I beheld a lost pair of kites,

hurrying into the symphonic richness of a still sky
towards heaven."

The sun, oh see, a burnished coin in a sky afire. Gentle-hinted in the west, the cool of dusk; and waters glistening in the east with a dance of flame and night. Flowers cupped and rich in perfume, long-tusked grass a-sighing twilight. And oh, the minarets. Gilden lightness, lapis campaniles, turrets floating in the haze of rested fragrance.

The steed, then, black from the darkling hills to westward; his rider argent, touched with fire. Weary with the day's hard travelling, knight and beast, yet brave with the vision of the minarets. Oh look, for the moving sun has painted Petra, the rose-red city half as old as time. And now, the sky a pale glass and the haze a dust of powdered-blue, Xanadu, or Damascus on the dragon-green, the luminous, the dark, the serpent-haunted sea.

Oh gaze: this world of dreams, of vast deeds done and told; of glimpses snatched and scarcely held; of redes unheard and shadowed forces grim, and mighty men whose faerie blades had carven half the world. In the twilight land, the cupolas aglimmer to the drowning sun, the giant steed and silver-armoured knight went tired to the sea.

From the north, as yet unnoticed by the silver knight, a man staggered in the wild meadows of grass and drowsing flowers. Unaware, he seemed, with his wild look, of the fragrances, attar and muscadine, the scents of grasses green and gold. Unlike the silver knight, this man, with his unkempt hair a white of years and an unmagical affair of lenses set before his staring eyes. The first notes of the evening birds chimed in a harmony that failed to touch him, and the cool sea-breeze moved his hair without taking the sting of heat from his eyes. Strange, in his outlandish garments unlike the weight of mail or the caress of silk and velvet.

Separate, joined only in their common

“DODOING A-WHAT
COMES NATURALLY”

damien broderick

***the mirrors
of
the sea***

destination, mounted paladin and crazed outlander wended their ways towards the spires of the city. The knight sat easy on his gorgeous saddle, his armour chased in patterns exotic and a crimson bundle behind the cantle of the ornamented leather. A tall lance rested to his right, its point a flare of white metal; and his long-sword, handle arabesqued in gold and orichalc, slapped against the mail of his left leg. His visor was raised, the better to see in the descended gloom, and his face was handsome with the scars of terrible battles. Iced-fire, his eyes, and set upon the flickering lights which brought the city of minarets a new enchantment in the darkness.

He fancied he could hear the slapping of the waves, and smell the scent of fresh brine on the breeze, when his huge ebon steed muttered and tossed his head at a

movement from the shadows. In a single fluid action, the knight's shield was on his arm and the lance slipped into the horizontal rest. With scarcely a motion of his corded neck, he looked into the star-flecked night. The stallion continued towards the city, towards the sea and the welcome of lights, but his metalled hooves trod more lightly. And, see, in a grassy hollow the wild man stood, huddled into himself, his eyes terror-stricken on the minaret shadows.

The knight croaked contemptuously, and slid his lance home to rest. With a touch to the tasselled reins, he stopped before the crazed man, and looked down on him. In the night, a lion howled and a multitude of small beasts scurried. The outlander wept, in himself, and his eyes were torn by the city. With a mighty blow, the silver knight struck the shield on his arm, and the clang echoed in a distant grove of smoke-barked trees. The smaller man looked up at the sound, through the faded glaze of lenses, before covering his face with tattered hands.

"What is your sorrow?" asked the argent giant on the midnight-steed. "Why need to weep, in this land, where the strong are strong and ferns sing by the rivers and the sea is deep for ships and salt with wonders?"

Had he possessed even the remnants of dignity, the crazed man would have drawn them about his soul. As it was, he could only stare from the knight to the glowing towers and back in a scurrying circuit to the knight.

"Horror, horror." He tore at his ears, at his hair. "Desolation and sand, burning winds all around and an empty waste and a scarecrow tin-suited on a broken nag. Who are you, death's head, and what is this lie of beauty?" He snickered his gaze from the man, and pawed at the luxuriant grass.

Under the jutting visor, the knight's eyes were longing for the minarets, for rest after his journey. He brought his attention back grudgingly to the maniac.

"What is it you seek?" he sneered. "Here, with a strong arm or a strong thought a man is a man. Why do you snivel?"

The other man took off his lenses and smeared them on a rag he tugged from his breeches.

"Be-devil me with nonsense, damn you? I see your snaggle teeth, skull. I see your hollow sockets."

And then, on knees stained darker than the darkness with grass, "Where are the hierarchies? Who is to tell me what to do? Who am I to force to my will, if I am not forced, not told, not instructed . . .?"

Behind the minarets, the moon sailed the sea and the sky, bright in the colour of the knight's apparel. On the distant waters, light swelled and moved. The man on the horse stretched the tired muscles of his shoulders, and sneered at the crazed outlander.

"See what you see, liar. Here are no deserts, save the emptiness of men who know no other way but that which others show them. Look, look, the city is beckoning me home from my journeys and I go to my satisfaction."

Gently tugging the reins, he rode on the swathe of moonlit carpet towards the city. Behind him, the lost man wandered in a burning desert, parched with a thirst he had never known, and hungry even for the sight of Death who rode from him. Thick with dust, hot and dying with no man to help him, he opened his wept eyes to a glimpse of minarets and moonlight. And it was gone.

Here, then, see: a wonder, a city, a desert, a man and one not a man. Oh, you have seen Satan, you have seen evil. And for you is the ravelling, for you the spinning of the Norn's thread, and the weaving, for the severing too is yours.

See, oh see, the burnished sun. For which is Satan?

'the winter of gerrit achterberg'

Where shall I find your beating heart?
 Not even in a winter dream,
 For the dead there have turned to stone;
 And what grave magic can impart
 Warmth to the grey curve of a cheek
 Fixed in that reign of cold? While here
 Fevers eat the flesh away
 Leaving a torment at the bone.

Now from the cobbles of the town
 In the blank hours before the light,
 Winds gather up the dust and blow
 Its grains about your feet of stone;

Your voice breaks on my driven sleep,
 I fling my arms out in the dark:
 Empty. I wake. God will not hear
 This cry I stifled long ago.

(Gerrit Achterberg: the Dutch poet who during a period of
 insanity killed his wife).

***philip
 martin***

meeting

Late come and lost
 In the hot cities of dust
 Whose image do I meet
 Walking in the garden?

Beneath the cinder trees
 And over the ashy grass
 It comes on and it comes
 And I hear my blood beat
 In the shuddering breast:

"This other and terrible shape
 Has come on your own feet."

***the
solipsist***

OR

just me

***chris
smale***

This essay is an attempt to establish the theory of solipsism as a legitimate and true philosophical proposition. This will involve a great deal of discursive discussion so I beg that the reader will bear with me. My first minor objective will be to destroy the truth of the concept of *a priori* knowledge. The Oxford defines "*a priori*" as "Previous to one's special examination, presumptively, in accordance with one's previous knowledge or prepossessions." It would seem from this that *a priori* knowledge is knowledge which is true quite apart from empirical proof or experience. An example of *a priori* knowledge is the proposition $2 + 2 = 4$. It is contended that this is *a priori* as it is true quite apart from empirical proof and experience and it is said to hold true quite apart from the possibility of empirical verification. It is contended that even if there were no objects in existence, $2 + 2$ would still equal 4 because that is the way it is constructed; the nature of $2 + 2$ is to equal 4. It seems to me that the force of the first two of the rules of *a priori* knowledge are tied up with the truth of the third. The reason why *a priori* statements are not derived from experience and can't be proven by experience is that they are held always to be true, and by definition it is impossible to gain experience of something you haven't experienced, and the truth of *a priori* knowledge in the future is something I supposedly cannot speculate upon.

However, it seems to me that if I can find a time in the future where 2 plus 2 cannot be said to equal 4, then *a priori* knowledge collapses. It seems to me also that before a thing can be said to be true it must exist; that is, it must be written, said or in some way formulated. However, if there were no consciousnesses in existence there would be nothing capable of forming the proposition $2 + 2 = 4$, and therefore it couldn't be said to be true. Can anyone seriously doubt that any of our so called

a priori knowledge would be known if we had not gained some knowledge of it by empirical experience. Before anyone came to the conclusion that $2 + 2$ would always = 4, he must have had some experience when $2 + 2 = 4$ and from this generalised; however, was this generalisation justified? Couldn't it be that it has just so happened that every time we added $2 + 2$ so far in history we found it came out equal to 4?

Having disposed of *a priori* knowledge, I now wish to discuss the nature of self and question its existence. As Descartes so rightly pointed out, it is possible to doubt the existence of a material universe corresponding to perceptions. Descartes did this by the dream hypothesis in which he said we can't prove we are not dreaming, and in the evil genius hypothesis he said it is logically possible to conceive of the universe being created by an evil genius who deliberately deceived us in our perceptions.

Thus having pursued his methodical doubt to the point where he could say that he could doubt the existence of everything outside of himself, he found he couldn't doubt his own existence for the very act of doubting was an act of self affirmation.

The only possible way that I can doubt that I exist is to doubt that it is I who is doubting, i.e. that "I" and "my" doubts are really part of the dream of a great dreamer. However, this leaves the problem of something existing, even if it is not I in the accepted sense of the word; thus for the sake of simplicity "I" may proceed as if I exist, for something has to exist and as "I" am part of the existent entity and "I" can't be sure that anybody else is, "I" may as well call the existent entity I.

Having established that I exist, I must now proceed to enquire into the nature of I. The question is: what is there about me I cannot doubt? For a start I am a conscious being in that I am aware, and my awareness takes the form of such processes as perception, deduction and thinking gener-

ally. Thus my consciousness is a very complex one.

However, it seems to me that I cannot know that I am more than a conscious being, i.e. I can never know that I have a body with all its various attributes. Thus I cannot say that I am material, but by the same token, as I don't know for sure what I am, I cannot without argument say that I am spiritual. As I have previously stated, I am a conscious being in that my consciousness is made up of perceptions. If my perceptions be physical then they must be at a certain point of space at a certain point of time; they must have weight and shape, etc., must have extension and solidity, they must have colour, etc., etc., for as Berkley pointed out it is impossible to imagine of matter devoid of these qualities. Quite obviously thoughts and perceptions can't be conceived of as having these qualities, and thus they can't be conceived of as physical; they must be non-physical, i.e. spiritual. Thus it would appear that I am a spiritual being with perceptions of a seemingly physical universe. Thus it appears that I must work out an attitude to this so-called universe; I must find some way of making it fit in with my concept of existence.

The first thing I must do is establish some sort of criterion for judging and deciding the degree of reality which I can assign to the elements of my existence. First of all I must set up rules for language, for if I don't my language must become a series of unintelligible sounds and symbols.

The second area where it is vital that I have rules is the area of existence, for I must separate out that which I say exists from that which I say doesn't exist.

The third area is that of statements about perceptions, i.e. statements detailing the sort of perception I am having; by this I do not mean the truth or falsity of statements like "the wall is red" or "my sister is shouting" but rather truth about statements

to the effect that "I am perceiving a red wall" or "I am perceiving a shouting sister." I distinguish between these cases because in one I have no way of checking its truth or falsity whereas in the other area I do have, for if I abide by the rules of language it is quite easy to see that it is incorrect to say "I am perceiving a green wall" when in fact I am perceiving a red wall. By perceiving a red wall I mean I am having perceptions of a red wall (in my mind) not that I am perceiving of a red wall which has an objective existence.

Having established truth and falsity in the realms of language, existence and perception I must now move on to a discussion of truth and falsity in the realm of referential statements. Referential is to be taken to mean: that which refers to something other than itself. Thus a referential statement would be one that refers to an objectively existing object such as a lift in the Ming Wing.

My position on this point is that it is impossible to tell whether there is an objectively existing lift in the Ming Wing. For the time being I will allow that there are other consciousnesses and that I can communicate with them. I do this for if I can dispose of the external world and all externally existing material phenomena, I can dispose of these other consciousnesses on the same grounds.

What then are the possible grounds for maintaining that there are objectively existing phenomena? Some people would say because we have empirical knowledge of the universe, i.e. we have perceptions of an external universe. However, this is not a true argument for it attempts to prove the truth of empiricism by empiricism, i.e. it is saying I have proof of the truth of referential statements in other referential statements. Others would like to say that there is an objective universe because we all agree on the nature of it: we all look in the one direction and say "there is a lift in the Ming

Wing." This is a form of the coherence theory which tries to distinguish between those things which are real and those which are merely illusions or hallucinations; it tries to do it by saying that when we all look at the same thing, we all agree upon its nature and we all see that it hasn't radically changed from the last time we saw it. However, this won't do as we can't prove the existence of the objective phenomena, and even if we could, we could still break down the coherence theory. When we all look at the same "object" we all claim to see the same qualities. However, is this so? Locke has proven that the secondary qualities of an object reside not in the object but in the perceiver, and can vary according to the perceiver. Thus due to the flexibility of our language many of the variations of the secondary qualities which are not part of the object anyway would be overlooked. Our words would agree but our perceptions wouldn't.



***"I am perceiving
a shouting sister"***

In the case of primary qualities much the same can be said. We may all agree that an object has extension, figure, motion, spatiality, etc., but do we agree as to their precise nature? The perception of the degree

of extension, figure, motion, spatiality, etc., would vary from person to person depending on where he was situated relative to the object and relative one to the other. Thus once more our language would agree but our perceptions would differ.

However, for the time being I will be content to allow the existence of objective phenomena. I do this as I feel I can dispose of them later in the process of delving into their nature. As I intend to talk about the whole universe I shall talk in universal terms.

The first thing I want to say about the universe is that different people see it in different ways. By this I do not mean such obvious things as people who are colour blind see colours in a different way to those who aren't or that tone deaf people have perceptions of sound different to those experienced by people with normal hearing. This is most obviously so as these are the most extreme cases of people who perceive differently to others. What I mean is that even between "average" people there are still differences in perception. So it is, I think, firmly established that people differ in respect to their perceptions relating to secondary qualities. Furthermore, there are differences between people in the range of their perceptions and the quality of them. Another important difference is caused by differences in environment, interest and attitude.

It is often said that people in widely differing situations live worlds apart. An example of this would be Mr. Menzies and a peasant farmer in the Deccan.

Because of their different environments they come into contact with and perceive different things. Because of their different stations in life they are interested in different things and therefore perceive different things; one is interested in the rain and the other the election returns. Therefore each perceives very closely that in which he is interested. Their difference in attitude also

makes them perceive different things; one being a capitalist politician, perceives any threatening gestures on the part of Red China, while the other, being a peasant farmer, perceives any promises they may make about more food. Thus I think it entirely reasonable to suggest that in fact these two men live in different worlds.

It would appear from this that what we call reality is merely the consensus of opinion, for from the "God's eye view" the world could be completely different to anything anybody imagines it to be, but this would not matter if we approached it systematically with some degree of coherence even if it was a wrong system.

I am on the same boat as the rest of humanity in that I have no way of knowing if I am correctly perceiving the objectively existing phenomena. It is not much use my comparing notes with others because they might be just as wrong as I am, but anyway, due to the generalised nature of our language, large numbers of individually minor but comprehensively important differences would be overlooked.

From this it would appear that I can never know of the correctness or incorrectness of my referential statements. This would seem to be the standard sceptical position reached by most writers in this field. However, it is not the conclusion but merely the starting point of my system.

It seems to me that if you accept the sceptical position then you may as well play cards all your life. However, I exist in a complicated consciousness that is constantly engaged in such processes as thought and perception and my big problem in life is to know what to do about my existence. One answer is to do nothing about it, but this is a painful thing for me to contemplate for my mind is such that I cannot do nothing. Besides, inactivity is the result of meaninglessness and hopelessness, two of the greatest enemies of being; they tend to negate being, therefore the more I fight

against them the greater my being. Thus if I wish to realise the potential of my being I must have courage to fight inactivity, i.e. I must work out a system for approaching existence.

This is impossible to do if I want to have a system based upon objective phenomena because I can never directly know anything about them. The only information I have is about my perceptions, and thus I must forget about the external world and build up a system upon perceptions.

It may be claimed that this is merely a practical and convenient way of approaching existence and not a philosophical reason for wiping out the "universe." Even though I do not agree with this criticism, for I think as a science (and philosophy claims to be the mother of sciences) it must always be practical and fit in with the facts and if it does not it is absurd, I will give another more philosophic reason.

It seems to me that no one has ever really talked about the objective universe as a real thing; it has always been a hypothesis for, for it to be said to exist it has to be postulated, and once it is postulated it has to be described in some way. It has to be described, for to say that the universe existed without having some idea of what it was like, i.e. description of it, would be meaningless.

Once people begin to describe it however, you find they are in fact describing not it but their perceptions of it, so that in fact when people talk about the universe they are in fact not talking about it but their own perceptions. In other words when people talk about the universe they are in fact talking about the universe which they themselves have "created."

It has been argued that this is not so due to the intention people display when talking about the universe. It is said that even if the universe does not exist when people talk about the universe, it doesn't mean they are talking about their thoughts;

it means they are talking about a non-existent object. However, I feel this is a very queer hypothesis as it is like saying that if I am asked to talk about a tennis ball and I mistakenly talk about a golf ball I am not talking about a golf ball. The argument gets even queerer when you substitute a "shplood" (a non-existent type of ball) for the tennis ball. The situation is then that I am not talking about a shplood which doesn't exist and which I am intending to talk about, I am not talking about a golf ball which I am in the process of describing, I am talking about a non-existent object.

For these reasons I think I can safely say that there is no objectively existing material phenomenon, and on the same grounds I think it is entirely reasonable for me to reject the possibility of there being objectively existing consciousnesses. Thus I can proceed to work out the outline of a system based upon the solipsistic position. However, before I do I must enter upon a preliminary discussion upon the concept of time.

There are great problems involved with any discussion of time. The problems are problems of language for the only terms in which one can discuss time are past, present and future. These terms are only meaningful in relation to one another and thus it is very difficult to talk about time if one wishes to do away with two of the terms. Prima facie, it seems absurd to say (as I wish to say) "time exists only in the present," because present means not past and not future.

However, I think this can be overcome if I view the three terms as hypotheses and then proceed to examine their truth. It is quite reasonable to suggest that time doesn't exist in the future, because to say it does cannot be supported by direct perception for the simple reason that to say time exists in the future is to say that that particular piece of time called future does not exist in the present, and if it doesn't exist in the

present it cannot give rise to perceptions, and if one cannot have perceptions one cannot say empirically that it exists.

Now it would seem that the only way one could arrive at a future would be from inference from perceptions in the past in which events occupied a sequence one after the other. This would seem to lead to the conclusion that time exists in a natural sequence. This of course would entail a present moving out of the past and into the future.

However, I can overcome this if I destroy the concept of the past. The question now is: how does one know of the existence of the past? The usual answer is because one has memories of it. This is prima facie a fairly reasonable answer. However, when one looks closely at the nature of memories the argument begins to weaken, for what are memories but perceptions — admittedly they are perceptions of perceptions which seemingly occurred in the past, yet how does one know this, for perceptions, even of perceptions, can, by their nature only exist in the present.

I maintain as I did with perceptions themselves that nobody has ever really postulated a past. Although the intentional object argument might apply here, I will only say that my above answer applies here.

Thus having postulated these three words and examined their nature I find that the postulated time of past and future cannot be shown to exist by reasoning based upon perceptions. For this reason I think I am entitled to say that existence is only in the present. However, in case it is still thought that the objection that the word "present" is meaningless, except in relation to past and future, still stands, I will not use the word and instead shall say that **EXISTENCE IS IN PERCEPTIONS**.

Now that I have established the above argument I think I can safely say that my existence is infinite. By infinite I mean without beginning and without end. The obvious objection to this is that I was born,

I am living and I am going to die. My answer to this is twofold. Before one can say this, one must first have an idea of past, present and future, an idea which I believe I disposed of above. Secondly, granting for a moment that there is past, present and future, I find it very difficult to have perceptions of myself being born, and it is even more difficult to have perceptions of the time when my perceptions started. This is logically impossible as it would involve a comparison between a time when I had perceptions of having perceptions and a time when I was having perceptions of not having perceptions. The objection that I shall die, i.e. cease to exist, is still a pressing one, but I feel I can dispose of it by saying that I can never say that I shall cease to exist for to say it, involves some perception of my not existing, and I can never perceive myself not existing until I don't exist, and even then by the very nature of not existing, I couldn't have perceptions of it. Therefore it is not possible for me to say that I am not infinite.

Having established that existence is in perception and that my existence is infinite, it is now possible for me to discuss the nature of my perceptions. It seems to me that I am at the point where I can explain where my perceptions come from and how it is that I am perceiving that which I am perceiving.

The answer to the first part of the question is simple, for my perceptions didn't come from anywhere as they always are (what I want to say but can't due to the fact that I have cut myself off from the appropriate language, is that they have never not been). Also, as I exist in perception, then I cannot ask where they came from as the question implies a past.

The question that next arises is why I am having this particular perception. The answer is essentially simple in that perceptions are controlled by a causation chain. However, the problem that then arises is

a very complex one in that normally a causation chain implies change, change implies process, process implies sequence, and sequence implies a concept of time based upon past, present and future. However, must this necessarily be so? There is no reason theoretically why the causation chain cannot be instantaneous, why the cause and effect cannot occur simultaneously. The only



“this is because things don't exist . . .”

argument against this could be that this is not the way the world works, i.e. in all known cause and effect relationships there is a time lag between the cause and the effect. For example if we take the most instantaneous casual relationship known to man there is still a time lag. This example would be the switching on of a light, for even though electricity travels at the speed of light there is still said to be a time lag between the cause and the effect. This case seems especially strong because due to the speed at which electricity moves it is held to be impossible to conceive of a more instantaneous cause and effect.

However, if one thinks about this then it becomes obvious that it can only be true if one presumes a past. The example presumes that at some point in the past the

light switch was thrown, time passed and then the globe was illuminated in the present. However, I believe that my arguments above dispose of the existence of the past. Also if one considers very closely the nature of the argument it becomes a fruitless one as the existence of a conventional casual chain in the accepted sense of the word can only be proven if one presumes a past and a past can only be proven if one presumes a casual chain.

Thus the answer to the question, where do perceptions come from is that they don't come from anywhere, they always are; and the answer to the question, how is it that I am perceiving this particular perception is to be found in an instantaneous casual chain.

All that now remains for me to do in this essay is give a brief account of what follows from this proposition.

The first thing that follows is that I am a determinist. I have no free will and no control over my perceptions. Things just happen but although I have no free will I can still to some extent "control" my existence by realising that determinism is the rule, in fact, the inherent rule of existence, and use it to improve my existence.

Once a determinist, it seems that my next step is into ethics; it follows from determinism that some acts are good for my existence in that they improve my existence, and other acts are bad in that they tend to degrade my existence, but none are morally culpable.

The next step it seems to me is into political philosophy; mine is of course Marxism. This is because it recognises determinism; it realises that a large part of causation is explainable in terms of motives and that the overriding motive is economic security and even economic prosperity. Furthermore it acts upon these principles.

At this point an objection arises in that a real dyed-in-the-wool solipsist would not bother with political philosophy as this

denotes a concern for other people; people in this context meaning other consciousnesses.

However, this objection is based upon a misunderstanding of my system of self.

To me it seems that I am a consciousness and that consciousness is the aggregate of perceptions; the only way I know I am conscious is that I am having perceptions. Thus I become as it were, a bundle of perceptions. Thus to be accurate I must not associate myself with that particular thing I perceive sitting at a desk writing an essay on solipsism for it is only part of my consciousness. Ideally, every perceptionary individual is important to me and I must do my best for them and work for their welfare. I, of course, do this through the agency of that perceptionary figure which is still writing the essay. However, in reality it is on the same plane of existence as the other perceptionary figures. My last topic is language. By necessity, in my system the connotation and the denotation of a word are the same thing. This is due to the fact that before an object can be said to exist it has to be described; this is because "things" don't exist, but specific distinct objects do exist.

Now the connotation of a word is a description of the object a word stands for. Now as the object only is in so far as it is described, then the description in fact becomes interchangeable with the object. This then brings us to the point where the meaning of a word, i.e. the connotation, is the object the word stands for, and as the denotation is the object that the word stands for, then the connotation and denotation of a word are identical.

These then are the bases and ramifications of what I consider to be a genuine solipsistic position. If the reader feels any of it to be plainly incredible I beg that he cast his emotions aside and consider the argument dispassionately and rationally for above all I would hate to criticise myself unjustly.

the oreichalch lady

How subtle-secret is her smile,
Her skin like smooth sawn-ivory,
The aeons pass her rank and file,
And yet she stays and smiles at me.

Daily before her the acolytes come
To bathe her o'er with nard and thyme.
Bathe her in nenuphar, galbanum,
The acolytes gone, but loathsome time
Has left her young and wise.

She stays, undesirous, sentient,
And seemingly sadly does despise
The nacarat, nonchalant Nile.
Yet o'er her face so somnolent
Lies a lissome, languorous smile.

hamish boyne-anderson

in a style we know of

it's funny when the old man dies
i mean you don't realise
how much your cells are soaked in his —
it's really a most peculiar biz
to wake and suddenly discover
that pa has croaked while in the shower
recess (though the mortician was pleased
at the precleaned lich), but it cheesed
us off: the excess costs incurred
to have him formally interred
albeit the white carnations were nice
but two bob extra for dentifrice
was a bit rough we thought.
they buried him with his port
able cork extractor that
he won in a game of baccarat
some years ago; yes his decease
has left us somewhat ill at ease
we didn't guess till he kicked the bucket
how bloody great he was . . . but f.it
bring us another beer.

peter barry

The Defends His Dated Aesthetics

for
Vaughan
Williams

"He's a reactionary of course"

"Well, one needn't be always discerning"

"Mm, positively decadent sometimes
-- all gothic mists and grey yearning"

". . . But he's so English my dear . . ."


I wince over the sherry

". . . Almost, if you listen carefully, you can hear
Green fields growing, yes, so very
English." I smile (having some veneer
Of social calm): "But he was Welsh I fear"


But nevertheless:

You can keep your Bartok
And Mahler: I'll be decadent today
— Give me Swinburne, Seltzer and Hock,
Crepe de Chine ties and blazers candy-gay
Punts, weedy rivers, and brown ale mild
And the grey twilight of gothic things
— And that's a line from Wilde!


Paul Marriott




I wonder what I'll
do on Saturday...



.....




.....




.....




.....




.....



.....



.....



.... I'll get a book....

....from Collins'.

TEACHING AS A CAREER

The Independent Schools need
SECONDARY TEACHERS
URGENTLY

Particularly for Mathematics and Science.

One Year of a Degree Course (three subjects) is the minimum requirement to enter

MERCER HOUSE for the
JUNIOR SECONDARY COURSE
(one year full-time)

Bursaries (free places) are available for suitable applicants.

Enquire from:—

THE BURSAR, MERCER HOUSE

11 Mercer Road, Armadale, SE.3.

Telephone: 20-2753, 20-4364 for further particulars.

SELBYS

We can supply all your requirements for

- **CHEMICALS**
- **LABORATORY GLASSWARE**
- **LABORATORY EQUIPMENT**
- **SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS**

including

STUDENT MICROSCOPES

SLIDE RULES

MOLECULAR MODELS

PHYSICS APPARATUS

PERIODIC TABLES — Wall

Chart or Notebook Size

TEACHING CHARTS AND

VISUAL AIDS

PREPARED MICROSCOPE

SLIDES

H. B. SELBY & CO. PTY. LTD.

393 SWANSTON STREET, MELBOURNE. Telephone: 34-3661

Also at:—

SYDNEY — BRISBANE — ADELAIDE — PERTH — HOBART

for the finest & friendliest in banking service

THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED


MONASH UNIVERSITY BRANCH

(eastern end of Union Building)

- **EXTENDED SAVINGS BANK HOURS:**
Monday - Friday, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- **TRADING BANK HOURS:**
Monday - Thursday, 9.30 a.m. to 3 p.m.
Friday, 9.30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- **A FULL TIME TRAVEL OFFICER**
is in attendance to arrange local and
overseas travel bookings.



CHEQUE & SAVINGS ACCOUNTS



round trip to the moon

More than half a million miles of paper and paperboard a year — enough to reach from here to the moon and back with sufficient left over to stretch to England and back — this is the impressive output of the 19 machines of Australian Paper Manufacturers Limited working round the clock the year round to meet Australia's ever-increasing demand for these vital materials.



set-up boxes, multiwall paper sacks, envelopes, stationery and posters, paper containers and cups, toilet tissues, and as laminates for building boards and panels.

A.P.M. is a truly Australian enterprise owned by more than 30,000 Australian investors and directly employing over 5,000 Australian workers in nine mills located in every State of

Paper and paperboard in scores of different grades for fibreboard shipping containers, paper bags and wrappings, cartons and

the Commonwealth. Besides a continuing modernisation and expansion programme at its established mills the company is building a new mill at Spearwood, near Perth for the developing Western Australian market. Every pound spent on an A.P.M. product is an investment in Australia's industrial progress.



AUSTRALIAN PAPER MANUFACTURERS LTD.
OWNED BY AUSTRALIANS




Head Office: South Gate, South Melbourne Sales Offices in all States.

DROP IN AT DEANS

(The Paint People)

FOR MELBOURNE'S GREATEST
RANGE OF



W. & G. DEAN PTY. LTD. 346 LITTLE COLLINS ST. 'PHONE 67-8291
Melbourne's leading specialists in Art and Drawing Office Supplies

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

You graduate in Arts, Science, etc. — and then what? Have you considered teaching as a career? We can help you with advice and information about conditions in the teaching profession and the requirements for it in Victoria, other states and New Zealand. Salaries are excellent — in Victoria women graduates start at £1,302 and men at £1,700.

ASSOCIATED TEACHERS

49 ELIZABETH STREET, 62-4642.



- GOLF
- TENNIS
- CRICKET
- FOOTBALL
- WATER SKI EQUIPMENT
- TRACK SUITS
- FISHING
- SOFTBALL
- BASEBALL
- SKIN DIVING EQUIPMENT, ETC.

Lindsay Hassett Sports Store

OFFERS

MONASH UNIVERSITY

STUDENTS AND STAFF

The best deal in town for all sporting requirements



LINDSAY HASSETT

also at

MYERS

CHADSTONE ● GEELONG ● BALLARAT

BULK and SCHOOL SECTION: 199 HAWKE STREET, WEST MELBOURNE

A Handy Reference Manual for Members of Clubs and Societies

GUIDE FOR MEETINGS AND ORGANIZATIONS

by N. E. RENTON

Fellow of the Faculty of Actuaries, Melbourne.

Sir Alexander Fitzgerald in his foreword says:

'the book is clearly written and the conclusions are effectively marshalled . . . I am glad to have the opportunity of recommending the book . . .'

200 Pages

1961

14/- (post 5d.)

THE LAW BOOK CO. OF A/ASIA PTY. LTD.

456 Little Collins Street, Melbourne, C.1



the new Royalite 120

This feature-packed Portable has been developed for your personal typing needs. It is light and compact, offers responsive typing action with crisp, clearly etched letters and will give years of dependable service. Each machine is equipped with a black and red fabric ribbon. Its astonishingly low price includes a handsome luggage-type carrying case with special safety lock.



BUSINESS EQUIPMENT PTY. LTD.

408 Latrobe Street, Melbourne. (Opposite
Royal Mint). Phone 329-7966.

NEW OAKLEIGH MOTORS

PTY. LTD.

Authorised FORD Dealers

NEW CAR SALES

USED CAR SALES

REPAIRS — ALL TYPES

Our MULGRAVE DIVISION offers every motoring facility to Monash students and staff.

FERNTREE GULLY RD., NOTTING HILL. Phone: 544-2424.

Also Head Office: 39-41 Warrigal Rd., Oakleigh. Phone: 56-7241.

you don't drink?

THEN WHY THE HELL
SHOULD YOU BOTHER
TO GO TO THE

NOTTING HILL HOTEL

***For All Your Pre-lecture
Entertainment***

JUST 30 SECONDS FROM THE UNIVERSITY IN FERNTREE GULLY ROAD. LOW-PRICED COUNTER-LUNCHES, RELAXING BEER GARDEN AND LOUNGE . . . STUDENTS WELCOME!

