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Quynh Do and Pushkar Maitra

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Keywords: Environmental Activism, Electoral Outcomes, Australia

JEL Classification: D72, Q50, P18

Quynh Do: Curtin University (email: quynh.do@curtin.edu.au); Pushkar Maitra: Monash University (email: pushkar.maitra@monash.edu).

Environmental Activism and Political Outcomes*

Quynh Do[†] and Pushkar Maitra[‡]

April 2025

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Activism against climate change is becoming more common globally. There is, however, little evidence on how such activism affects political outcomes. We examine the impact of the Stop-Adani convoy, a protest led by the former leader of the Greens against the proposed Adani Carmichael coal mine in Queensland Australia, on the electoral outcomes in the 2019 Australian federal election. We find that relative to 2016, the Liberal-National Coalition vote share in 2019 was 10 percent higher along the route of the convoy. In addition, mining engagement in the area significantly and positively affected the Coalition vote share. Surprisingly, the convoy had little positive electoral effects for the Greens. Residents of mining regions exhibited lower environmental consciousness and more socially conservative attitudes, and were more likely to vote for the more conservative Coalition.

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[†] Curtin University; email: quynh.do@curtin.edu.au.

[‡] Monash University; email: pushkar.maitra@monash.edu.

I have always believed in miracles

Scott Morrison, Prime Minister of Australia after the unexpected victory in the 2019 Federal elections

1 Introduction

"Environmental activism", defined as the collective actions of individuals or groups aimed at protecting or aiding the environment, is commonplace in today's world. Examples of organizations engaged in environmental activism include Scientists Rebellion, Fridays for Future, Just Stop Oil, and Extinction Rebellion. These groups typically engage in coordinated civil disobedience to disrupt the business-as-usual, and raise awareness about the climate crisis and the worsening environmental quality. However, it has been argued that such activism does more harm than good and hurts the environmental movement by creating a backlash. For example, when handing down his judgment against the Extinction Rebellion action in April 2021 (involving breaking windows at the headquarters of Barclays Bank), the judge chose to condemn the protest as a stunt that would not help to solve the climate crisis, rather *they risk(ed) alienating those who they look to for support.*[1] In this paper, we examine whether such activism can influence political outcomes. Our focus is on Australia, and specifically, we examine the effects of the "Stop-Adani Convoy" on the 2019 Australian federal elections.

Australia is the home to some of the largest coal deposits in the world. The increasing demand for energy around the world (particularly in Asia) has meant that several countries have, over the past decade or so, attempted to engage with Australia to ensure a flow of coal to satisfy their growing energy demand. One example of such an engagement has been the planned Adani (or Adani-Carmichael) coal mine in Queensland. In 2010, Adani, an Indian multinational company with businesses around the world in sectors such as energy, resources, and agribusiness, had proposed to establish a coal mine in the Galilee Basin in Queensland. It was to be the largest coal mine in Australia. It was argued that the coal would supply Indian power plants and generate electricity for millions of people, and the mine would create 10,000 jobs in Queensland. Production was to commence in 2014, with an initial output of 2 million tonnes per annum, rising to 60 million tonnes per year in 2022. The proposal included the development of the coal mine itself, as well as associated rail and port infrastructure to transport and export coal. It, however, faced immediate backlash from environmental groups. Large-scale public protests and online campaigns

[1] The Guardian, January 28, 2023.

have continued since 2010. Over the years, while both the state government in Queensland and the Australian Federal government have supported it, bureaucratic and legal wranglings have prevented the mine from being opened.

On 17 April 2019, Bob Brown, the former leader of the Australian Greens and an environmentalist, embarked on a journey across the four eastern states of Australia (Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) to raise awareness and protest against the Adani-Carmichael coal mine. The stated aim of this "Stop-Adani convoy" was to *show all politicians that Australians want to stop the mine* (Stop-Adani). However, it ended up highlighting the deep divisions in public opinion regarding the mine, the environment, and climate change. For example, in Clermont, Queensland, the arrival of the convoy was met with significant hostility, including stone-throwing and verbal abuse from local pro-Adani supporters. This confrontation highlighted the strong local support for the coal mine and the deep-seated opposition to *outside* interference.

In May 2019, Scott Morrison, the leader of the Liberal party in Australia and the incumbent Prime Minister of Australia, defied at least 3 years of opinion polls and public expectation to lead the (Liberal-National) Coalition to a shock election victory.[2] The result shocked many Australians, none more so than those that were climate conscious. The election result was viewed as a public reaction against climate change. Ambitious emissions reduction targets and the planned national embrace of electric vehicles (which was derided by Scott Morrison, as Labor's plan to *end the weekend*) were gone in an instant. Anecdotally, it has been argued that the convoy cost ALP votes, particularly in Queensland. The election outcome — re-election of the Coalition with a convincing majority in regional Queensland in particular — was discussed in the media with many articles and quoted commentators (and elected politicians from these regions) implicating the convoy in the outcome.[3] This was broadly attributed to the convoy *annoying* Queenslanders.

In this paper, we examine the political impacts of the Stop-Adani convoy on the 2019 Federal elections in Australia. Our key outcome variable is the Coalition (two-party preferred or TPP) vote share at the level of Statistical Area Level 2 (SA2). We restrict our analysis to the Eastern states and territories that the convoy passed through including Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, and Victoria. Those SA2s that have a stop or are on the

[2]Liberal–National Coalition, commonly known simply as the Coalition or the LNP, is an alliance of centre-right to right-wing political parties that forms one of the two major groupings in Australian federal politics. The two partners in the Coalition are the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party of Australia (the latter previously known as the Country Party and the National Country Party). Its main opponent is the Australian Labor Party (ALP). See Figure A1 for the opinion poll results during 2019. Throughout 2019, the Coalition trailed in the polls.

[3]For example, Michelle Landry of the Liberal National Party, a member of the Coalition, who was the elected representative of Australia's biggest coal mining electorate of Capricornia, actively thanked the convoy on election night for helping her achieve a 10.5% swing. Bob Brown, however, called that *hogwash*.

convoy route are treatment SA2s, and those that do not are control SA2s. Our results show that having the convoy route passing through the SA2 results in a 10% higher Coalition vote share in 2019, relative to 2016. The effects of convoy are driven essentially by SA2s located in Queensland. In addition, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of population employed in mining results in 1.8% increase in Coalition's vote share, and up to 2.5% if the convoy passes through the SA2. Finally, we do not find any systematic effects of the convoy on the vote share of the Greens, in both the lower and upper houses of Parliament elections.

Stops along the convoy route and the actual route of the convoy were potentially not random: the route and stops along the route were possibly purposively chosen to maximize its impacts. To address the selection issue, we use two alternative approaches: synthetic controls (Abadie et al., 2015, Abadie, 2021) and synthetic difference-in-differences (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021, Clarke et al., 2023). Using the synthetic difference-in-differences method, we find that Coalition vote shares in 2019 are 3.3 percentage points (6%) higher in a SA2 with a stop, relative to a SA2 without a stop, while they are 2.6 percentage points (5%) higher in a SA2 on the convoy route relative to a SA2 where the convoy route did not pass through. The synthetic control method also gives relatively robust results.

Our paper contributes to the sparse literature on the effects of climate protests on public sentiment. Existing research shows that increases in emissions over time are lower in US states that elect legislators with strong environmental records (Dietz et al., 2015). State-level environmental protests are associated with reduced carbon dioxide emissions (Olzak and Soule, 2009, Muñoz et al., 2018), and the presence of local environmental non-governmental organizations is associated with reductions in local carbon dioxide emissions from power plants (Grant and Vasi, 2017). Another strand of research finds that climate protests can transform bystanders to participants (Fisher, 2019, Kleres and Wettergren, 2017, Swim et al., 2019). Bugden (2020) examines whether and how climate protests affect public perceptions (or sentiment pools). Using an experimental vignette survey experiment, Bugden (2020) shows that the effects depend on political preferences (Democrats vs Republicans in the US) and the type of protests (peaceful marches vs civil disobedience). We add to this literature by showing that such activism also affects political outcomes.[4]

The large electoral effects of the convoy are not surprising. Previous literature has shown that convoys that reflect activist behaviour in some dimensions could influence social, educational and

[4]While much of the popular debate on environmental protests has focused on disruptive activities, activism need not necessarily be disruptive. Activism can be manifested in litigation, activism targeting business actors, activism working within the political system, and activism outside the economic and political system (see, for example Fisher and Nasrin, 2021). Activism targeting the business actors is possibly closest to what we had in the context of the Stop-Adani convoy. This kind of activism typically targets business practices as part of a campaign to pressurise institutional investors (and universities) to divest from fossil fuels. Similarly, efforts outside the economic and political systems have included a range of more confrontational tactics, such as boycotting, striking, protesting, and direct action that target politics, policymakers, and businesses (Meyer and Tarrow, 1997).

political outcomes. Ang (2023) exploits the five-year roadshow of the first American blockbuster (1915's The Birth of a Nation, a fictional portrayal of the founding of the KKK) and shows that the arrival of the roadshow in a county coincided with a sharp spike in lynchings and race riots. The effects persist a century later. Kalra (2021) uses the actual and planned route of a Hindu nationalist campaign tour across India (the BJP's Rath Yatra campaign in 1990) and finds that the resulting communal violence led to increased gettoisation of the minority Muslims, i.e., the violence displaced Muslims to segregated neighbourhoods. However, post-event, Muslim primary education levels were higher in cities that were more susceptible to violence. Blakeslee (2018) shows that BJP's Rath Yatra also had substantial electoral effects in the constituencies through which it passed, leading to a 5 percentage point increase in BJP's vote share, and increasing its probability of victory by 11 percentage points. We contribute to the literature by showing that the Stop-Adani convoy led by the former leader of the Greens significantly increases the Coalition's vote share in the 2019 Australian lower house federal election but has little positive effect on the Greens' electoral outcomes.

What explains these large political effects of the Stop-Adani convoy? Colvin (2020) argues that the convoy helped the politicians create an *us versus them* narrative of division between inner-city "greenies" and Queensland mining communities, who would be left behind should the mine not go ahead. These divisions helped foster a social dynamic that ultimately inhibited co-operation and good policy outcomes. The different patterns of behaviour in Queensland are not a surprise. Grosjean and Khattar (2019) and Baranov et al. (2023) argue that in Australia, unbalanced sex ratios in parts of the country in the 18^{th} and 19^{th} centuries have had significant long-term effects on attitudes towards women and occupational choice. Regions in Australia with some of the highest men-to-women ratios (see Grosjean and Khattar, 2019, Figure 2) correspond to the mining areas today. We find that residents in areas with mining activities (specifically in Commonwealth electoral districts with mines and with a greater share of residents employed in mining) are less concerned about the environment at the time of voting. *Second*, residents in mining areas tend to have more socially conservative attitudes. They are significantly less likely to show disagreement with statements such as (*a*) Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist; (*b*) Women fail to appreciate what men do for them; and (*c*) Women seek to gain power by getting control over men. They are also less likely to support law changes to allow same-sex couples to marry. *Finally*, vote share for female candidates is significantly lower in areas with greater mining engagement.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the different datasets used in the analysis, presents selected descriptive statistics, and discusses the empirical specifications. Section 3 presents the key results on the effect of the stop/route on the Coalition TPP vote share. Section 4 discusses the role of mining using different measures of mining engagement. Section 5 examines the partisan effects of the convoy, i.e., the effect on the vote share of the Greens; Section 6 discusses issues related to the fact that the stops and the route were potentially intentionally chosen (selection). In Section 7 we discuss potential channels that explain the effects of mining engagement. Finally, Section 8 concludes.

2 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Specifications

2.1 Australian Electoral System and Vote Shares

Australia is a representative democracy with a federation of six states and two self-governing territories. Members of the federal (national) parliament are elected through elections held every three years. Voting is compulsory for Australian citizens 18 years and older. Australia implements a preferential voting system in the federal elections. Voters are required to allocate preferences to candidates on the ballot paper. If a candidate gets over 50% of the vote in first preferences, they are declared elected. If no candidate reaches this target, the candidate with the lowest number of first preference votes is excluded and the preferences on those ballot papers are distributed to the remaining candidates. When one candidate receives at least 50% of the vote from their own first preference votes and preferences transferred from excluded candidates, that candidate is declared elected. Under full preferential voting (as in a federal House of Representatives election), all the ballot papers that indicate a first preference for a candidate other than the final two are be counted towards one or the other of these two top-ranked candidates. See Muller (2022) for a quick guide to the preferential voting system in Australia. Australia operates a *nearly* two-party system with Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal-National Coalition.

Our main dependent variable is the Coalition two-party preferred or TPP vote share in the lower house of the Australian Parliament (also known as the House of Representatives). Data on the two-candidate preferred votes, that is, votes received by the candidates of the top two parties after distribution of preferences at the polling booth level, are made available by the Australian Election Commission. We restrict our analysis to polling booths in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), New South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), Tasmania (TAS) and Victoria (VIC). The choice of these states is driven by the route of the convoy. Our analysis is conducted at a Statistical Area Level 2 (henceforth SA2), a higher level of aggregation than the polling booth. We match each polling booth to a SA2 (using the booth location codes provided by the AEC) and then calculate the Two-Party-Preferred votes for Coalition and ALP in each SA2 s in election t as follows: (i) aggregate all two party preferred votes for the Coalition from every booth in each SA2 s in election t (Coalition TPP $\text{Votes}_{s,t}$); (ii) aggregate all two party preferred votes for ALP from every booth in each SA2 s in election t (ALP TPP $\text{Votes}_{s,t}$). The total votes in each SA2 s is given by Total TPP $\text{Votes}_{s,t}$ = Coalition TPP $\text{Votes}_{s,t}$ + ALP TPP $\text{Votes}_{s,t}$. The Coalition

TPP vote share for each SA2 s in election t can be calculated as:

$$\text{Coalition TPP Vote Share}_{s,t} = \text{Coalition TPP Votes}_{s,t}/\text{Total Votes}_{s,t}$$

Using this definition the ALP TPP Vote share$_{s,t} = 1-$Coalition Vote Share$_{s,t}$, i.e., the ALP TPP vote share is the inverse of the corresponding Coalition TPP vote share.

In additional regressions (See Section 5), we use two alternative measures of vote shares. These are the first preference votes for the Greens at the SA2 level and the share of votes received by the Greens in the upper house of the Australian Parliament (the Senate). The first preference votes for the Greens in the lower and upper house elections at the SA2 level are computed following the same steps as above.

During the period 2010–2022, the Coalition TPP vote share has varied between 49–53% in the Eastern states of the country (Figure 1). This Figure also presents the Coalition TPP vote share in each of the five federal elections by state. It is the highest in Queensland, followed by New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, and Australian Capital Territory: the pattern is generally unchanged across all elections; the only exception is 2022, when we see that the Coalition TPP vote share in Tasmania is higher than in Victoria. It is clear that the Coalition gained significantly in Queensland in 2019.

For our main analysis, we restrict ourselves to the 2016 and 2019 federal elections, though we will use data from the 2013 and 2022 federal elections for additional robustness checks. In the SA2s in ACT, NSW, QLD, TAS and VIC, the Coalition TPP vote share increased from 49.81% in 2016 to 51.26% in 2019.[5] Figure 2a presents the distribution of the Coalition TPP vote share in 2016 and 2019 across the different SA2s in our sample. Figure 2b presents the heat maps showing the pattern of Coalition TPP vote share in the different SA2s in the 2016 and 2019 Federal elections.[6]

2.2 Descriptive Statistics at the SA2 level

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for selected SA2 characteristics in the estimating sample (i.e., those in ACT, NSW, QLD, TAS and VIC). These are calculated using data from the 2016

[5]For the country as whole the Coalition TPP vote share increased from 50.54% in 2016 to 51.95% in 2019.

[6]Figure A2 in the Appendix presents the change in Coalition TPP vote share between 2016 and 2019 in each SA2. In Figure A2, darker shaded SA2s experienced an increase in Coalition vote share while lighter shaded SA2s experienced a decrease in Coalition vote share. It is clear from Figure A2 that the Coalition TPP vote share increased between 2016 and 2019 in Queensland and also in SA2s with a stop or along the route. Figures B1 and B2 in the Appendix present the heat maps for the Coalition TPP vote shares in 2016 and 2019 and the change in Coalition vote share between 2019 and 2022 for the whole country.

Figure 1: Coalition TPP Vote share. 2010–2022



Notes: The average Coalition Two-party vote share in SA2s located in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania in the Federal elections 2010–2022. The average for all Eastern states and territories also presented.

Census. Our estimating sample consists of 1536 SA2s, which vary along a number of different dimensions. The average population is 11,110 with a standard deviation of 6,305. The area ranges from 0.018 square km to 60,905 square km (with an average of 105.64 square km), and the average population density is 0.044 persons per square km. 81% of the SA2s are characterised as urban. On average, 3.7% of the SA2 population are migrants, while less than 1% of the residents are characterised as working away.

2.3 Stops and Routes

We use Google API to determine the route based on the convoy stops. We then geo-match the stops/routes to the SA2s and define two binary variables: Stop in SA2 = 1 if there is a convoy stop in a particular SA2, and Route in SA2 = 1 if the route passes through a particular SA2. The average distance from the centroid of the SA2 to the nearest stop is 62.3 kilometers and the corresponding distance to the nearest point on the route of the convoy is 51.38 kilometers (see Table 1). There is significant variation in these distances across the SA2s. Table A1 presents the key stops for the convoy.

Figure 2: Coalition TPP Vote Share. Federal Elections 2016 and 2019

(a) Overall Distribution



(b) Distribution by SA2



Notes: Data for SA2s located in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria included. Australia has a preferential voting system and the party winning the majority of the TPP votes (raw votes + preferences flowing in from other parties and candidates) in each electorate is declared the winner. In Figure 2a we present the histogram of the Coalition TPP vote shares in the two federal elections. Figure 2b presents the corresponding patterns by SA2. In Figure 2b, the red dots denote the stops during the Stop-Adani Convoy and the lines denote the convoy route. See Figure B2 in the Appendix for the corresponding vote shares for the entire country.

Table 1: **Summary Statistics of SA2**

	Mean (1)	**SD** (2)	**Min** (3)	**Max** (4)
Total population	11109.518	6304.737	384.000	36380.000
Median age of persons	39.676	6.037	22.000	62.000
Median personal income weekly	676.969	178.980	260.000	1576.000
Median family income weekly	1753.996	512.910	678.000	3720.000
Average number of persons per bedroom	0.842	0.110	0.700	1.600
Population density	0.044	0.956	0.000	27.361
Area in km square	105.635	1773.254	0.018	60905.048
Number of people completing high school	4763.456	3471.073	148.000	28587.000
Number of people completing Bachelor degree	1390.342	1273.442	22.000	10661.000
Internet access	3313.768	1947.429	118.000	14573.000
Total dwellings	3991.379	2267.988	132.000	16284.000
Unemployment rate	6.770	3.009	1.300	45.500
Migration in past 5 years	4208.217	2847.793	117.000	27834.000
Persons employed away from work	172.174	94.367	3.000	525.000
Population in Mining	56.018	146.831	0.000	2776.000
Share of population in Mining	0.006	0.015	0.000	0.232
Urban	0.814	0.389	0.000	1.000
Vote share of Coalition in 2016	0.497	0.138	0.133	0.871
Vote share of Coalition in 2019	0.512	0.141	0.136	0.853
Vote share of Green in 2016 (House)	0.100	0.073	0.000	0.566
Vote share of Green in 2019 (House)	0.102	0.071	0.006	0.626
Vote share of Green in 2016 (Senate)	0.082	0.068	0.000	0.471
Vote share of Green in 2019 (Senate)	0.096	0.072	0.007	0.467
Distance from centroid of SA2 to convoy stop (km)	62.298	117.424	0.581	1403.045
Distance from centroid of SA2 to convoy route (km)	51.377	114.260	0.212	1402.839
Mine in SA2 (operating mine)	0.041	0.197	0	1
Number of Mines (Mining Intensity)	0.108	0.877	0	21
Mining Density	0.105	1.045	0	20.287
Number of SA2	1536			

Notes: Authors' computation using Census 2016 data at the SA2 level. Sample restricted to SA2s located in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria.

2.4 Mining Engagement

Of particular interest to us is the extent of mining engagement at the SA2 level. We do this in a number of different ways. *First*, we use as our measure of mining engagement the share of the population employed by the mining sector. Although, on average 0.6% of the SA2 population is employed in mining, this proportion varies considerably, ranging from 0–23%. Although 88.36% of the SA2s in our sample have less than 1% of the population employed in mining, there are several SA2s where more than 10% of the population are employed in the mining sector. Mining is, therefore, of significant localised importance in the Eastern states. Figure 3a presents the heat map of the distribution of the share of population employed in the mining sector (Census 2016) in the SA2s in the eastern states.[7] The share of first preference votes for the Greens remained the same across the two election years, although even here there is significant variation (0–56.5% in 2016 and 0.6–62.5% in 2019).

Second, using data made available by the Australian Mining Atlas, we can obtain the location of mines throughout the country. The mines are categorized into operating mines, historical mines, mineral development, closed, care and maintenance, and feasibility. For our primary analysis, we restrict ourselves to operating mines. In subsequent analysis, we extend the sample to include historical mines, closed mines, and those under care and maintenance. We geo-match the mines to each SA2 in our estimation sample and obtain three different measures of mining engagement: (a) a dummy variable *Mine in SA2* taking a value of 1 if the SA2 has an operating mine, and 0 otherwise; (b) *Mining Intensity* as the number of mines in a particular SA2; (c) *Mining Density* as the number of operating mines in the SA2 divided by the area of the SA2. As the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 show, 4% of the SA2s have a mine; the average number of mines in a SA2 is 0.11, although with a large variation (from 0 to 21), and the average mining density is 0.11, again with a large variation (from 9 to 20.29 per square km). Figure 3b presents the heat map of the presence of operating mines (whether a SA2 has at least one operating mine, as per Australian Mining Atlas 2024). Figures A4a and A4b in the Appendix present the heat maps of mining intensity and mining density across the SA2s in the Eastern states.[8]

2.5 Additional Data

There are two additional data sources that we utilise for our analysis. *First*, we use data from the 2019 Australian Election Study (AES). The AES is one of the key sources of information on political attitudes and behaviours in Australia. The study provides insights into what explains voters' choices in elections and public opinions on a range of policy issues. *Second*, we use data from the Australian Marriage Equality Referendum, 2017, where all Australian citizens were required to vote, using a postal ballot, *Yes* or *No* to the question "Should the law be changed to allow same-sex couples to marry?". Aggregated data on the proportion voting *Yes* are made available by the Australian Election Commission at the Commonwealth Electoral Division (CED) level.

[7]Figure B3 in the Appendix presents the corresponding distribution for SA2s in the entire country.

[8]In Figure B4 in the Appendix we reproduce the maps that are presented in Figures 3b, A4a and A4b, but extend the definition of mines to include all four categories of mines (operating, historic, historic/under care and maintenance). Figure B5 in the Appendix presents the heat map of the presence of operating mines, the mining intensity, and the mining density in SA2s across the whole country.

Figure 3: Mining Engagement at the SA2 level

(a) Distribution of Share of Mining. SA2



(b) Distribution of whether a SA2 has operating mine(s) by SA2



Notes: Figure 3a presents the heatmap of the share of population employed in the mining sector (as per Census 2016) in SA2s located in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. Figure 3b presents the heat map of presence of operating mines (whether a SA2 has at least one operating mine, as per Australian Mining Atlas 2024) in SA2s located in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. Figures A4a and A4b, in the Appendix, present the corresponding heatmaps for the distribution of the mining intensity and mining density in SA2s located in ACT, NSW, QLD, TAS, and VIC. The black dots denote the convoy stops and the blue lines denote the convoy route.

2.6 Empirical Specifications

We first examine whether SA2s with a stop or on the route experienced greater support for the Coalition in 2019 relative to 2016. Consider the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Coalition TPP Vote share}_{st} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Year 2019} + \beta_2 \text{ Stop in SA2} \\ + \beta_3 \text{ (Year 2019} \times \text{Stop in SA2)} + \gamma\mathbf{Z} + \zeta_i + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

The dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share in SA2 s in year $t; t = 2016, 2019$. Year 2019 is a dummy taking a value of 1 if the election year is 2019; and 0 if otherwise. Stop in SA2 is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there is a stop in the SA2. In an alternate specification, we replace Stop in SA2 with the binary variable Route in SA2 (= 1 if the SA2 is on the route of the convoy). The estimated $\hat{\beta}_2$ gives us the effect of a stop in SA2 (or route in SA2) on the vote share of the Coalition in 2016. $\hat{\beta}_2 + \hat{\beta}_3$ gives us the corresponding effects in 2019. So $\hat{\beta}_3$ (the difference-in-difference estimate) is the differential effect of a Stop in SA2 (Route in SA2) on the vote share in 2019 vs 2016. The reason why we would expect a stop in a SA2 (or a route in SA2) to have an effect on the Coalition vote share comes from the fact that the convoy passing through the SA2s could have made the issue of climate change and mining more salient to the population. The incumbent Coalition government was viewed as being less sympathetic to climate change.

We then turn to the role of mining. We begin by investigating the relationship between mining engagement and Coalition vote share. As a starting point, we estimate the following regression:

$$\text{Coalition TPP Voteshare}_{st} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{ Share Mining}_s + \gamma\mathbf{Z} + \zeta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

Here Share Mining_s denotes the proportion of the total resident population that is employed in the mining sector. $\hat{\alpha}_1$, therefore, presents the direct effect of mining engagement in the SA2 on the Coalition TPP vote share.

We next examine whether mining engagement has different effects on Coalition TPP vote share in 2016 vs 2019. To examine this we estimate an extended version of equation (2).

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Coalition TPP Voteshare}_{st} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{ Share Mining}_s + \alpha_2 \text{ Year 2019} \\ + \alpha_3 \text{ (Share Mining}_s \times \text{Year 2019)} + \gamma\mathbf{Z} + \zeta_i + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Here $\hat{\alpha}_1$ is the effect of a unit increase in the share of mining in SA2 s on the Coalition vote share in 2016, the corresponding effect in 2019 is given by $\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_3$. $\hat{\alpha}_3$ is the differential effect of the share of mining on Coalition TPP vote share in 2019 relative to 2016.

Finally, we examine whether the effect of mining is exacerbated in a SA2 with a stop (or if it is on the convoy route). To address this, we estimate the following extended version of equation (3)

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Coalition TPP Voteshare}_{it} = \alpha_0 &+ \alpha_1 \text{ Share Mining} + \alpha_2 \text{ Year 2019} \\
&+ \alpha_3 \text{ (Share Mining} \times \text{ Year 2019)} + \alpha_4 \text{ Stop in SA2} \\
&+ \alpha_5 \text{ (Stop in SA2} \times \text{Year 2019)} \\
&+ \alpha_6 \text{ (Stop in SA2} \times \text{Share Mining)} \\
&+ \alpha_7 \text{ (Stop in SA2} \times \text{Share Mining} \times \text{Year 2019)} \\
&+ \gamma \mathbf{Z} + \zeta_i + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned} \tag{4}
$$

The variables are as explained above. In an alternate specification we include, instead of the Stop in SA2, a dummy for Route in SA2. Here $\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$ gives the differential effect of a unit increase in the share of mining on the Coalition vote share in 2019 vs 2016 if the SA2 has a stop (or if it is on the route of the convoy).

In additional regressions, we replace Share Mining in equations (2) — (4) sequentially with the three other measures of mining: Mine in SA2, Mining Intensity, and Mining Density, as defined in Section 2.4.

3 Effect of Stop/Route in SA2 on Coalition Vote share

We now turn to the regression results. This section presents the results on the effect of a stop in or the route through a SA2 on Coalition TPP vote share. We start with a discussion of parallel trends (Section 3.1) and this is followed in Section 3.2 by a discussion of our regression results, corresponding to equation (1). Section 3.2 also presents the results by state and shows that the observed effects are largely driven by the patterns in Queensland. Finally, Section 3.3 discusses the robustness of our key results.

3.1 Parallel Trends

Before presenting the main results, we examine the trends in Coalition TPP vote shares in each SA2, which relates to the identifying assumption of the DID design that we use. We want to rule out the possibility that in the absence of the convoy, the Coalition vote share would be different across SA2s with/without a stop and on/off the route.

Figure 4: Pre-Trends



Notes: Estimated coefficient and 90% confidence intervals for $\hat{\tau}_4$ and $\hat{\tau}_5$ from equation (5) presented. The reference year is 2016. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Regressions include state fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level.

To do this, we additionally include data from the 2013 federal elections and estimate the following extended version of equation (1):

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Coalition TPP Vote share}_{it} = \tau_0 + \tau_1 \text{ Year 2013} + \tau_2 \text{ Year 2019} + \tau_3 \text{ Stop in SA2} \\ + \tau_4 \text{ (Year 2013} \times \text{Stop in SA2)} \\ + \tau_5 \text{ (Year 2019} \times \text{Stop in SA2)} + \zeta_i + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

The variables are as defined above. As before, we also estimate a version of equation (5) where instead of Stop in SA2 we include Route in SA2 and the corresponding interactions. We assume 2016 to be the reference year. In Figure 4 we present $\hat{\tau}_4$ and $\hat{\tau}_5$ and the corresponding 90% confidence intervals. By construction, the estimated effect for 2016 is 0. There is no evidence to suggest that the assumption of parallel pre-trends does not hold in the data.

3.2 Regression Results: Effect of Stop/Route in SA2 on Coalition Vote share

3.2.1 Results for Eastern States and Territories

The regression results, corresponding to the regression specification given by equation (1), are presented in Table 2. Panel A presents the coefficient estimates, and Panel B presents the implied difference estimates. In columns 1 and 2, we examine the effects of a Stop in SA2, while in columns 3 and 4, we examine the effects of the Route in SA2. In columns 2 and 4, we include additional SA2 level controls, including total population, median total weekly family income, urban area, and population density.

We find that SA2s that have a stop or route passing through have significantly higher coalition vote shares in 2019. Having a stop in the SA2 increases the Coalition TPP vote share by a statistically significant 2.5 percentage points, as captured by the interaction term *Stop in SA2* $\times$ *Year 2019* (column 1). Similarly, in 2019, having a route through the SA2 increases the Coalition TPP vote share by a statistically significant 2.4 percentage points, as captured by the interaction term *Route in SA2* $\times$ *Year 2019* in column 3. The inclusion of SA2 level controls increases the magnitude of the effects to 3.3 percentage points in column 2, and 2.5 percentage points in column 4, both are statistically significant (with $p < 0.05$ and < 0.01 respectively).

Our results also reveal interesting difference estimates. For example, in 2016, the Coalition TPP vote share was statistically similar in SA2s with and without a stop ($\hat{\beta}_2$ in column 1). This increases to a statistically significant 5.1 percentage points higher vote share for the Coalition in 2019 in SA2s with a stop ($\hat{\beta}_2 + \hat{\beta}_3$). Given that the average Coalition vote share in 2016 was 49.6% in SA2s without a stop and 54.4% in SA2s with a stop; the 5.1 percentage points effect corresponds to 9.4% higher vote share for the Coalition in areas with a stop. Similarly, the estimates in column 3 imply that the Coalition vote share ($\hat{\beta}_2$) was 2.9 percentage points higher in SA2s on the route in 2016. The corresponding effect of having the convoy route passing through the SA2s in 2019 ($\hat{\beta}_2 + \hat{\beta}_3$) was 5.2 percentage points. Given that the average Coalition TPP vote share is 49.4% in SA2s off the route and 53% in SA2s on the route, the 5.2 percentage point effect corresponds to a 9.8% increase in the Coalition vote share.

Additionally, our results show that SA2s without a stop experienced a statistically significant 1.4 percentage point increase in Coalition TPP vote share in 2019 ($\hat{\beta}_1$); this increases to 3.9 percentage points in SA2s with a stop ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$). The effect is stronger at 4.7 percentage points when we include additional SA2 level controls (column 2). The inclusion of SA2 level controls increases the magnitude of the effect of a stop in 2019 from 5.1 to 5.9 percentage points. Likewise, SA2s that were not on the route experienced on average a 1.2 percentage point higher Coalition vote share ($\hat{\beta}_1$) in 2019 relative to 2016; and this effect increased to 3.7 percentage points in SA2s on

Table 2: Stop/Route in SA2 and Coalition TPP Vote share

	Stop in SA2		Route in SA2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: *Regression Estimates*				
Year 2019	0.014***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Stop in SA2	0.025	0.026		
	(0.017)	(0.021)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019	0.025*	0.033**		
	(0.014)	(0.014)		
Route in SA2			0.029**	0.011
			(0.011)	(0.011)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019			0.024***	0.025***
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	0.535***	0.575***	0.533***	0.573***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.087	0.232	0.093	0.233
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*				
Stop in SA2: 2019 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)	0.039***	0.047***		
	(0.015)	(0.015)		
Route in SA2: 2019 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)			0.036***	0.037***
			(0.006)	(0.006)
2019: Stop in SA2 vs No Stop ($\hat{\beta}_2 + \hat{\beta}_3$)	0.051***	0.059***		
	(0.022)	(0.023)		
2019: Route in SA2 vs No Route ($\hat{\beta}_2 + \hat{\beta}_3$)			0.052***	0.036***
			(0.013)	(0.013)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the two-party Coalition vote share. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. The estimating equation is equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the SA2 level presented in parenthesis. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

the route ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$, column 4). The effect of the route passing through the SA2 is a 3.6 percentage point increase in the coalition vote share in 2019 (see column 4).

3.2.2 State Specific Results

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the effects of the convoy were particularly strong in the state of Queensland. To examine whether there are state specific heterogeneities in the effects of the convoy on the Coalition TPP vote shares, we re-estimate the regression given by equation (1), separately for each state. The regression results are presented in Table 3.[9]

The view that the electoral effects of the convoy (that we present in Table 2) are driven by the patterns in Queensland is corroborated by the results presented in Table 3. Only in Queensland (columns 2 and 6), the DID estimates are statistically significant: relative to 2016, having a stop in the SA2 increases the Coalition TPP vote share in 2019 by a statistically significant 4.6 percentage points. Similarly, relative to 2016, having a route through the SA2 increases the Coalition TPP vote share by a statistically significant 5.1 percentage points. The difference estimates corroborate the main argument. Having a stop or the route passing through is associated with a 9.1 percentage point increase in the Coalition TPP vote share in 2019, relative to 2016. Given that the average Coalition vote share in Queensland in 2016 was 52.1% in SA2s without a stop and 54.4% in SA2s with a stop; the 9.1 percentage point effect of having the convoy passing through the SA2 implies a huge 16.7% increase in vote share for the Coalition. The results are weaker (and generally not statistically significant) in the other states.

The strong effects of the convoy in Queensland are expected, given that the Adani-Carmichael coal mine is located in Queensland and promised several thousand jobs to Queenslanders. Our findings are also consistent with anecdotal evidence that the convoy resulted in a strong backlash in Queensland because of the rhetoric of climate change and the anti-coal message.

3.3 Robustness

In this section, we present a set of additional regressions that examine the robustness of our results. *First*, we conduct two sets of placebo regressions (Section 3.3.1). *Next* (Section 3.3.2) we exclude the major cities (Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Hobart) and ACT. *Finally*, Section 3.3.3 conducts the analysis at a higher level of aggregation.

[9] We exclude ACT from our analysis. Hence, four different sets of regressions are computed. The regression results without the SA2 level controls are available on request.

Table 3: Stop/Route in SA2 and Coalition TPP Vote Share. State Specific Effects

	Stop in SA2				Route in SA2			
	NSW	QLD	VIC	TAS	NSW	QLD	VIC	TAS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Year 2019	0.011***	0.045***	-0.014***	0.023**	0.012***	0.041***	-0.014***	0.021**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Stop in SA2	0.063	0.021	-0.047*	0.036				
	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.062)				
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019	0.003	0.046***	-0.005	-0.010				
	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.028)				
Route in SA2					0.048***	0.015	-0.070*	0.020
					(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.041)	(0.031)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019					-0.005	0.051***	-0.013	0.014
					(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.026)	(0.016)
Constant	0.518***	0.536***	0.578***	0.479***	0.510***	0.530***	0.578***	0.473***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.053)
Sample Size	1,025	837	798	158	1,025	837	798	158
R-squared	0.185	0.168	0.214	0.147	0.189	0.178	0.222	0.153
SA2 Level Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Difference Estimates								
Stop in SA2: 2019 vs 2016	0.014	0.091***	-0.019	0.013				
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.026)				
Route in SA2: 2019 vs 2016					0.007	0.091***	-0.026	0.035**
					(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.014)
2019: Stop in SA2 vs No Stop	0.066	0.066***	-0.052**	0.026				
	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.087)				
2019: Route in SA2 vs No Stop					0.043***	0.065***	-0.082**	0.034
					(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.042)	(0.033)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the two-party Coalition vote share. Sample restricted to federal elections in 2016 and 2022. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. The estimating equation is equation (1), run separately for each state. Standard errors clustered at the SA2 level presented in parenthesis. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

3.3.1 Falsification Exercises

Persistence of Effects? The results presented so far support the argument that a stop in or the route of the convoy passing through a particular SA2 is associated with a large increase in the Coalition TPP vote share. If these effects are persistent, we expect to see a similar effect in the 2022 federal elections.[10] To examine this question, we conduct a falsification exercise. We re-estimate the regressions given by equation (1) but this time instead of comparing the patterns in 2016 and 2019 we compare these in 2016 and 2022. Essentially, we do the following thought exercise: hold the route and stops of the convoy unchanged and assume that the 2019 elections did not happen. The regression results corresponding to the revised version of equation (1) are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. The DID estimates (Stop/Route in SA2 $\times$ Year 2022) are never statistically significant. Having a stop or a route passing through the SA2s is not associated with a significantly higher vote share for the Coalition in 2022 relative to 2016. While there is no additional effect of having a stop in 2022, having a route in the SA2s is associated with a 4.5 percentage point (same magnitude when we include SA2 level controls) increase in Coalition vote share. Part of this is explained by the fact that SA2s on the route are always associated with a higher Coalition vote share; the patterns for SA2s with a stop are different, particularly for the 2022 Federal elections (compare Figures A3a and A3b in the Appendix).

Placebo Regressions: Table A3 in the Appendix presents the results of a second placebo regression. Here we restrict data to the 2013 and 2016 federal elections, holding the stops and routes fixed and re-estimating equation (1): i.e., assuming that the convoy happened before the 2016 elections instead. The DID estimates are never statistically significant. Additionally, the difference estimates show that the Coalition's vote share in SA2s with a stop or on the route was significantly higher in 2013 relative to 2016.

3.3.2 Excluding Major Cities

We re-estimate our major regression (equation (1)) by excluding the major cities in each state (Sydney, Brisbane, Hobart and Melbourne) and the territory of ACT (which includes Canberra). The regression results are presented in Table A4 in the Appendix. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.

[10] Of course we acknowledge that the COVID years (2020 and 2021) do not make the 2019 and 2022 elections directly comparable. However, while the intensity of lockdowns varied by state, the entire population experienced the COVID effect.

3.3.3 Analysis at a Higher Level of Aggregation

Our analysis, thus far, has been conducted at the SA2 level. We next examine whether the results on the political effects of a stop/route continue to hold at a higher level of aggregation. Specifically, we perform the analysis at the level of Statistical Area 3 (or SA3). The corresponding regression results are presented in Table A5 in the Appendix. Since SA2s are nested within SA3s, we can compute the Coalition TPP vote share by aggregating up.

While weaker, the results are qualitatively similar to our main results presented in Table 2. *First*, consider the results in columns 1 and 2 (the effect of a stop in a SA3). The DID estimates are positive and statistically significant. Additionally, relative to 2016, having a stop in a SA3 is associated with a 3.5 percentage point increase in Coalition vote share. Next, we consider the effects of the route going through a SA3. While the DID estimates are not statistically significant, compared to 2016, having the route passing through a SA3 in 2019 is associated with a 2.3 percentage point increase in Coalition TPP vote share in the SA3. However, this effect is smaller than the SA2 effect of 3.6 percentage points (see Table 2).

4 Role of Mining

In this section, we examine how mining engagement and its interactions with the stop/route of the convoy affected electoral outcomes.

4.1 Mining Engagement: Share of Population Employed in Mining

To examine the effect of mining on Coalition vote share, we first present the correlation between the share of mining (share of population employed in mining) and the Coalition vote share in the SA2 (with and without additional SA2 controls). The regression results, corresponding to the regression specification given by equation (2), are presented in Table 4. The regression results in column 1 show that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of the population employed in mining is associated with a statistically significant 0.610 percentage points (1.14%) increase in the Coalition vote share. However, the effect reduces to a statistically not significant 0.046 percentage points (0.08%) when we include additional SA2 level controls (column 2).

Are the effects of mining engagement by residents different across the two election years? The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, corresponding to the regression specification given by equation (3), imply that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of population employed in mining is associated with a 0.166 percentage point (0.31%) increase in the Coalition vote share in

2016, but a 0.391 percentage points (0.68%) decrease in Coalition vote share when we include SA2 controls. The difference-in-difference estimate ($\hat{\alpha}_3$) is statistically significant in both columns 3 and 4. A 1 percentage point increase in the share of the population engaged in mining is associated with a 0.96 percentage point (1.8%) increase in the Coalition TPP vote share in 2019, relative to 2016 ($p < 0.01$). Moreover, the difference estimates in panel B show that in 2019, the effect of 1 percentage point increase in the share of population employed in mining is associated with a large and statistically significant 1.127 percentage point (2.12%) increase in the Coalition vote share (the effect decreases to 0.555 percentage points (0.96%) when we include SA2 level controls).

In Columns 5–8, we investigate whether the mining effect is stronger in SA2s with a stop (or on the route). The regression specification is given by equation (4). Consistent with the results presented in columns 3 and 4, an increase in the share of population employed in mining is associated with an increase in Coalition TPP vote share both in 2016 and 2019, but the effect is relatively higher in 2019. The differential effects on Coalition vote share (2019 vs 2016) were similar in SA2s with and without a stop: a 1 percentage point increase in share of mining was associated with a 0.94 percentage point (1.77%) increase in Coalition vote share in a SA2 without a stop ($\hat{\alpha}_3$, Panel A) and a similar (0.97 percentage point or 1.82%) increase in a SA2 with a stop ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$, Panel B); the difference ($\hat{\alpha}_7$) is statistically not significant.

Mining share is associated with a larger increase in Coalition TPP vote share in 2019 relative to 2016 in SA2s on the route: a 1 percentage point increase in share of mining was associated with a 0.75 percentage point (1.43%) increase in Coalition TPP vote share in SA2s off the route ($\hat{\alpha}_3$ Panel A), compared to a 1.32 percentage point (2.49%) increase in SA2s on the route ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$ in Panel B). The effects are slightly weaker when we include SA2 level controls. These results suggest that mining engagement has a positive effect on Coalition vote share, and areas along the convoy and off the convoy experience statistically similar effects.

4.2 Mining Engagement: Presence of Mines

Tables A6—A8 in the Appendix present the regression results using alternative measures of mining engagement. In Table A6 we present regression results corresponding to presence of a mine in SA2; and in Tables A7 and A8 those corresponding to mining intensity and mining density, respectively.

The presence of operating mines in a SA2 has considerably weaker effects on the Coalition TPP vote share. For example, the regressions presented in column 1 of Table A6, imply that the Coalition vote share is 6.5 percentage points higher in a SA2 with a mine, though this effect is considerably smaller and no longer statistically significant when we include SA2 level controls (column 2). Coalition vote share in 2019 is 8.4 percentage points higher in SA2s with an operating mine, relative to those without (see column 3), though the effect decreases considerably in

Table 4: Mining Engagement and Coalition Vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Regression Estimates								
Share Population in mining	0.610***	0.046	0.166	-0.391**	0.149	-0.431**	0.075	-0.365*
	(0.224)	(0.179)	(0.196)	(0.182)	(0.219)	(0.193)	(0.223)	(0.199)
Year 2019			0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Share mining × Year 2019			0.962***	0.946***	0.943***	0.930***	0.754***	0.764***
			(0.204)	(0.197)	(0.239)	(0.225)	(0.213)	(0.207)
Stop in SA2					0.028	0.038		
					(0.021)	(0.026)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.006	0.017		
					(0.015)	(0.014)		
Stop in SA2 × Share mining					-0.160	-0.143		
					(0.460)	(0.557)		
Stop in SA2 × Share mining × Year 2019					0.023	-0.106		
					(0.388)	(0.384)		
Route in SA2							0.027**	0.017
							(0.014)	(0.013)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							0.009	0.011
							(0.008)	(0.008)
Route in SA2 s× Share mining							0.079	-0.249
							(0.412)	(0.421)
Route in SA2 × Share mining × Year 2019							0.563	0.496
							(0.381)	(0.389)
Constant	0.536***	0.583***	0.532***	0.579***	0.531***	0.577***	0.529***	0.576***
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.087	0.227	0.093	0.233	0.094	0.235	0.099	0.235
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Effect of Share mining in 2019 ($\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_3$)			1.127***	0.555***				
			(0.305)	(0.239)				
Effect of Share mining 2019 vs 2016								
Stop in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)					0.966***	0.824***		
					(0.306)	(0.311)		
Route in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)							1.317***	1.260***
							(0.315)	(0.329)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. The estimating equations are equations (2), (3) and (4) (columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–8 respectively). Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

magnitude (from 8.4 to 3.0 percentage points, or from 15.1% to 5.4%) and remains statistically significant when we include SA2 level controls. However, there is no evidence that the effect of mining engagement varies between 2016 and 2019 in SA2s with a stop or on the route of the convoy (columns 5–6 and 7–8 respectively): none of these estimates are statistically significant.

The results are even weaker when we consider mining intensity or mining density (Tables A7 and A8 respectively). When we include SA2 level controls, there is no evidence to support the argument that in 2019 Coalition vote share is higher in SA2s with a higher mining intensity or higher mining density (though the unconditional effect continues to be statistically significant in Table A7). An increase in the number of mines or the density of mines in the SA2 are both associated with an increase in Coalition vote share in 2019, though the effects are no longer statistically significant when we include SA2 level controls (columns 3 and 4 of Tables A7 and A8). An increase in the number of mines and mining density in a SA2 both have stronger effects on Coalition vote share in 2019 (relative to 2016) when there is a stop in the SA2 (columns 5 and 6) or the route passes through the SA2 (columns 7 and 8).

In some ways, the fact that the results are weaker when we use the presence of mines/mining intensity/mining density as measures of mining engagement in the SA2 is anticipated, since the share of population employed by the mining sector is plausibly a more direct and cleaner measure of mining engagement. While the average share employed in mining is significantly higher in SA2s with a mine (0.005 vs 0.038, $p = 0.000$), the heterogeneity in share employed in mining is large even in SA2s without a mine.

5 Effect on Preferences for Greens

In our previous sections, we have identified the negative effects of the Stop-Adani convoy. We next examine whether this convoy had any partisan effects; specifically, whether there were any effects on the vote share of the Greens (recall that Bob Brown himself was a noted environmentalist and a former leader of the Australian Greens).

To do this, we first consider the share of first-preference votes for the Greens in the House of Representatives. We re-estimate equation (1) with this new dependent variable. The regression results are presented in columns 1–4 of Table 5. These results suggest that neither having a stop in the SA2 nor the route passing through the SA2 has a statistically significant effect on the first preference vote share of the Greens.

We next consider the effect of mining on the first preference vote shares for the Greens. The regression results corresponding to equations (2) – (4) are presented in Panel A of Table 6. An increase in the share of the population in the SA2 engaged in mining is associated with a decline in the proportion of first preference votes going to the Greens. The effects are large: a 1 percentage point increase in the share of population employed in mining is associated with a 0.62 percentage point (5.97%) reduction in the first preference vote share for the Greens. While the total effect remains negative, the additional effect of share of population employed in mining is positive for 2019, implying that the effect of mining engagement has a weaker effect on the Green's vote share. In other words, while an increase in the share of the population employed in mining is associated with a decrease in Green's vote share both in 2016 and 2019, the effect in 2016 is relatively larger. In 2019, Green's first preference vote share is higher in SA2s without a stop or not on the route, though the effect is statistically significant only in the case of the latter and imprecise in the case of the former.

To better understand the effect of the convoy on the preference for the Greens, we also examine how the convoy affected Greens' vote share in the Senate (upper house of the Australian Parliament). Columns 5–8 of Table 5 present the regression results corresponding to the estimating equation given by equation (1), where the dependent variable is the first preference vote share for the Greens in the Senate at the SA2 level. The following results stand out. *First*, there is no evidence to suggest that Green's first preference vote share is systematically higher in 2019 (relative to 2016) in SA2s with a stop or on the route (as captured by the difference estimates in Panel B). Whether the Greens gained in SA2s with a stop or on the route is also unclear. While in 2019, the Greens' first preference vote share was higher in SA2s with a stop relative to SA2s without one, the opposite holds for SA2s on and off the route.

Panel B of Table 6 examines the effects of mining engagement on the first preference vote share of the Greens in the Senate. An increase in mining engagement is associated with a large decline in the Greens first preference vote share both in 2016 and in 2019, and the effects are similar across the two years (Share mining $\times$ Year 2019 is not statistically significant; columns 3 and 4). This is unlike in the elections for the House of Representatives (Panel A, columns 3 and 4). However, increased mining engagement does not have a differential effect depending on whether the SA2 has a stop or is on the route.

Overall, these results suggest that the convoy had little positive electoral effects for the Greens: the effects at the Senate levels are negligible while there are some positive effects at the House of Representatives level. Thus, there is little evidence of systematic effects of the convoy on the Greens' vote share.

Table 5: Stop / Route in SA2 and First Preference Vote share of Greens. 2016 vs 2019

	House of Representatives				Senate			
	Stop in SA2		Route in SA2		Stop in SA2		Route in SA2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: *Regression Estimates*								
Year 2019	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.014***	0.014***	0.015***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Stop in SA2	-0.003	0.002			-0.001	0.007		
	((0.016))	(0.016)			(0.014)	(0.013)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019	0.015	0.015			-0.001	-0.002		
	(0.011)	(0.011)			(0.007)	(0.008)		
Route in SA2			-0.005	-0.000			-0.006	-0.003
			(0.008)	(0.007)			(0.007)	(0.006)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019			-0.003	-0.003			-0.007**	-0.005
			(0.005)	(0.005)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.095***	-0.008	0.096***	-0.008*	0.076***	-0.036***	0.077***	-0.035***
	((0.003))	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
SA2 level Controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State / Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,919	2,919	2,919	2,919
R-squared	0.070	0.226	0.071	0.226	0.097	0.299	0.098	0.299
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Stop in SA2: 2019 vs 2016	0.015	0.016			0.014**	0.012		
	(0.011)	(0.011)			(0.006)	(0.008)		
Route in SA2: 2019 vs 2016			-0.002	-0.002			0.008***	0.009***
			(0.005)	(0.003)			(0.003)	(0.003)
2019: Stop in SA2 vs No Stop in SA2	0.012	0.017			-0.001	0.005		
	(0.020)	(0.019)			(0.014)	(0.014)		
2019: Route in SA2 vs No Route in SA2			-0.009	-0.003			-0.012*	-0.007
			(0.008)	(0.007)			(0.007)	(0.006)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. In columns 1–4, the dependent variable is the Greens First Preference vote share for the House of Representatives at the SA2 level in 2016 and 2019. Dependent variable in columns 5–8 is the Greens First Preference vote share at the SA2 level in 2016 and 2019 in the Senate (Upper House) elections. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors clustered at the SA2 level presented in parenthesis. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 6: Mining Engagement and Vote share for the Greens. 2016 vs 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: **House of Representatives**								
A1: *Regression Estimates*								
Share of population in mining	-0.615***	-0.684***	-0.652***	-0.720***	-0.634***	-0.702***	-0.557***	-0.647***
	(0.077)	(0.049)	(0.080)	(0.055)	(0.089)	(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.053)
Year 2019			0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Share mining × Year 2019			0.079**	0.076*	0.105**	0.096**	0.125**	0.109**
			(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Stop in SA2					0.013	0.022		
					(0.021)	(0.019)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.021	0.020		
					(0.014)	(0.013)		
Stop in SA2 × Share mining					-0.203	-0.300		
					(0.305)	(0.286)		
Stop in SA2 × Share mining × Year 2019					-0.331*	-0.294		
					(0.186)	(0.181)		
Route in SA2							0.005	0.009
							(0.010)	(0.009)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							-0.003	-0.002
							(0.006)	(0.006)
Route in SA2 × Share mining							-0.410*	-0.372*
							(0.247)	(0.213)
Route in SA2 × Share mining × Year 2019							-0.095	-0.065
							(0.115)	(0.115)
Constant	0.103***	0.002	0.103***	0.002	0.103***	0.001	0.103***	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)
SA2 level Controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State / Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.087	0.245	0.087	0.246	0.089	0.249	0.089	0.247
A2: *Difference Estimates*								
Stop in SA2: 2019 vs 2016					-0.226	-0.198		
					(0.180)	(0.175)		
Route in SA2: 2019 vs 2016							0.030	0.044
							(0.103)	(0.102)
2019: Stop vs No Stop in SA2					-0.534	-0.595		
					(0.392)	(0.364)		
2019: Route vs No Route in SA2							-0.505**	-0.437***
							(0.248)	(0.211)

Continued...

Table 6 (Continued). Mining Engagement and Vote share for the Greens. 2016 vs 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel B: **Senate**								
B1: *Regression Estimates*								
Share of population in mining	-0.755***	-0.826***	-0.767***	-0.840***	-0.779***	-0.854***	-0.704***	-0.799***
	(0.107)	(0.063)	(0.110)	(0.067)	(0.128)	(0.075)	(0.120)	(0.068)
Year 2019			0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.013***	0.014***	0.014***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Share mining × Year 2019			0.023	0.027	0.054	0.065*	0.078*	0.081*
			(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Stop in SA2					0.004	0.018		
					(0.018)	(0.015)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.011	0.009		
					(0.010)	(0.011)		
Stop in SA2 × Share mining					0.029	-0.098		
					(0.295)	(0.252)		
Stop in SA2 × Share mining × Year 2019					-0.264**	-0.283**		
					(0.121)	(0.141)		
Route in SA2							-0.001	0.002
							(0.009)	(0.008)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							-0.005	-0.003
							(0.004)	(0.004)
Route in SA2 × Share mining							-0.229	-0.182
							(0.269)	(0.208)
Route in SA2 × Share mining × Year 2019							-0.080	-0.117
							(0.083)	(0.082)
Constant	0.094***	-0.015**	0.087***	-0.022***	0.087***	-0.022***	0.087***	-0.022***
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)
SA2 level Controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State / Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,919	2,919	2,919	2,919	2,919	2,919	2,919	2,919
R-squared	0.028	0.276	0.038	0.286	0.039	0.288	0.040	0.286
B2: *Difference Estimates*								
Stop in SA2: 2019 vs 2016					-0.210*	-0.218		
					(0.116)	(0.137)		
Route in SA2: 2019 vs 2016							-0.002	-0.036
							(0.072)	(0.070)
2019: Stop vs No Stop in SA2					0.235	0.381		
					(0.321)	(0.297)		
2019: Route vs No Route in SA2							0.309	-0.299
							(0.241)	(0.190)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable in Panel A is the Greens first preference vote share in the House of Representatives and that in Panel B is the Greens first preference vote share in the Senate. The estimating equations are equations (2), (3) and (4) (columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–8 respectively). Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

6 Addressing Selection

The main purpose of the convoy was to raise awareness of climate change, global warming, and the Adani-Carmichael coal mine. Therefore, it is highly likely that stops and routes were intentionally chosen to maximize the impact of the convoy. There is, therefore, a potential selection bias. In Table 7 we present the means and standard deviations (and the difference in means) of a set of SA2 characteristics, obtained from the 2016 census, by whether there is a stop in the SA2 (or whether the route passed through the SA2). The descriptive statistics presented in Table 7 imply that the SA2s that had a stop and those that did not (columns 1–5) and correspondingly those that had the route pass through and those that did not (columns 6–10), were systematically different along a number of dimensions. For example, average high school completion rates, the proportion having a bachelor degree, the share of the population employed in mining, and the Coalition vote share in 2016 are all significantly higher in SA2s with a stop (or on the route). Furthermore, these characteristics are jointly significant ($p = 0.000$) in explaining whether there is a stop in a SA2 (or if the route passes through a particular SA2).

In the absence of an IV that is correlated with the choice of the stop/route but not directly correlated with the Coalition TPP vote share, except through the choice of the stop/route, we use two recent advances in econometric methods to address the selection issue – synthetic difference-in-differences and synthetic controls. Both methods are designed to address the selection problem in causal inference.

The synthetic control (SC) method addresses the selection problem by constructing a weighted combination of control units to create a *synthetic* version of each treated unit. This counterfactual control is designed to mimic the pre-treatment outcomes and other observed characteristics of the treated unit before the treatment is applied. To construct the synthetic control, we first identify a set of control units that did not receive the treatment. We then construct a weighted combination of these control units with weights chosen such that the synthetic control unit *closely* matches the treated unit on pre-treatment outcomes and other observed characteristics. These weights are optimally generated based on the pre-treatment characteristics of treated and control units, and fixed over time (zero time weights). Since the SC approach attempts to control for unobserved confounders that could bias the estimation of the treatment effect, any difference in outcomes between the treated unit and the synthetic control after the treatment can be attributed to the treatment itself, rather than to pre-existing differences.

Synthetic Differences-in-differences (SDID) combines the synthetic control method with the traditional DID approach. Similar to the synthetic control method, we first construct a synthetic version of the treated unit using a weighted combination of control units based on pre-treatment characteristics. While SC uses asymmetric unit weights to construct the parallel trend and as-

Table 7: Selection?

	No Stop in SA2		Stop in SA2			No Route in SA2		Route in SA2		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Difference	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Total Population ('000)	11.120	6.324	10.684	5.497	0.436	11.190	6.312	10.315	6.200	0.875
Median Age	39.673	6.059	39.806	5.126	-0.132	39.682	6.066	39.620	5.773	0.062
Median Weekly Personal Income ('00)	6.771	1.781	6.705	2.160	0.066	6.780	1.771	6.672	1.973	0.108
Median Weekly Total Family Income ('00)	17.572	5.132	16.193	4.903	1.380	17.598	5.087	16.973	5.515	0.625
Average Number of Persons per Bedroom	0.842	0.110	0.819	0.098	0.023	0.842	0.109	0.841	0.119	0.001
Population Density	0.045	0.968	0.009	0.033	0.036	0.046	1.002	0.031	0.183	0.014
Area in square km	107.130	1794.265	43.346	141.081	63.783	99.388	1839.727	166.960	888.736	-67.573
Share High School Completion	0.410	0.132	0.356	0.137	0.054**	0.412	0.129	0.376	0.159	0.036**
Share Bachelor	0.118	0.065	0.100	0.073	0.019*	0.119	0.064	0.108	0.077	0.011*
Share Internet Access	0.297	0.040	0.293	0.046	0.004	0.298	0.040	0.288	0.044	0.010**
Average dwelling per Resident	0.361	0.045	0.374	0.046	-0.013*	0.362	0.045	0.361	0.044	0.001
Percent Unemployment	6.753	3.008	7.478	3.007	-0.725	6.729	3.015	7.178	2.927	-0.450*
Share Migrant	0.366	0.091	0.402	0.095	-0.037**	0.366	0.089	0.375	0.111	-0.009
Share Working Away	0.016	0.004	0.017	0.003	0.000	0.016	0.004	0.016	0.003	0.000
Share Employed in Mining	0.006	0.014	0.022	0.034	-0.016***	0.005	0.014	0.013	0.023	-0.008***
Urban	0.815	0.388	0.778	0.422	0.038	0.829	0.377	0.676	0.470	0.152***
Share of Coalition Votes (2016)	0.496	0.139	0.544	0.108	-0.048**	0.494	0.138	0.530	0.137	-0.036***
Share of Green Votes House (2016)	0.101	0.002	0.088	0.016	0.013	0.102	0.002	0.090	0.008	0.012
Share of Green Votes Senate (2016)	0.083	0.002	0.074	0.014	0.009	0.083	0.002	0.073	0.007	0.010
Observations	1500		36			1394		142		
F-test of Joint Significance					5.13 [0.000]					4.58 [0.006]

Notes: SA2 characteristics as per the 2016 Census.

sumes no time weight, SDID uses both asymmetric unit weights and time weights to construct the counterfactual parallel trend and allowing for different levels of outcomes for treated and control units. Thus, SDID allows us to find a weighted average of control units with a pre-treatment trend that is *parallel* to the treated unit average. Then it applies the DID approach by comparing the differences in the outcomes between the treated unit and its synthetic control before and after treatment. This involves taking the difference of two differences. The first is the difference in outcomes for the treated unit before and after treatment. The second is the difference in outcomes for the synthetic control before and after treatment. By combining the strengths of SC and DID methods, synthetic DID helps ensure that the pre-treatment characteristics are balanced while accounting for time-varying factors that could influence the outcomes. In short, SDID enhances the DID framework by addressing the limitations associated with selecting a comparable control group (from using equal weight of each unit) and enhances the SC framework by addressing the limitations associated with taking only one difference (using zero time weight).

Turning to our case, recall that we denote SA2s with a stop or route passing through as treated SA2s, and SA2s without a stop or route passing through as controlled SA2s or untreated SA2s. With the synthetic control approach, each synthetic controlled SA2 is constructed so that it closely resembles the corresponding treated SA2 in terms of the Coalition vote shares of previous years, and other covariates listed Table 7 (total population, median weekly family income, urban, population density, and share of population engaged in mining activities). Once an aggregation of multiple synthetic controlled SA2s is constructed from a convex combination of the underlying control SA2s, the difference in Coalition vote share in 2019 between the treated and synthetic control SA2s is the treatment effect of having a stop or route of the convoy passing through.

Figure A5 in the Appendix presents the treatment–control difference and the 95% confidence interval for the difference. These figures show a large increase in Coalition TPP vote share in 2019 compared to 2016. The SDID and SC estimates are presented in Table 8 in columns 1–4 and 5–8, respectively. Consistent with our main regression results of the effect on Coalition TPP vote share (presented in Table 2), we find that Coalition vote shares are significantly higher in SA2s with a stop or having the convoy route passed through. Using the synthetic difference-in-differences method, we find that Coalition vote shares in SA2s in 2019 are 3.3 percentage points (6%) higher in SA2 with a stop, relative to SA2 without a stop. The effect is slightly weaker with the route: Coalition vote shares in SA2s where the route of the convoy passed through are 2.6 percentage points (5%) higher relative to SA2s where the convoy route did not pass through. The synthetic control method also gives relatively robust results. Having a convoy stop in SA2s is associated with a 3.4 to 4.8 percentage point (6.3% to 8.8%) increase in Coalition vote share relative to SA2s without a stop. The effect of having a convoy route passing through is again slightly smaller than the effect of having a stop. Having a convoy route passing through SA2s is associated with a 2.5 to 3.9 percentage point (4.7% to 7.4%) increase in Coalition vote shares,

Table 8: Stop/Route in SA2 and Coalition TPP Vote share. Synthetic Control and Synthetic Difference-in-Difference Estimates

	Synthetic Difference-in-Differences				Synthetic controls			
	Stop in SA2		Route in SA2		Stop in SA2		Route in SA2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Coalition vote share (House)								
Effect of Stop	0.033**	0.033***			0.048**	0.034***		
	(0.010)	(0.008)			(0.024)	(0.010)		
Effect of Route			0.026***	0.026***			0.039*	0.025***
			(0.005)	(0.006)			(0.019)	(0.007)
Panel B: Greens vote share (House)								
Effect of Stop	-0.004*	-0.004			-0.048**	-0.013		
	(0.003)	(0.003)			(0.024)	(0.017)		
Effect of Route			-0.003	-0.003			-0.050**	0.002
			(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.024)	(0.012)
Panel C: Greens vote share (Senate)								
Effect of Stop	-0.004	-0.004			-0.011	-0.002		
	(0.003)	(0.003)			(0.014)	(0.008)		
Effect of Route			-0.005***	-0.005***			-0.016**	-0.008**
			(0.001)	(0.002)			(0.008)	(0.006)
Sample Size	3,873	3,873	3,873	3,873	3,873	3,873	3,873	3,873
Predetermined covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Synthetic DID and synthetic control regression results presented. Dependent variable in Panel A is the Coalition TPP vote share, in Panel B is the Green's first preference vote share in the House of Representatives and in Panel C is the Green's vote share in the Senate (upper House of the parliament). All regressions control for parallel trend assumptions using 2013 and 2016's vote shares. Predetermined covariates include all covariates listed in Table 7. 95% CIs and p-values are based on large sample approximations (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021). Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

under the counterfactual parallel trend assumptions.

We conduct an additional robustness check using a matched difference-in-differences approach, where we use nearest neighbour matching to construct the control SA2s. Then we compare SA2s relative to matched control observations to identify the difference in 2019 Coalition vote shares in SA2s with similar characteristics. Upon matching treated and control SA2s using pre-determined covariates listed in Table 7 and the share of Coalition votes in 2013 and 2016, our results show that having a stop in SA2 is associated with a 8 percentage point (14.7%) increase in Coalition vote share relative to SA2 without a stop ($p = 0.005$). However, the effect of having a route passing through is however not statistically significant. Following the same approach, we find a slight reduction (but not statistically significant) in 2019 Greens' vote share at the House in SA2s with a stop or on the route. Similar results hold for Greens' vote shares in the Senate.

7 Mines and Attitudes

The mining sector in Australia has been at the centre of the *climate wars*. In recent years, Australia has profited from a global mining boom, which has seen the industry expand its activities both domestically and internationally. It is broadly accepted that political conservatives are less likely to adopt climate change-mitigating behaviours, relative to their politically liberal counterparts (the *left-right debate*, see Chan and Faria, 2022, Berkebile-Weinberg et al., 2024, Smith et al., 2024, Cakanlar, 2024). Is that true for Australia as well?

To examine this question, we use data from several different surveys and show that (a) respondents in the mining regions of Australia are less likely to regard concerns for the environment as important/very important when deciding who to vote for; and (b) residents of mining regions are socially more conservative.[11]

We first examine voter preferences on environmental issues. Using data available from the AES 2019, we define a dummy variable taking a value of one if voters respond important or very important to the following question: *When you were deciding how to vote, how important was the environment to you personally?* The OLS regression results presented in Table 9, Panel A, column 1 show that an increase in the share of the population in the commonwealth electoral division (CED) employed in mining has a large and statistically significant reduction in the probability of respondents reporting that the environment was important/very important when deciding how to vote in 2019. The effects are large: a 1 percentage point increase in the share of the

[11] A large part of the analysis in this section is at the Commonwealth Electoral Division (CED) level because this is the lowest level of aggregation at which the data is available.

Table 9: Mines and Conservative Attitudes

		Operating Mines Only		Multiple Type of Mines	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Voter Preferences on Environmental Issues					
When you were deciding how to vote, how important was the environment to you personally?					
Share Employed in Mining	-1.474**				
	(0.492)				
Mine in CED		-0.018		-0.016	
		(0.017)		(0.030)	
Number of Mines in CED			-0.000		-0.000
			(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.887***	0.880***	0.877****	0.882***	0.877***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Number of observations	1,976	1,976	1,976	1,976	1,976
Panel B: Gender Attitudes					
(a) Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist: Disagree/Strongly disagree					
Share Employed in Mining	-2.018***				
	(0.466)				
Mine in CED		-0.075*		-0.066*	
		(0.034)		(0.030)	
Number of Mines in CED			-0.002***		-0.000***
			(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.458***	0.459***	0.448***	0.468***	0.448***
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.014	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.015
(b) Women fail to appreciate what men do for them: Disagree/Strongly disagree					
Share Employed in Mining	-2.904**				
	(0.876)				
Mine in CED		-0.073***		-0.047***	
		(0.017)		(0.012)	
Number of Mines in CED			-0.001**		-0.000*
			(0.001)		(0.000)
Constant	0.518***	0.511***	0.500***	0.514***	0.500***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.016	0.017	0.015	0.016	0.015
(c) Women seek to gain power by getting control over men: Disagree/Strongly disagree					
Share Employed in Mining	-1.245*				
	(0.653)				
Mine in CED		-0.072		-0.044*	

Continued . . .

Mines and Conservative Attitudes. Continued

		Operating Mines Only		Multiple Type of Mines	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		(0.038)		(0.022)	
Number of Mines in CED			-0.001*		-0.000*
			(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.496	0.501***	0.489***	0.503**	0.489***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)
R-squared	0.010	0.012	0.009	0.011	0.009
Number of observations	2,007	2,007	2,007	2,007	2,007
Panel C: Proportion Voting *Yes* in Marriage Equality Survey					
Share Employed in Mining	-0.681				
	(1.266)				
Mine in CED		-0.031		-0.015	
		(0.029)		(0.035)	
Number of Mines in CED			-0.001*		-0.000*
			(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	0.617***	0.619***	0.615***	0.618***	0.615***
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.001)
Number of CEDs	150	150	150	150	150
R-squared	0.111	0.123	0.122	0.113	0.126

Notes: OLS regressions with state fixed effects presented. In Panel A, the dependent variables = 1 if Voters respond important/very important to the question: *when you were deciding how to vote, how important was the environment to you personally?*. In Panel B, the dependent variable = 1 if participants disagree/strongly disagree with the following questions: (*a*) *Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist*; (*b*) *Women fail to appreciate what men do for them*; and (*c*) *Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.* Panel C uses data on the proportion voting *Yes*/*No* in the Australian Marriage Equality Survey 2017 available at the Commonwealth Electoral Division (CED) level. Panels B and C use data from the Australian Election Survey conducted in 2019. Data aggregated to the CED level. Columns 2 and 3 restrict the sample of mines to operating mines only. Columns 4 and 5 in addition include historical mines, closed mines and those under care and maintenance. Standard errors clustered at the State level presented in parenthesis. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

population employed in mining is associated with a 1.47 percentage points (1.67%) reduction in the likelihood that the voters viewed the environment as important or very important when voting. The estimates in columns 2–5 are all negative but imprecisely estimated. These results suggest that residents in areas more engaged with mining were less likely in 2019 to vote based on environmental preferences.

We next turn to the question of social conservatism. We show, using a number of different measures, that residents of mining areas are significantly more socially conservative. *First*, using data from the AES in 2019, we find that residents in areas more engaged with mining have more conservative gender attitudes. In Panel B of Table 9 we consider as outcomes the following dummy variables that are equal to one if the respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees with the following statements: (a) *many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist*; (b) *women fail to appreciate what men do for them*; and (c) *women seek to gain power by getting control over men.* A negative coefficient estimate is indicative of more conservative values.

Our results show that residents in CEDs with a higher share of population employed in mining are less likely to show disagreement with all three statements in 2019. In particular, a 1 percentage increase in the share of residents employed in mining is associated with a 2.02 percentage point (4.41%) reduction in the probability of disagreeing/strongly disagreeing with statement (a); a 2.9 percentage point (5.61%) reduction in the probability of disagreeing/strongly disagreeing with statement (b); and 1.25 percentage point (2.51%) reduction in the likelihood of disagreeing/strongly disagreeing with statement (c). The estimates remain negative and statistically, even when we use the other measures of mining engagement. For example, in Panel B (column 2), we see that the presence of an operating mine in a CED is associated with a 7.5 percentage point (16.3%) lower likelihood of the participant disagreeing/strongly disagreeing with the statement (a) *Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist*; 7.3 percentage point (14.3%) reduction in the probability of disagreeing/strongly disagreeing with the statement (b) *Women fail to appreciate what men do for them*; and a 7.2 percentage point (14.4%, though not statistically significant) reduction in the probability of disagreeing/strongly disagreeing with the statement (c) *Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.*[12]

In Panel C of Table 9, we present the OLS regression results of the proportion that voted *Yes* to the question "Should the law be changed to allow same-sex couples to marry?" in the postal ballot of the Australian Marriage Equality Referendum 2017. The regression results show that the presence of a mine or higher intensity of mines is associated with a reduction in the percentage voting *Yes* at the CED level. The effect is statistically significant in columns 3 and 5, where the explanatory variable is mining intensity or number of mines in the CED. In columns 2 and 4, where the mining dummy is not statistically significant, the coefficients are still negative. The coefficient estimates indicate that the proportion voting *Yes* is 3.1 percentage points (5%) lower in CEDs with an operating mine; this reduces to 1.5 percentage points (2.4%) when we consider multiple types of mines. In column 1, where the explanatory variable is share of the population in the CED employed in mining, while the effect is imprecisely estimated, they are fairly large in magnitude: a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of the resident population in the CED is associated with a 0.68 percentage point (1.1%) decrease in the probability of voting *Yes.*

[12]While 78% of CEDs across the country have no mines, 12% have multiple mines and 8% have more than 5 mines. Across the country, the average percentage of the population in a CED employed in mining is 0.8, ranging from 0.02–7.55%.

Finally, we examine the effect of mining engagement on preference for women candidates in the election as an alternative measure of social conservatism. The booth level data made available by the Australian Electoral Commission also provides information on the first preference votes that each candidate receives. Aggregating this information across all booths in the SA2, we obtain the proportion of the total number of first preference votes received by women candidates in 2019. We then examine whether mining engagement is correlated with fewer voters voting for women candidates.

The regression results are presented in Table 10.[13] We again consider four different measures of mining engagement: share of residents of the SA2 employed in mining, whether the SA2 has an operating mine; the number of operating mines in the SA2 (mining intensity) and mining density in the SA2. The difference-in-difference estimates (mining engagement $\times$ Year 2019) are always negative and statistically significant. Irrespective of how we measure mining engagement in the SA2, mining engagement is associated with a significantly lower vote share for women at the SA2 level in 2019. For example, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of the population employed in mining is associated with a 0.54 percentage point (1.8%) reduction in the proportion of votes for women in 2019 (Panel B, column 2). Having a mine in the SA2 is associated with a 7.2 percentage point (23.8%) reduction in the proportion of votes for women in 2019 (Panel B, column 4).

Overall, our evidence suggests that residents in mining regions are socially more conservative. By triggering the conservative beliefs of the population in these regions, the convoy could have affected the votes in favour of the Coalition, who had taken a more conservative stance in the 2019 election.

8 Conclusion

Australia is in the middle of an energy transition. In response to the exigencies of climate change, fossil fuels are being replaced with renewable sources alongside efforts to reduce demand and increase efficiency. As a result of this transition, coal markets are in structural decline in Australia, though the fossil fuel industry has resisted, politically, this climate change induced shift. Any social and systems change—especially any planned social and systems change—is inherently political, as it concerns issues of power and distribution of resources, and this is certainly the case for the Australian energy transition. While Australia has the technology to move from fossil fuels to renewable energy, the social dynamics remain challenging. The Stop-Adani (protest) convoy

[13] The estimating equation is given by equation (1). The dependent variable is the share of first preference votes received by women candidates at the SA2 level.

Table 10: Mining Engagement and Voting for Women Candidates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: *Regression Results*								
Share employed in mining	0.566	0.587						
	(0.538)	(0.557)						
Mine in SA2			0.001	0.015				
			(0.035)	(0.036)				
Number of Mines in SA2					0.009	0.010		
					(0.009)	(0.009)		
Mine density in SA2							0.008	0.007
							(0.006)	(0.006)
Year 2019	-0.012	-0.012	-0.015*	-0.015*	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.017**	-0.017**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Share mining × Year 2019	-1.138**	-1.130**						
	(0.522)	(0.523)						
Mine in SA2 × Year 2019			-0.088**	-0.086**				
			(0.035)	(0.035)				
Number of Mines × Year 2019					-0.022***	-0.022***		
					(0.005)	(0.006)		
Mine density × Year 2019							-0.018***	-0.018***
							(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.317***	0.295***	0.321***	0.302***	0.320***	0.298***	0.320***	0.299***
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.023)
Observations	2,939	2,939	2,939	2,939	2,939	2,939	2,939	2,939
R-squared	0.012	0.019	0.013	0.020	0.012	0.019	0.012	0.019
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State / Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Share mining†	-0.572**	-0.543*						
	(0.287)	(0.294)						
Mine in SA2‡			-0.087***	-0.072**				
			(0.030)	(0.031)				
Number of Mines in SA2†					-0.013**	-0.012*		
					(0.006)	(0.007)		
Mining Density in SA2†							-0.010**	-0.011***
							(0.004)	(0.004)

Notes: Dependent variable is the share of votes received by women candidates at the SA2 level. OLS regression results presented. Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. †: Effect in 2019; ‡: Effect in 2019 in SA2s with an operating mine relative to those without. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$.

during the 2019 federal election campaign brought this difficulty to the fore.

Did the Stop-Adani Convoy cause ALP to lose what was viewed as an unlosable election? Our results show that having a stop or the route of the convoy passing through an area results in a 10% percentage point increase in Coalition vote share in that area. In addition, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of population employed in mining in a SA2 increases the Coalition vote share by 1.8%.

In addition, our results show that the convoy had little positive electoral effect for the Greens. The results remain robust under alternative methods to control for selection bias (matched difference in difference, synthetic controls, and synthetic difference-in-differences). Residents of mining regions are more socially conservative and are less likely to report that environmental concerns are important in their voting decisions.

In Australia, coal is also a major employer. Any attempt to shut down the coal industry will have adverse implications for the population who depend on this industry for their livelihood, resulting in a backlash. Our results, therefore, provide evidence of the perverse effects of environmental activism.

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Appendix. Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Opinion Polls January — May 2019



Notes: Aggregation of Opinion Polls from different sources (Essential, Ipsos, Newspoll, Roy Morgan, YouGov-Galaxy). Data on actual vote share in the Federal elections made available by Australian Election Commission. Polls conducted between January 9 and May 16, 2019.

Figure A2: Change in Coalition Vote Share. 2019–2016



Notes: Change in Coalition TPP vote share in each SA2 between 2016 and 2019 presented. Sample includes SA2s in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. Positive (darker shaded) SA2s experienced an increase in Coalition vote share while negative (lighter shaded) SA2s experienced a decrease in Coalition vote share. The blue dots denote the stops during the Stop-Adani convoy.

Figure A3: Coalition TPP Vote share. 2010–2022. Effect of Stop/Route in SA2

(a) Stop in SA2



(b) Route in SA2



Notes: Figure A3a presents average Coalition Two-party vote share in SA2s with a Stop in the Federal elections 2010–2022. Figure A3b presents average Coalition TPP vote share in SA2s on the Route in the Federal elections 2010–2022. Averages based in SA2s located in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania

Figure A4: Distribution of Mines across SA2 in SA2

(a) Distribution of Mining Intensity



(b) Distribution of Mining Density



Notes: Figure A4a shows the number of operating mines (as per Australian Mining Atlas 2024) in SA2 located in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. Figure A4b presents the distribution of density of operating mines (as per Australian Mining Atlas 2024) in SA2 located in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. The black dots denote the convoy stops and the blue lines denote the convoy route.

Figure A5: Addressing Selection. Synthetic difference-in-differences and Synthetic Control. Difference between Treatment and Control

(a) Synthetic difference-in-differences



(b) Synthetic controls



Notes: The difference estimate (treatment – control) using the counterfactual parallel trend allowing for level differences between treated and untreated SA2s using the Synthetic Difference-in-Difference (Figure A5a) and Synthetic Control (Figure A5b) presented. Also presented is the 95% confidence interval.

Table A1: Time line of the Stop-Adani Convoy

April 17, 2019	Hobart to Devonport to Melbourne (overnight)
April 18, 2019	Melbourne to Albury-Wodonga
April 19, 2019	Albury-Wodonga to Sydney
April 20, 2019	Sydney to Coffs Harbour
April 21, 2019	Coffs Harbour to Brisbane
April 22, 2019	Rally and march at Adani HQ Brisbane
April 23, 2019	Brisbane to Hervey Bay
April 24, 2019	Hervey Bay to Rockhampton/Yeppoon
April 25, 2019	Albury-Wodonga to Sydney
April 21, 2019	Rockhampton/Yeppoon to Airlie Beach
April 26, 2019	Airlie Beach Rally
April 27, 2019	Airlie Beach/Camp Nudja via Mackay to Galilee Area
April 28, 2019	Special Galilee event. Head south to Canberra Rally
April 29, 2019	Galilee Area to Rockhampton/Yeppoon
April 30, 2019	Rockhamption to Canberra
May 5, 2019	Rally for Climate in Canberra
May 18, 2019	Federal Election

Table A2: Persistence of Effects. Effects on Coalition Vote share in 2022

	Stop in SA2		Route in SA2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Year 2022	-0.005	-0.007	-0.007	-0.010*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Stop in SA2	0.031*	0.031		
	(0.017)	(0.020)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2022	-0.028	0.001		
	(0.032)	(0.036)		
Route in SA2			0.032***	0.014
			(0.011)	(0.011)
Route in SA2 × Year 2022			0.013	0.031
			(0.020)	(0.019)
Constant	0.524***	0.570***	0.521***	0.568***
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	1,991	1,991	1,991	1,991
R-squared	0.053	0.190	0.058	0.191
Difference Estimates				
Stop in SA2: 2022 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)	-0.033	-0.007		
	(0.032)	(0.035)		
Route in SA2: 2022 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)			0.006	0.020
			(0.019)	(0.018)
2022 Stop in SA2 vs No Stop ($\hat{\beta}_2 + \hat{\beta}_3$)	0.003	0.032		
	(0.034)	(0.040)		
2022: Route in SA2 vs No Route ($\hat{\beta}_2 + \hat{\beta}_3$)			0.045**	0.045**
			(0.022)	(0.021)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. Sample restricted to federal elections in 2016 and 2022. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. The $\hat{\beta}$'s are the estimated coefficients from equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the SA2 level presented in parenthesis. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A3: Placebo Regression: Comparing 2013 and 2016

	Stop in SA2		**Route in SA2**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: *Regression Estimates*				
Year 2013	0.030***	0.031***	0.030***	0.031***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Stop in SA2	0.029*	0.031		
	(0.017)	(0.020)		
Stop in SA2 $\times$ Year 2013	0.009	0.013		
	(0.013)	(0.013)		
Route in SA2			0.030***	0.013
			(0.011)	(0.011)
Route in SA2 $\times$ Year 2013			-0.004	-0.002
			(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.523***	0.542***	0.521***	0.542***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)
SA2 level Controls	✗	✓	✗	✓
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	3,067	3,067	3,067	3,067
R-squared	0.079	0.233	0.081	0.232
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*				
Stop in SA2: 2013 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)	0.039***	0.043***		
	(0.013)	(0.013)		
Route in SA2: 2013 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)			0.027***	0.029***
			(0.005)	(0.005)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. The $\hat{\beta}$'s are the estimated coefficients from equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the SA2 level presented in parenthesis. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

Table A4: Stop/Route in SA2 and Coalition Vote Share. Excluding Major Cities

	Stop in SA2		Route in SA2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: *Regression Estimates*				
Year 2019	0.016***	0.016***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Stop in SA2	0.031*	0.036		
	(0.018)	(0.022)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019	0.036***	0.041***		
	(0.014)	(0.013)		
Route in SA2			0.030**	0.012
			(0.012)	(0.012)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019			0.031***	0.032***
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	0.435***	0.451***	0.431***	0.448***
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.015)
SA2 level Controls	✗	✓	✗	✓
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,785	2,785	2,785	2,785
R-squared	0.051	0.204	0.058	0.205
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*				
Stop in SA2: 2019 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)	0.052***	0.0577***		
	(0.013)	(0.013)		
Route in SA2: 2019 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)			0.045***	0.046***
			(0.007)	(0.007)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria (excluding the major cities Sydney, Brisbane, Hobart and Melbourne). SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. The $\hat{\beta}$s are the estimated coefficients from equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the SA3 level presented in parenthesis.

Table A5: Stop/Route in SA3 and Coalition Vote share

	Stop in SA3		Route in SA3	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: *Regression Estimates*				
Year 2019	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.013***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Stop in SA3	0.038*	0.018		
	(0.021)	(0.019)		
Stop in SA3 × Year 2019	0.020*	0.021*		
	(0.012)	(0.012)		
Route in SA3			0.021	0.021
			(0.017)	(0.015)
Route in SA3 × Year 2019			0.009	0.010
			(0.009)	(0.008)
Constant	0.519***	0.641***	0.519***	0.641***
	(0.010)	(0.032)	(0.010)	(0.032)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	476	476	476	476
R-squared	0.104	0.287	0.097	0.290
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*				
Stop in SA3: 2019 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)	0.034***	0.035***		
	(0.011)	(0.012)		
Route in SA3: 2019 vs 2016 ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3$)			0.023***	0.023***
			(0.007)	(0.007)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria (excluding the major cities Sydney, Brisbane, Hobart and Melbourne). SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. The $\hat{\beta}$s are the estimated coefficients from equation (1). Standard errors clustered at the SA3 level presented in parenthesis.

Table A6: **Mining Engagement. Having operating mine(s) in SA2 and Coalition Vote share**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Regression Estimates								
Mines	0.065***	0.012	0.049***	-0.004	0.049***	-0.002	0.045**	-0.007
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Year 2019			0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***	0.011***	0.011***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mines × Year 2019			0.035***	0.034***	0.034***	0.033***	0.033***	0.033***
			(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Stop in SA2					0.022	0.033		
					(0.019)	(0.023)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.022	0.029*		
					(0.015)	(0.015)		
Stop in SA2 × Mines					-0.013	-0.042		
					(0.049)	(0.051)		
Stop in SA2 × Mines × Year 2019					-0.001	-0.004		
					(0.039)	(0.038)		
Route in SA2							0.026**	0.009
							(0.012)	(0.011)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							0.023***	0.024***
							(0.007)	(0.007)
Route in SA2 s× Mines							0.023	0.022
							(0.038)	(0.037)
Route in SA2 × Mines × Year 2019							-0.003	-0.001
							(0.023)	(0.022)
Constant	0.540***	0.582***	0.534***	0.575***	0.533***	0.574***	0.531***	0.572***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.091	0.227	0.095	0.231	0.096	0.233	0.102	0.234
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Effect of Mines in 2019 ($\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_3$)			0.084***	0.030*				
			(0.017)	(0.016)				
Effect of Mines 2019 vs 2016								
Stop in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)					0.032	0.028		
					(0.038)	(0.037)		
Route in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)							0.030	0.031
							(0.020)	(0.020)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. The estimating equations are equations (2), (3) and (4) (columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–8 respectively). Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A7: Mining Engagement. Number of operating mines and Coalition Vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Regression Estimates								
Number of mines	0.008**	-0.000	0.004	-0.004	0.009**	-0.001	0.008*	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Year 2019			0.014***	0.014***	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***	0.011***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of mines × Year 2019			0.007***	0.007***	0.009***	0.008**	0.009***	0.008**
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Stop in SA2					0.030	0.037*		
					(0.018)	(0.021)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.019	0.027*		
					(0.015)	(0.014)		
Stop in SA2 × Number of mines					-0.011**	-0.009*		
					(0.005)	(0.005)		
Stop in SA2 × Number of mines × Year 2019					-0.003	-0.003		
					(0.004)	(0.004)		
Route in SA2							0.030***	0.013
							(0.012)	(0.011)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							0.022***	0.024***
							(0.007)	(0.007)
Route in SA2 s× Number of mines							-0.009*	-0.005
							(0.005)	(0.006)
Route in SA2 × Number of mines × Year 2019							-0.003	-0.002
							(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.542***	0.584***	0.535***	0.577***	0.534***	0.575***	0.532***	0.573***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.085	0.227	0.088	0.230	0.091	0.234	0.096	0.234
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Effect of Number of mines in 2019 ($\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_3$)			0.012***	0.004				
			(0.005)	(0.003)				
Effect of Number of mines 2019 vs 2016								
Stop in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)					0.006***	0.005***		
					(0.002)	(0.001)		
Route in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)							0.006***	0.006***
							(0.001)	(0.001)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. The estimating equations are equations (2), (3) and (4) (columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–8 respectively). Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A8: Mining Engagement. Operating mine density and Coalition Vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Regression Estimates								
Mine density	0.003	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Year 2019			0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mine density × Year 2019			0.005**	0.004*	0.004*	0.003	0.004*	0.003
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Stop in SA2					0.026	0.027		
					(0.018)	(0.022)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.021	0.029**		
					(0.015)	(0.014)		
Stop in SA2 × Mine density					-0.002	-0.001		
					(0.005)	(0.004)		
Stop in SA2 × Mine density × Year 2019					0.002	0.002		
					(0.004)	(0.004)		
Route in SA2							0.029**	0.010
							(0.012)	(0.011)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							0.023***	0.024***
							(0.007)	(0.007)
Route in SA2 s× Mine density							-0.001	0.001
							(0.005)	(0.004)
Route in SA2 × Mine density × Year 2019							0.002	0.003
							(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.543***	0.583***	0.536***	0.577***	0.535***	0.575***	0.533***	0.573***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.083	0.227	0.086	0.230	0.088	0.233	0.094	0.233
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Effect of Mine density in 2019 ($\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_3$)			0.006**	0.004				
			(0.002)	(0.003)				
Effect of Mine density 2019 vs 2016								
Stop in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)					0.006*	0.005		
					(0.003)	(0.003)		
Route in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)							0.006*	0.006*
							(0.003)	(0.003)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. The estimating equations are equations (2), (3) and (4) (columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–8 respectively). Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

Figure B1: Coalition TPP Vote Share. Federal Elections 2016 and 2019. Entire Country



Notes: Data for SA2s for Australia. Australia has a preferential voting system and the party winning the majority of the TPP votes (raw votes + preferences flowing in from other parties and candidates) in each electorate is declared the winner. The red dots denote the stops during the Stop-Adani convoy.

Figure B2: Change in Coalition Vote Share. 2019–2016. Entire Country



Notes: Change in TPP Coalition vote share in each SA2 between 2016 and 2019 presented. Positive (darker shaded) SA2s experienced an increase in Coalition vote share while negative (lighter shaded) SA2s experienced a decrease in Coalition vote share. The red dots denote the stops during the Stop-Adani convoy.

Figure B3: Distribution of Share of Mining. SA2. Entire Country



Notes: Share of population employed in the mining sector (as per Census 2016) in SA2s located in Australia. The black dots denote the convoy stops.

Figure B4: All Types of Mines (operating/historic/closed/care and maintenance)

Presence of Mine



Mining Intensity



Mining Density



Notes: Figure B4 presents the heat map of whether a SA2 has an operating/historic/closed/care and maintenance mine (as per Australian Mining Atlas 2024), the number of such mines and the density of such mines located SA2s in Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. The black dots denote the convoy stops and the blue lines denote the convoy route.

Figure B5: Distribution of Presence of Mines, Mining Intensity and Mining Density in SA2. Entire country



Notes: Figure B5 presents the heat map of whether a SA2 has an operating mine (as per Australian Mining Atlas 2024), the number of such mines and the density of such mines in SA2s across the country. The black dots denote the convoy stops and the blue lines denote the convoy route.

Table B1: Mining Engagement. - Having mine(s) in SA2 and Coalition Vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Regression Estimates								
Mines	0.059***	0.011	0.048***	-0.000	0.050***	0.002	0.043***	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Year 2019			0.012***	0.012***	0.011***	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mines × Year 2019			0.023***	0.024***	0.021***	0.021***	0.019***	0.018***
			(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Stop in SA2					0.034*	0.044*		
					(0.019)	(0.023)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.011	0.019		
					(0.014)	(0.014)		
Stop in SA2 × Mines					-0.058	-0.074		
					(0.044)	(0.047)		
Stop in SA2 × Mines × Year 2019					0.041	0.045		
					(0.035)	(0.037)		
Route in SA2							0.020	0.009
							(0.013)	(0.012)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							0.018**	0.019**
							(0.008)	(0.008)
Route in SA2 s× Mines							0.018	0.008
							(0.026)	(0.026)
Route in SA2 × Mines × Year 2019							0.010	0.016
							(0.016)	(0.016)
Constant	0.537***	0.578***	0.531***	0.572***	0.530***	0.571***	0.529***	0.570***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.015)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.101	0.228	0.105	0.231	0.106	0.234	0.110	0.234
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Effect of Mines in 2019 ($\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_3$)			0.071***	0.026**				
			(0.011)	(0.011)				
Effect of Mines 2019 vs 2016								
Stop in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)					0.062*	0.065*		
					(0.035)	(0.036)		
Route in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)							0.028**	0.034**
							(0.013)	(0.014)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. The estimating equations are equations (2), (3) and (4) (columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–8 respectively). Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. Mine types include operating, historic, closed, under care and maintenance. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B2: Mining Engagement. Number of mines and Coalition Vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Regression Estimates								
Number of mines	0.002**	0.001***	0.001*	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.001**	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Year 2019			0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of mines × Year 2019			0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Stop in SA2					0.028	0.039*		
					(0.018)	(0.022)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.018	0.025*		
					(0.014)	(0.014)		
Stop in SA2 × Number of mines					-0.002	-0.007**		
					(0.003)	(0.003)		
Stop in SA2 × Number of mines × Year 2019					0.004**	0.003**		
					(0.002)	(0.002)		
Route in SA2							0.026**	0.013
							(0.012)	(0.011)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							0.020***	0.021***
							(0.007)	(0.007)
Route in SA2 s× Number of mines							0.002	-0.003
							(0.005)	(0.004)
Route in SA2 × Number of mines × Year 2019							0.004**	0.004**
							(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	0.542***	0.582***	0.535***	0.576***	0.534***	0.574***	0.531***	0.573***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.086	0.228	0.089	0.230	0.090	0.234	0.097	0.233
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Effect of Number of mines in 2019 ($\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_3$)			0.002**	0.001***				
			(0.000)	(0.000)				
Effect of Number of mines 2019 vs 2016								
Stop in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)					0.005**	0.004***		
					(0.002)	(0.001)		
Route in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)							0.004***	0.004***
							(0.001)	(0.001)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. The estimating equations are equations (2), (3) and (4) (columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–8 respectively). Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. Mine types include operating, historic, closed, under care and maintenance. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

Table B3: Mining Engagement. Mine Density and Coalition Vote share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Regression Estimates								
Mine density	0.001***	0.000***	0.000**	0.000	0.000**	0.000	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year 2019			0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mine density × Year 2019			0.000**	0.000**	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Stop in SA2					0.026	0.027		
					(0.018)	(0.022)		
Stop in SA2 × Year 2019					0.021	0.028**		
					(0.014)	(0.014)		
Stop in SA2 × Mine density					-0.001	-0.001		
					(0.002)	(0.002)		
Stop in SA2 × Mine density × Year 2019					0.002	0.002		
					(0.002)	(0.002)		
Route in SA2							0.028**	0.010
							(0.012)	(0.011)
Route in SA2 × Year 2019							0.022***	0.023***
							(0.007)	(0.007)
Route in SA2 s× Mine density							0.001	0.002
							(0.003)	(0.003)
Route in SA2 × Mine density × Year 2019							0.003	0.003
							(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.543***	0.583***	0.536***	0.576***	0.535***	0.574***	0.532***	0.573***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.014)
SA2 level controls	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
State/Territory Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Size	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944	2,944
R-squared	0.084	0.228	0.086	0.230	0.088	0.233	0.094	0.234
Panel B: *Difference Estimates*								
Effect of Mine density in 2019 ($\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\alpha}_3$)			0.001***	0.001***				
			(0.000)	(0.003)				
Effect of Mine density 2019 vs 2016								
Stop in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)					0.003	0.003		
					(0.002)	(0.002)		
Route in SA2 ($\hat{\alpha}_3 + \hat{\alpha}_7$)							0.003	0.003*
							(0.002)	(0.002)

Notes: OLS regression results presented. Dependent variable is the Coalition TPP vote share. The estimating equations are equations (2), (3) and (4) (columns 1–2, 3–4 and 5–8 respectively). Estimation sample restricted to Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria. Mine types include operating, historic, closed, under care and maintenance. SA2 level controls include total population, median total weekly family income, urban/rural location and population density. Standard errors are clustered at the SA2 level. Significance: $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.