Gen17

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AUSTRALIAN
CENTRE FOR
JEWISH CIVILISATION

AUSSIES IN THE PROMISED LAND:

FINDINGS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN OLIM SURVEY (2018-19)

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The photograph on the cover of this report was taken by David Bankier and has been used with his written permission.

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This report is based on data collected as part of the Australian Olim Survey (2018-19) which was conducted at the Australian Centre of Jewish Civilisation (ACJC), Monash University. Comparisons were made possible by access to data from the Gen17 Australian Jewish Community Survey (2017), which was conducted by the Australian Centre of Jewish Civilisation (ACJC) and the Jewish Communal Appeal (JCA) Sydney. The Gen17 survey was made possible by the generous financial support of the JCA, Gandel Philanthropy, the Pratt Foundation, Australian Jewish Funders, the Besen Family Foundation, the Cher Family Foundation and Jewish Care (Victoria).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study presents an analysis of data from the Australian Olim Survey, which was conducted between November 2018 and January 2019 and was completed by 386 respondents. Comparisons with Australian Jews currently living in Australia were made possible by the findings of the Gen17 Australian Jewish Community Survey (n = 8,621, subsequently referred to as Gen17). The objective of this report is to present an overview of the lives of the Australian olim before their aliyah, their aliyah experiences and how their lives and attitudes compare to those of Jews currently living in Australia. The report also identifies some of the predictors of remigration (returning to live in Australia after aliyah) and offers recommendations for communal policy.

Aliyah and Israel engagement of Australian Jews

There are varying estimates of the number of Australians who have made aliyah to Israel. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics Israel, 6,950 people immigrated to Israel from Australia (prior to the end of 2016), of whom an estimated 4,000 were born in Australia and 2,950 were Israelis with Australian-born fathers.

Professor Sergio DellaPergola estimates that for the period 1948 to 2017, the total aliyah from Australia and New Zealand was 8,120 and that approximately 10,000 people who have immigrated to Israel were either born in Australia/New Zealand or have a father born in Australia/New Zealand. Gen17 found that the overwhelming majority of Australian Jews had visited Israel (93%), close to two-thirds (62%) having visited for less than 4 months and one-fifth (20%) having lived in Israel for more than one year. 11% of Australian Jews considered it 'very' or 'fairly likely' they would make aliyah in the future.

Demographic characteristics of Australian olim

Respondents to the Australian Olim Survey were aged 18 to 80, the largest proportion being aged 18 to 39. The gender distribution in the sample is slightly skewed (females = 57%). In addition, close to half (45%) of the respondents had made aliyah in the decade prior, which is consistent with the low mean age of respondents and the fact that most moved to Israel as young adults. The younger age of respondents might also be the consequence of our online survey to which contact was through Facebook and other media which the young frequent more than older olim.

Motivations for aliyah

Mostly altruistic 'pull factors' were influential in respondent aliyah. The motivator for aliyah for the overwhelming majority was 'Zionism', suggesting a high level of Israel engagement compared to other English-speaking diaspora communities. The next most popular aliyah motivators were 'a desire to live among Jews' and 'for children to grow up and be educated in a Jewish environment'. Only a minority of Australian olim (23%) indicated that their aliyah was motivated by the desire to find a marriage partner; similarly, career opportunities and the Israel health system were not significant motivators for aliyah for the majority.

Jewish educational background of Australian olim and Gen17 participants

Australian olim were found to have strongly similar educational backgrounds to Gen17 respondents with substantial Israel engagement (i.e. who had spent a minimum of one year in Israel). These two groups were more demographically similar than Gen17 respondents with minimal Israel engagement (i.e. who had not visited Israel or had only visited briefly), Jewish educational background being a case in point. Gen17 respondents with substantial Israel engagement were nearly twice as likely as those with minimal Israel engagement to have received Jewish schooling (48% compared to 25%). Australian olim were close to three times more likely (70%) as those with minimal Israel engagement to have received Jewish schooling.

Both Australian olim and Gen17 respondents with substantial Israel engagement had a high rate (90%-92%) of youth movement participation. Whilst among Gen17 participants the largest two youth movements attended were Habonim Dror (23%) and Maccabi (15%), the largest two youth movements attended by Australian olim were Bnei Akiva (41%) and Habonim Dror (31%). There are distinctive youth movement-based patterns in

aliyah rates over the last 70 years. Whilst prior to 1990, Habonim Dror had the highest rate of aliyah of all youth movement participants, there was a drop over the subsequent two decades. In the past two decades Bnei Akiva has the highest rate of aliyah of all youth movement participants.

Australian olim had far higher rates of gap-year program participation (70%), compared to Gen17 respondents reporting substantial (46%) and minimal (4%) Israel engagement. In terms of yeshiva/seminary study, Australian olim had a lower rate of participation (23%) compared with Gen17 respondents reporting substantial Israel engagement (33%), but both had a higher rate of participation compared with Gen17 respondents reporting minimal Israel engagement (4%). Whilst only a small proportion of Australian olim indicated they had attended a short high school Israel program (8%) or Taglit/Birthright (6%), it should be noted these two programs are relatively recent educational experiences for Australian Jews.

Integration process of Australian olim

The majority of Australian olim (82%) indicated a very high level of satisfaction with living in Israel, the remainder were dissatisfied (15%) or unsure what to say (3%), with a positive correlation between participants' satisfaction with income, work and sense of prosperity.

Hebrew fluency of Australian olim

85% of olim surveyed report that they can understand Hebrew, a key to cultural integration, whereas at aliyah only 46% did so. 78% of olim report they can speak Hebrew well, whereas on aliyah only 33% could. Finally, 81% report they can read well now, compared to 51% who could read at aliyah. Overall, olim on arrival have reading skills more than comprehension or speech, however having attained Hebrew literacy, the workplace is the place where they speak the most Hebrew, and the home is the place they speak the least.

Australian olim and National Service

National conscription is a security necessity in Israel and an important means of social integration for immigrants. Australian olim, however, had low rates of National Service participation (30%), one quarter having served in the IDF and another 5% having participated in different forms of civil service (mainly women). Of those who did no national service, the majority were females (70%). Older olim were more likely than younger olim to have completed National Service, olim aged 50-59 for example being twice as likely as those aged 30-39 to have served in the IDF (30% and 15% respectively). These differences are consistent across the Australian olim, irrespective of earlier youth movement participation. They can be explained in part by the fact almost all these immigrants come after university and thus would be older than the average Israeli recruit just out of high school. Moreover, women who are married receive a complete exemption and can also obtain exemption on religious grounds while men who get married soon after arrival can also get a shortened term of compulsory service.

Economic circumstances of Australian olim

The majority (75%) of Australian olim reported prosperous economic circumstances. Whilst no data exist that might have enabled an examination of the motivating factors for remigration, since only 25% of Australians in Israel indicated poor economic circumstances it is cautiously hypothesised that financial difficulty might have been experienced by a higher proportion of Australian olim who returned to Australia. However, further research in Australia is required to establish motivating factors.

Places of residence of Australian olim

Consistent with the view that large cities offer a 'soft landing' for olim, it is unsurprising that the majority (78%) indicated they had lived in a highly populated city, this proportion dropping somewhat (58%) as reported by olim at the time of their survey participation. Given the high rate of youth movement participation among olim, it was striking that 15% indicated they lived on a kibbutz at the time of their survey participation, given that kibbutz movement currently comprises less than 2% of the Israeli population.

Denominational identification of Australian olim and Gen17 participants

There were differences in the proportions of Australian olim and Gen17 participants in terms of the Jewish identification. Among Gen17 participants, 18% are Modern Orthodox with an additional 5% strictly Orthodox, and 30% identify as Traditional. Among the current olim on the other hand, 53% identify as Modern Orthodox, 4% as strictly Orthodox and only 14% Traditional.

Both denominational stability and change were evident among the Australian olim. Among those raised Modern Orthodox, the majority (81%) continued to identify as Modern Orthodox at the time of their survey participation. In contrast, of those raised Traditional only 28% defined themselves similarly at the time of their survey participation, 48% adopted an Orthodox self-definition while 16% chose a secular or other definition.

When the Australian olim were asked to define themselves according to Israeli categorisation, 57% identified as Dati (Orthodox), 26% as Hiloni (Secular), 13% as Masorati (Traditional), the remainder Reform or Other. Among older olim, one quarter indicated they were more religiously observant than they had been in the past, whilst among younger olim (aged 39 or under) 14% reported being more religiously observant than in the past.

Jewish identification of Australian olim and Gen17 participants

Eighteen questions were used to understand the importance of a range of values to the Jewish identities of Australian olim and Gen17 participants (sub-divided into those with substantial and minimal Israel engagement).

Looking at measures of Jewish peoplehood belonging, all three groups of Australian Jews *strongly* agree that feeling part of a worldwide Jewish people is important to their own sense of Jewish identity, with the olim (67%) expressing this to a similar higher degree with the substantially engaged (65%) and both marginally higher than the remainder (61%). In addition, there were minimal differences between these three groups with respect to the importance of morality, social justice, philanthropy, and Jewish culture

When the examining questions related to celebrating festivals, learning about history, living or visiting Israel and belonging to a community, Australian olim regarded these as important with the greatest frequency, Gen17 participants with minimal Israel engagement regarded these as important with the lowest frequency, with Gen17 participants with substantial Israel engagement falling between the two.

This pattern was also found when questions that were more religious in nature were examined, including studying Jewish texts, prayer, Halakha (Jewish law) and believing in God. When it came to the importance of remembering the Holocaust and combatting antisemitism, both Gen17 sub-groups rated these more highly than the Australian olim.

Attitudes towards Israel of Australian olim and Gen17 participants

Contrasts in views about Israeli society were evident when comparing Australian olim and Gen17 participants. When examining response to the proposition that 'I feel a sense of responsibility to ensure that the state of Israel continues to exist', there was consistency across the Australian olim and two Gen17 sub-groups. Focusing on the strongest response, however, finds that 80% of Australian olim and Gen17 participants with substantial Israel engagement indicated that they 'strongly agree', the proportion drops significantly for Gen17 participants with minimal Israel engagement (64%), the largest section of Australian Jewry.

There was also consistent agreement across the Australian olim and two Gen17 sub-groups regarding responses to the question 'is there too much corruption in Israel's political system?' When focusing upon the strongest response, however, the contrasts are striking with 46% of Australian olim, 24% of Gen17 participants with substantial Israel engagement and 13% of Gen17 participants with minimal Israel engagement indicating they 'strongly agree'.

On other measures the same pattern is observed. Thus around 40% of Australian Jewry 'strongly agree' that 'democracy in Israel is alive and well', although the Australian olim are the *least* sure of this at 36%. About a third in all three groups strongly agree that Orthodox Judaism has too much influence in Israel's society. While

41% of the olim agree that Israel needs to control the West Bank for security reasons, among Australian residents this proportion falls to 35% and 31% respectively. Finally, regarding sensitivity to discrimination *within* Israel society, the olim give a far *higher* total score of agreement ('strongly agree' and 'agree') than do both other groups in the following order: olim 58%, then 45% finally 33%. Clearly the self-critical perspective is sharpened when living in Israel rather than in distant Australia.

Migration and remigration

This section probes the question of why some Australian Jews have returned to Australia from Israel by examining the predisposition to remigrate of Australian olim *currently* in Israel. In response to the question 'How satisfied are you with your life in Israel?' most of the olim are satisfied (85%), a significant minority are dissatisfied (15%). These responses correlate with the question 'Thinking of the next five years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel?', to which 10% indicated that they are considering leaving Israel. Among those dissatisfied with their life in Israel, almost a quarter of respondents (23%) are likely to leave Israel or cannot decide, this amounts to a relatively high disposition to remigrate compared to only 6% among those who are satisfied with their life in Israel.

Gender was correlated with the disposition to remigrate. Among female olim, 8% indicated they were likely to leave Israel and 5% were uncertain, compared to 4% and 2% among males; 94% of men and 87% of women indicate that they're 'definitely' or 'very likely' to continue living in Israel.

Disposition to remigrate was also age-related, with 11% of those aged 30-39 reporting they are very likely to leave Israel compared to 6% in the entire sample, with an additional 4% who say they don't know if they were likely to continue to live in Israel.

It may be helpful to consider that the Gen17 findings (Graham & Markus, 2018) identified the 30-39 age bracket as encountering the greatest degree of economic hardship compared with all other age groups. If their difficulties are typical given their life-stage, it may be possible that the 30-39-year-old Australian olim's low degree of satisfaction and likelihood of leaving Israel (11%) is a product of similar life-stage-related economic circumstances

Socio-economic variables identified as possible drivers of remigration include work satisfaction, income, and economic situation. The general patterns suggest that those indicating high satisfaction with their work and income were also highly likely to indicate their intention to remain in Israel, whilst those indicating low satisfaction were also highly likely to indicate their intention to leave Israel. Economic factors were revealed to predict remigration intention more strongly than Jewish education or Zionist ideology.

The insights in this report have policy implications for Jewish community organisations that promote Israel engagement and aliyah. Jewish educational institutions, especially the Jewish day schools and youth movements, may take pride in their contribution to the strong Israel connectedness of Australian Jews living in Australia as well inspiring those who have made Israel their home. The economic struggles which appear to predict the remigration of Australian olim also merits consideration in a Jewish community which prides itself on fostering a love of Israel.

A major message of this report is that it is not enough just to facilitate migration to Israel but to generate the conditions which allow olim to settle and be successful in their aliyah to Israel. This challenge lies not with the institutions of Jewish education alone. Indeed, it lies with all Australian Jewish institutions, social and economic, to work together to create those conditions that will contribute to the economic vitality of Israel itself and the Australian olim within it.

INTRODUCTION

HOMELAND, DIASPORA, TRANSNATIONALISM AND JEWISH PEOPLEHOOD

The transnational approach to the study of migration proposes that immigrants' ethnic identity in the global era is anchored in various geographical spaces that transcend the borders of the nation-state of the country of destination (Glick-Schiller et al., 1992; Lev Ari, 2015). The lack of congruency between the geographical space (the destination country) and the social space in which most immigrants go about their daily lives (the origin and destination country) drives an identity construction process that has its points of reference in different places. Consequently, this identity is constructed in a complex process in which immigrants must themselves merge different and often contrasting elements that originate in different geo-cultural spaces (Lev Ari, 2015; Vertovec, 1999).

Today's immigrants, including olim, whether Australian or from the FSU, unlike olim in the early years of the state, are seldom required to suppress specific dimensions of their identity to blend into the host society. Instead, these immigrants find ways to accommodate their range of identities concurrently by using each identity intelligently in different social contexts (Levitt & Glick-Schiller, 2004; Vertovec, 2001). In Israel, olim are ideologically predisposed, some even commanded to declare their country of destination (Israel) as their homeland and the country of origin (Australia) is regarded by all as the diaspora, while elsewhere and everywhere, the country of destination would be regarded as their diaspora and their identity, as a diasporic identity. But even in Israel, ideology acknowledged and notwithstanding, expatriate Australians and FSU immigrants live in differing degrees within their own ethnic diaspora, albeit with different degrees of social boundary permeability. This cultural bubble affords the possibility of feeling at home while being abroad in a place different from the personal and cultural home of their country of origin. Indeed, an important characteristic of the particularistic identity of members of any diaspora is the maintenance of relations with the country of origin, at familial, cultural and socioeconomic levels. It follows, therefore, that the transnational perspective requires shifting the unit of analysis away from the individual sovereign states to the global system of migration.

The Jewish people now can be understood as a particular case of contemporary peoples that live in multiple diasporas with a shared cultural homeland. Israel–diaspora relations therefore can be viewed as a particular case of a transnational peoplehood which in the Jewish case predated the rise of the nation state in the midst of which was born the Zionist movement and the Jewish State.

International travel from the diaspora to Israel then can be seen as a form of cultural tourism which impacts upon travellers at a level of attachment to a physical society outside the locale in which they reside permanently, as well as attachment to an imagined people to which both the traveller and the hosts purportedly belong. At the same time, Jewish immigrants to Israel from these many diasporas, on arrival may automatically become citizens of the Jewish State. They also engage in different intensities and reciprocal modalities with their diaspora countries of origin, so that the status of what is home and what is homeland may be ambiguous, fluid and complex.

Identification with the collective is an under-examined and under-theorised component of Jewish identity and identity education. There is a move away from classical homeland-centric models of collective identity towards a transnational model of 'peoplehood.' Introduced in 1934 by Mordechai Kaplan (Kaplan, 1967), the term 'Jewish peoplehood' describes a sense of belonging and connection among Jews that transcends national, political or religious belief differences.

Understanding Jewish identity from the perspective of a national identity alone is a parochial enterprise whether in Israel or in Australia. Peoplehood, when properly understood, cannot be reduced to a synonym for the interaction of Jews in their local community. In the globalised world of multiculturalism, transnational Jewish peoplehood may serve as a collective referent for Jews of all ages, whether bearing singular or multiple nationalities or ethnicities. Jewish peoplehood thus understood becomes an emergent possibility in a world of transnational corporations, cultures and peoples

JEWISH PEOPLEHOOD

Following Mittelberg (1999), within the global context, identity is privatised to become an outcome of personal choice, the preservation of the latter serving as the meta-value of postmodern society. Since ethnicity itself is a matter of choice in the contemporary context, together with the changing intensity and salience it bears at any given time in a person's lifecycle, it is not in fact disappearing as had been anticipated by some, but functions as one aspect of the individual's multiple identities in a pluralised world (Glazer et al., 2014; Mittelberg, 1999).

The prevalent public and academic discourse on Jewish identity and belonging often focuses confrontationally upon contentious issues such as nationality and religion, thereby becoming exclusionary by nature. In Israel, the controversy turns primarily on religion; in the diaspora it focuses upon the nation. The peoplehood paradigm offers a model that acknowledges a wide range of Jewish expressions characteristic of the late modern Jewish world. The defining feature of peoplehood is that it reflects the global spirit of the times, as well as generating a creative tension between Jewish individuals who are very different from each other. In focusing on relationships rather than identity, peoplehood allows every individual to be Jewish in their own way and possess multiple identities—such as diaspora-Jewish and Israeli-Jewish.

Glazer et al. (2014) note that fostering and strengthening Jewish identity formation is an important purpose of Jewish education; some would argue it is its overriding purpose. Yet what is meant by Jewish identity and how our educational purposes are understood to nurture its construction has become increasingly contested.

For some, Jewish identity is characterised by a set of external established and measurable markers (for example, determined by rabbinic tradition, or theoretical understanding of Jewish peoplehood, or an image of an educated Jew), for others it is an emergent self-understanding shaped by the ways in which we align ourselves with certain others (an 'us') and distinguish ourselves from others ('them'). Talk of coherent identities, hybrid identities, Jewish identity as a cultural category or as a committed form of life, identity as content, identity as character, as story or as an understanding of purposes, *are constructions* that can be found to inform our approach to the many communal projects Jews set for ourselves whether in the diaspora or in Israel.

Glazer et al. (2014) offer the formulation of multiple identities in Jewish education. In their words,

> The term *multiplicity* simply points to there being more than one – by definition it points to the presence of difference, but holds back from offering an interpretation of what that difference amounts to (in a way in which terms such as pluralism, cosmopolitanism and hybridity do not). 'Multiple identities' does not tell us whether difference is to be considered substantive or incidental, whether it represents loss (where difference is created by a loss of coherency) or a gain (where difference allows for relationships that give rise to the emergence of the new. (Glazer et al., 2014, pp. 4-5).

In this way, a multiple identities approach is inclusive of different perspectives on Jewish identity both in Israel and the diaspora and is appropriate for the empirical frame of this research

Despite the term 'Jewish peoplehood' being coined close to a century ago, it appears to have enduring relevance for the postmodern global outlook, seeking to create the broadest possible common basis among those who belong to the Jewish people rather than drawing clear, firm and divisive boundaries.

The Jewish peoplehood approach promotes the development of interpersonal relations among individuals and institutions at the local level in Israel as well as in diaspora communities. It aspires to the broadest possible unifying basis for joint action while making formal preconditions relating to beliefs, commitment, and behaviour irrelevant (Mittelberg, 2011).

Mittelberg (2011) offered an initial conceptual framework for the peoplehood paradigm. It comprises six dimensions: (a) a sense of personal closeness to other Jews; (b) a sense of shared fate; (c) a sense of responsibility for and commitment to other Jews and their communities; (d) possession of the cultural knowledge and skills necessary to feel at home within Jewish culture(s); (e) engagement in local and global

social networks with depth and meaning; and (f) involvement in practices that signify and realise all of the above dimensions.

Mittelberg et al. (2013), based on a longitudinal study on school twinning between Israeli and American high school students, concluded that Jewish peoplehood is a multi-dimensional complex construct that cannot be reduced to religious identification alone but is comprised of four distinct dimensions: *collective belonging* or identification with the Jewish people; *Jewish cultural capital* or familiarity with the cultural knowledge, language, customs, and rituals that makes a Jew feel comfortable anywhere in the Jewish world; *Jewish responsibility* or commitment to the welfare of other Jews; and *interpersonal attachment* or personal connection with other Jews.

Laron and Mittelberg (2013), based on a study of Israeli student teachers, reported that Israeli teacher training students projected a strong grasp of Jewish and Israeli identity that revealed the existence of a striking, deeply held view of the Holocaust as a central factor in shaping their Jewish and Israeli identity. At the same time, their multidimensional analysis of peoplehood belonging identified the sense of connection and feeling of closeness to world Jewry as the weak point in Jewish identity perception, the respondents displaying very little involvement in actual relations with diaspora Jews.

In their view, Jewish peoplehood can be broken down into six components: identification with the Jewish people; pride in being an Israeli; personal connections with other Jews; responsibility for Jewish survival; Jewish networks and Jewish importance in daily life; and the Zionist imperative of aliyah. While Mittelberg (2011) reported on a combined Israel and diaspora sample, the data in the latter study was drawn from an exclusively Israeli sample, thereby enabling the inclusion of the imperative of immigration to Israel within the concept of Jewish peoplehood. The underlying premise is nonetheless that if people consider themselves part of the cultural and historical heritage of the Jewish people and express all or some of the parameters adduced above in their lifestyles, they fall within the Jewish Peoplehood paradigm.

This study has determined its empirical unit of analysis to be the Jews of Australia, those who made aliyah and continue to live in Israel today, those Australians who lived in Israel for an extended period in the past, as well as those who live in Australia today but have not lived in Israel for an extended period. The Jewish peoplehood paradigm allows an exploration of the meanings that all these Jews attribute to their collective belonging and, in so doing, allows us to understand the differences between them and between the communities within which they choose to live their lives.

AUSTRALIAN ALIYAH

Identifying how many Australians have ever made aliyah and how many remain in Israel is challenging. First, Israel maintains two relevant databases, annual immigration data and the national census. The problem is that these databases use different references points and can therefore not be cross- referenced easily.

Whilst annual immigration data defines immigrants according to country of last residence, irrespective of country of birth, the national census defines immigrants according to respondents' country of birth or the country of birth of the respondents' father. Those not born in Australia who moved and subsequently lived in Australia before making aliyah would not be counted as Australian olim in the national census. Given the high proportion of Gen17 respondents aged over 70 who were born in Europe, it is likely the number of olim from Australia is far higher than Israeli records suggest. Secondly, no reliable data exists regarding those Australian olim who remigrate to Australia.

According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 6,950 Australians have made aliyah (up until the end of 2016), of whom only 4,000 were born in Australia themselves and 2,950 Israelis had an Australian-born father. This figure includes citizens and permanent residents. (Joseph Androues, Israeli Central Bureau of Statstics, personal correspondence).

Professor Sergio DellaPergola[1] of the |Hebrew University and Israel's eminent demographer, estimates that the total aliyah between 1948 and 2017 from Australia and New Zealand combined is 8,120. This estimate is based on annual immigration data (not national census data), sourced from the Israeli CBS according to last country of residence regardless of country of birth. Needless to say, not everybody remained in Israel after immigrating.

In addition, DellaPergola[2] estimates on the basis of a special analysis of the Israeli 2008 census that approximately 10,000 people, either born in Australia or New Zealand or with an Australian/New Zealander father, have made aliyah. In total, 8,000 came on aliyah from the two countries. In this analysis the data is based on country of birth or birth of father, together with a rough estimate of people born in third country and who had immigrated from Australia. Thus the 2008 estimate of 10,000 Israelis of Australian and NZ heritage is a maximum estimate for both countries together. The 10,000 also include children of migrants born in Israel but does not include the original immigrants who may have deceased or remigrated. It is therefore clear that there are more people of Australian origin than actual immigrants.

PREDISPOSITION TOWARDS ALIYAH

Having presented the rate of aliyah in the past what might be the future rate of aliyah from Australia? When the Gen17 Preliminary findings report was published (Graham & Markus, 2018), a small but significant proportion (11%) indicating they were 'very' or 'fairly likely' to make aliyah was reported. It is this question that drew the attention of the authors since it offered us an estimate of the future migrant steam to Israel that might join the olim under study here.

Table 1: Gen17, 'How likely is it that you will choose to live permanently in Israel in the future?'

	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
Very / Fairly likely	973	11
Not very / Not at all likely	7,191	**83**
Don't know	457	5
Total (N)	8,621	100

Whilst with other questions, the 'don't know' response might not be especially meaningful, here it could be taken as an indication that the respondents may have been considering aliyah seriously. However, even if we look only at the 973 respondents who said it was likely they would choose to live permanently in Israel in the future, as we might have expected 44% had already been to Israel for more than a year, but remarkably, 56% reported being previously in Israel for less than a year. Of these, 41% had been in Israel for less than four months, including 4% who had never been to Israel. The indication is that a significant minority of the community are thinking about aliyah.

Closer analysis reveals a greater proportion of younger people indicated they were 'likely' or 'fairly likely' to make aliyah, being 20% more likely than those aged 60 and above. Men were 13% more likely to indicate likelihood for aliyah compared with females.

[1] Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Special processing, courtesy of Sergio DellaPergola, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
[2] Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Special processing, courtesy of Sergio DellaPergola, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

VISITS TO ISRAEL

For this report the authors divided the Gen17 dataset into two groups (see table 2). One group of 1,682 respondents had spent a minimum of twelve months living in Israel before returning to Australia; 355 of these respondents had been in Israel for at least three years. Altogether, they constituted close to 20% of the sample. The other group, constituting just over 80% spent less than a year in Israel. Of that group almost 8% had never been to Israel, while the majority had been in Israel for less than 4 months (33% less than a month 34% one month to three months).

Table 2: Gen17, 'What was the longest time you spent in Israel in any one visit?'

	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
Never	644	**8**
Less than 1 year	6,288	73
More than 1 year	**1,682**	19
Don't Know	7	0
Total (N)	8,621	100

Understanding the possible differences between these three groups was one of the motives for this research. The aim of the research was to identify similarities and differences in these Australians' background experiences, including their Jewish education. This research also sought to understand the aliyah experience, its challenges and the factors which were associated with olim remaining in Israel.

The comparative analysis in this report enables an understanding of these three groups:

1. Australian olim (currently living in Israel)

2. Gen17 respondents with substantial Israel engagement (currently living in Australia but who lived in Israel for over one year)

3. Gen17 respondents with minimal Israel engagement (currently living in Australia and who have spent minimal-to-no time in Israel)

THE AUSTRALIAN OLIM SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The data on Australian olim was collected using an online self-administered survey during the period 14 November 2018 to 11 January 2019. The target population was Australian and New Zealanders currently living in Israel. Letters of invitation to participate were circulated via the listservs of organisations in Israel representing the ZFA, its Israel Office and Telfed, olim Facebook pages, as well as being informally circulated via email and social media to olim and their social networks in a snowball sample. It is acknowledged that this methodology ran the risk of under sampling the older generation who spend less time on digital media than their children.

The survey questionnaire was largely based on the Gen17 Australian Jewish Community Survey instrument which enabled the comparisons of Australian Olim with Australian Jewry. In addition, questions on attitudes toward Israeli society utilised questions from the Pew Research Center study on Israeli society (2016), while questions on social integration of olim built on the study by Rebeca Raijman (2015) of South African immigrants in Israel.

The achieved sample was 429, including 386 Australians and 43 New Zealanders. In the analysis reported here we utilise unweighted data in both the Gen17 and the olim survey. Given the parameters of this report, which compares Australians currently living in Australia and Israel, the New Zealand sample was omitted and will be analysed separately by New Zealand researchers as part of their NZ Gen19 project. As discussed above, while it is difficult to establish the size of the population from which we drew our sample, given DellaPergola's population estimate and the absence of accurate data on remigration rates, we estimate a response rate close to 10%, with possibly a higher rate for those under 40 years of age.

It is acknowledged that this is by no means a representative sample of Australian olim, neither currently in Israel, nor all who have made Israel their home since the foundation of the State. The sample does, however, enable comparative analysis which contributes to the understanding of Australian Jewry. Transnational analysis in the Jewish social scientific literature is regrettably uncommon, comparisons of diaspora Jewish communities with their compatriots living in Israel are even rarer.

THE AUSTRALIAN OLIM

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

The survey sample is characterized by the high percentage of olim who were born in Australia (Table 3), reflecting as we will see the young age of the olim. In addition, 20% of these olim came from Australia after earlier migration from Israel, South Africa and Europe.

Table 3: Australian olim, 'What is your country of birth?'

	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
Australia	311	**81**
Israel	18	5
South Africa	15	4
England	11	3
Europe, USA & Canada	29	8
Argentina	1	0.3
Egypt	1	0.3
Total (N)	386	100

The olim sample does not reflect the geographic distribution of Australian Jewry (Table 4). Whilst the Australian Census and the Gen17 survey indicate that Victorian Jewry is slightly larger than the Jewish population of New South Wales, there was a disproportionately higher percentage emigrating from Melbourne (64%) compared to Sydney (27%).

Table 4: Australian olim and Gen17, comparing Australian cities (for olim, the city they lived in before aliyah) (percentage)

	OLIM	GEN17
Melbourne, Victoria	64	48
Sydney, New South Wales	27	47
Perth, Western Australia	6	3
Rest of Australia	3	3
Total (N)	386	8,621

It is beyond the scope of this report to determine whether these numbers are indicative of a pattern in immigration from these two cities currently or in the past. The ZFA, however, has maintained a database of olim for the last decade (2010-2019).[3] Of the 1,153 olim aged over 18, 50% were from Melbourne, 40% were from Sydney, 7% were from Perth. The largest city of origin for olim is Melbourne, followed by Sydney, however the margin of difference in the sample is larger than that found in ZFA national data. Among the Australian olim surveyed, Melbournians had more than double the number of olim. Perth had a number of olim which was proportionate with its community size.

An examination of the Israel trips of Jews from different Australian cities sheds additional light upon the Israel connectedness of the Jews living in these cities (Figure 1). When comparing Australian olim with Gen17

[3] Adapted from data provided by the ZFA, which we gratefully acknowledge.

participants indicating substantial or minimal Israel engagement, the proportions coming from each Australian city differ noticeably. Gen17 participants indicating minimal Israel engagement most closely approximate the Gen17 population sample in terms of the proportion coming from each city. However, when it comes to Gen17 participants indicating substantial Israel engagement, the proportion of Melbournians who visited Israel for more than a year, is almost double.

Figure 1: Comparing Australians who visited Israel for less than 1 year, Australians who visited Israel for more than 1 year and Australian olim by city of residence (percentage)



AGE

The Australian Olim Survey respondents were aged 18 to 80, the largest proportion being young adults aged 18 to 39. This may be attributed in part to the online nature of recruitment and higher likelihood of younger people being contacted via social media. Owing to the fact that the majority of participants had made aliyah at a young age and have immigrated over the past decade, the sample is skewed towards young and recent olim, allowing greater focus on recent aliyah experience, which fortuitously is more relevant for policy recommendations.

Table 5: Age of Australian olim

	PERCENT
18 to 39	41
40 to 59	33
60 and above	26
Total (%)	100
Total (N)	386

More female olim participated in the survey than males. This is normative in survey research, where females have been found to be more likely to respond to surveys (Moore & Tarnai, 2002). The gender proportions in Gen17 were similarly skewed (females 56% and 44% males).

Figure 2: Australian olim, gender distribution (percentage)



Of the Australian Olim Survey participants, close to half (45%) immigrated in the decade prior to the survey, which is consistent with the low mean age of the participants as well as the fact that most olim moved to Israel when they were young adults.

Figure 3: Australian olim, year of aliyah by decade (percentage)



MOTIVATIONS FOR ALIYAH

When participants were asked to indicate the extent to which a range of factors influenced their decision to make aliyah, highly altruistic 'pull factors' were influential. As can be seen from Figure 4, the greatest motivator for aliyah for the overwhelming majority of olim was 'Zionism', reflecting a level of Zionist identification not found in other English-speaking diaspora communities. 'A desire to live among Jews' and 'for children to grow up and be educated in a Jewish environment' were the next most influential factors.

Figure 4: Australian olim, 'To what extent did the following factors influence your decision to leave Australia?' (percentage)



Despite the majority of Gen17 respondents indicating they have relatives or close friends in Israel (65% and 57% respectively), 'living in closer proximity to family' was revealed to be an important aliyah motivator for only a minority of Australian olim (23%). Equally interesting was that despite almost two-thirds (62%) making aliyah whilst they were single, less than one-third indicated that finding a marriage partner was an important factor motivating their aliyah. Career opportunities and the Israel health system, for the vast majority, were not motivators for aliyah, perhaps indicating that for young, healthy and altruistic olim, these factors were not important.

Figure 5: Australian olim, 'To what extent did the following influence your decision to leave Australia?' (percentage)

Legal status at time of aliyah (Table 6) may provide insight into the intentions of olim regarding permanent residence in Israel. Close to three-quarters (69%) of the olim made official aliyah when they moved to Israel, meaning they automatically became Israeli citizens on arrival and intended to do so. The proportion who had attained Israeli citizenship by the time of their participation in the survey increased to 88%.

Table 6: Australian olim, comparing Legal status upon making aliyah and currently (percentage)

	UPON ALIYAH	CURRENT
I came as an oleh/ olah	69	88
I came as a temporary resident	12	0
I came as a tourist	8	1
I came as a permanent resident	3	9
Student	2	1
Other – Specify	6	1
Total (N)	386	386

Given the substantial proportion of Australian olim who arrived in Israel as young single adults, the change in their relationship status between immigration and the time of the survey is unsurprising. As can be seen in Table 7, whilst close to two-thirds of the olim were single when they made aliyah, only one-fifth indicated they were single when participating in the survey. The proportion of married people doubled between aliyah and the time they completed the survey, with a negligible proportion having divorced, separated or become widowed.

Table 7: Australian olim, comparing marital status upon making aliyah and currently (percentage)

	UPON ALIYAH	CURRENT
Single (never married and not living with a partner)	**62**	**21**
Married	**31**	**65**
Unmarried but living with a partner	3	6
Divorced	3	**4**
Widowed	0.3	3
Separated	0	1
Prefer not to say	1	1
Total (N)	386	386

Focus on the young adults among the Australia olim finds that the proportion who are single decreased from 81% when they made aliyah to 42% at the time of the survey (Figure 6). The proportion of married olim rose from 11% to 44%.

Figure 6: Australian olim, comparing marital status upon making aliyah and currently, for olim aged 18- 39



JEWISH EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

COMPARING AUSTRALIAN JEWS WITH AUSTRALIAN OLIM

One of the striking findings in this report was the similarity between the Australia olim and the Gen17 participants with substantial Israel engagement. These two groups were found to have more in common than those with substantial Israel engagement and minimal Israel engagement currently living in Australia.

Comparative analysis of English-speaking diaspora communities such as the United State reveals that whilst Jewish day school education is normative in families identifying as Orthodox, this is not the case for the non-Orthodox majority. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, day school Jewish education enjoys a high participation rate, with close to two-thirds of British Jewish children attending Jewish schools (Staetsky & Boyd, 2017). It must be noted, however that since the 1990s, the Faith Schools Policy has brought considerable government funding to British Jewish schools, making them essentially free (Graham 2014). Jewish education in Australia, although not as generously funded as in the United Kingdom, also has a high participation rate. Indeed, Jewish education has been described as the "Jewel in the crown" of Australian Jewry (Forgasz & Munz, 2011, p. 1125).

There seems to be a correlation between high intensity Jewish education and aliyah, however among the older olim, there is a significant minority who received no Jewish education. Table 8 reports the differential intensity of day school education (N = 3394), which is far less than the overall Gen17 adult sample of 8621.

Additional differences emerge between the Australian olim and Gen17 participants when their Jewish education is examined. (Table 8). Close to three-quarters of the olim received a Jewish education, compared to almost 100% of the Australians who had visited Israel for more than one year, as well as those Australians who had been in Israel for under one year. It should be noted that the olim and the Australians who had spent more than one year in Israel, had an identical 55% that had attended Jewish day school for ten years or more. At the same time it is critical to note that among 29% of the olim, who were primarily older, there are apparently other educational forces that generate the altruistic drive to make aliyah in the absence of Jewish day school education and we will refer to this below.

Table 8: Australian olim and Gen17, comparing years of Jewish day-school education (percentage)

	OLIM	GEN17 (ISRAEL >1YR)	GEN17 (ISRAEL <1YR)
None	**29**	2	3
1 to 6 years	7	34	38
7 to 9 years	9	10	13
10-13 years	55	55	47
Total (N)	386	976	2,418

Table 9 compares the olim and the Gen17 participants by the Jewish day schools they attended. The higher number of olim who attended Mount Scopus College, until recently the largest Jewish day-school in Australia, was also reflected in the high proportion of Gen17 respondents indicating they were Mount Scopus alumni (41%). In the Australian olim sample, however, Mount Scopus College alumni comprised a smaller proportion (29%), which is likely a product of school size, among other factors. These proportions were also reflected in Moriah College (NSW) alumni, reflecting a reasonably similar demographic and school size. This contrasts interestingly with the proportion of olim who were graduates from Leibler Yavneh College, Beth Rivkah Ladies College and Carmel School, the only three schools which had greater proportions of students represented in the Australian Olim Survey sample than were represented in Gen17.

Table 9 below details Gen17 Primary (2,453) and Secondary Jewish day school (2,414) attendance. There is consistency across Jewish Primary and Secondary school attendees, close to one third having visited Israel for

more than a year. Summing up, among olim, over 70% had some day school education; among visitors for more than a year, close to 45%; and among those who visited less than a year, around 25% experienced some day school education.

Table 9: Australian olim and Gen17, comparing Jewish day-school attended (percentage)

	PRIMARY JEWISH DAY SCHOOL			SECONDARY JEWISH DAY SCHOOL		
	OLIM	GEN17 > 1 YR	GEN17 < 1 YR	OLIM	GEN17 > 1 YR	GEN17 < 1 YR
Mount Scopus College	26	21	**31**	29	27	**41**
Leibler Yavneh College	**19**	17	7	**19**	15	4
Beth Rivkah Ladies College	**13**	11	6	**14**	12	6
Moriah College	12	15	**18**	13	17	**20**
Carmel School (Perth)	**6**	5	3	**6**	5	2
Yeshivah College (Melbourne)	5	**6**	4	4	**6**	4
Bialik College	3	4	**6**	4	4	**5**
Emmanuel Day School	3	2	2	3	3	3
Masada College	3	4	**8**	2	4	**9**
Yeshiva College (Sydney)	3	3	2	2	1	1
King David School	2	3	**5**	1	2	**4**
Kesser Torah College	2	1	0	3	1	1
Mount Sinai College (Sydney)	2	2	3	*	*	*
Adass Israel School	1	**5**	2	1	**4**	2
Sholem Aleichem College	1	0	2	*	*	*
Sinai College (Brisbane)	0	0	0	*	*	*
Yesodei HaTorah College	0	0	0	0	*	*
Total (JDS)	**288**	**809**	**1844**	**273**	**740**	**1674**
Total sample	386	1,682	6,939	386	1,682	6,939
% of participants @JDS	**75**	**48**	**27**	**71**	**44**	**24**

*These Jewish day schools have a primary school only

YOUTH MOVEMENT INVOLVEMENT

Together with upbringing and Jewish education, youth movements are regarded as important to the development of Israel connectedness and Zionism. In both Gen17 and the Australian Olim Survey, the respondents were asked to indicate which youth groups they had been involved in growing up. As can be seen in Table 10, respondents could indicate attendance at more than one youth group, which was the case for a significant minority.

The far left and right columns of Table 10 indicate the numbers which attended each youth movement. The largest youth movement by numbers attended in Gen17 was Habonim Dror with 1,945 former chanichim, followed by Bnei Akiva with 1,238. If Maccabi is set side momentarily, to focus on youth movements, Habonim Dror and Bnei Akiva are the two most popular across all three groups. Among olim, however, the proportions change, half indicating they attended Bnei Akiva during their upbringing and less than a third indicating they had attended Habonim Dror. The high representation of Bnei Akiva and Habonim Dror alumni among olim (82% combined) together with the finding that the alumni of two movements combined, amount to 56% of all those having spent more than one year in Israel and 32% of those who had spent *less* than one year in Israel, motivated further exploration of these two youth movements below.

Table 10: Australian olim and Gen17, comparing youth movements attended (percentage)

OLIM TOTAL REPORTED INVOLVEMENT	OLIM	GEN17 (ISRAEL >1 YR)	GEN17 (ISRAEL <1 YR)	TOTAL REPORTED INVOLVEMENT (GEN17)
Bnei Akiva (N=193)	**50**	**28**	**11**	Bnei Akiva (N=1238)
Habonim Dror (N=122)	**32**	**28**	**21**	Habonim Dror (N=1945)
Hineini (N=47)	**12**	8	5	Hineini (N=483)
Chabad Youth (N=40)	10	8	3	Chabad Youth (N=329)
Beitar (N=29)	8	8	9	Beitar (N=751)
Maccabi (N=25)	7	**13**	**15**	Maccabi (N=1289)
Synagogue youth (N=18)	5	5	7	Synagogue youth (N=572)
Netzer (N=12)	3	6	4	Netzer (N=379)
Hashomer Ha'tzair (N=11)	3	5	3	Hashomer Ha'tzair (N=258)
Bnai B'rith youth (N=11)	3	2	4	Bnai B'rith youth (N=304)
Skif (N=5)	1	1	2	Skif (N=116)
Tsofim (Israeli Scouts) (N=4)	1	1	1	Tsofim (Israeli Scouts) (N=53)
Total (N)	386	1,682	6,288	

* Respondents could nominate more than one movement

After considering the differences in youth movements attended, we now focus upon the question of the differential impact of the movements among Australian Jewry, measured by only one dimension, the length of time the alumni lived in Israel. The overall average is that 20% of alumni had spent more than a year in Israel. Looking at the first column of the table it is evident that that the movements with above average time in Israel going from highest to lowest were Chabad Youth 40%, Bnei Akiva 39%, Betar 31%, Hashomer Hatzair 31%, Hineni 27%,Netzer 25%, Habonim Dror 24%, with the remainder being below the 20% average.

Table 11: Gen17, youth movement alumni length of time lived in Israel (percentage)

OLIM TOTAL REPORTED INVOLVEMENT	GEN17 (ISRAEL >1YR)	GEN17 (ISRAEL <1YR)	GEN17 (NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS)
Bnei Akiva (N=193)	**39**	61	Bnei Akiva (N=1238)
Habonim Dror (N=122)	**24**	76	Habonim Dror (N=1945)
Hineini (N=47)	**27**	73	Hineini (N=483)
Chabad Youth (N=40)	**40**	60	Chabad Youth (N=329)
Beitar (N=29)	**31**	69	Beitar (N=751)
Maccabi (N=25)	**17**	**83**	Maccabi (N=1289)
Synagogue youth (N=18)	**14**	86	Synagogue youth (N=572)
Netzer (N=12)	**25**	75	Netzer (N=379)
Hashomer Ha'tzair (N=11)	**31**	69	Hashomer Ha'tzair (N=258)
Bnai B'rith youth (N=11)	**8**	92	Bnai B'rith youth (N=304)
Skif (N=5)	**4**	96	Skif (N=116)
Tsofim (Israeli Scouts) (N=4)	**26**	74	Tsofim (Israeli Scouts) (N=53)
Total (N)	1,682	6,288	Total 8,621
Total (%)	20%	80%	100%

* Respondents could nominate more than one movement

The potential impact of youth movement may be examined further by considering the proportion of alumni who attended for a considerable time and those who attended for a short time (Table 12). What is interesting here is the higher rate of attendance over three years among both the olim and the substantially engaged Australian Jews compared to the less substantially engaged Australian Jews. It seems also fair to surmise that among the Bnei Akiva and Habonim Dror alumni who had been in Israel for less than a year were also alumni who had spent less years in the movement and this seems to apply to all the movements in differing degrees. Intensity of involvement matters.

Table 12: Australian olim and Gen17, comparing by number of years of youth movement attendance (percentage)

	OLIM		GEN17 (ISRAEL >1YR)		GEN17 (ISRAEL <1YR)		
	1-2 YEARS	3+ YEARS	1-2 YEARS	3+ YEARS	1-2 YEARS	3+ YEARS	
Bnei Akiva (N=193)	18	**82**	22	**78**	47	53	Bnei Akiva (N=1238)
Habonim Dror (N=122)	20	**80**	20	**80**	44	56	Habonim Dror (N=1945)
Hineini (N=47)	34	66	41	59	48	52	Hineini (N=483)
Chabad Youth (N=40)	25	**75**	16	**84**	22	**78**	Chabad Youth (N=329)
Beitar (N=29)	52	48	47	53	53	47	Beitar (N=751)
Maccabi (N=25)	16	84	28	72	25	76	Maccabi (N=1289)
Synagogue youth (N=18)	44	56	26	74	33	67	Synagogue youth (N=572)
Netzer (N=12)	42	58	22	79	48	52	Netzer (N=379)
Hashomer Ha'tzair (N=11)	46	55	29	71	53	48	Hashomer Ha'tzair (N=258)

* Respondents could nominate more than one movement

Another youth movement contribution which was reported by a high proportion of olim was their participation in an Israeli gap-year program run under the auspices of the youth movements. Bnei Akiva's Midreshet Torah V'Avodah (MTA) and Tafnit programs, as well as Habonim Dror's Machon Le Madrichim and Shnat Hachshara were reported collectively as having been attended by 70% of the Australian Olim Survey participants. Habonim Dror's Machon Le Madrichim and Shnat Hachshara were attended by over one third of participants (39%) whilst close to a quarter (23%) engaged in yeshiva/seminary programs. An additional 8% report having participated in short term high school programs in Israel with another 6% in Taglit Birthright, although we should recall that these latter two programs are more recent innovations when looking at the last 70 years which reflect the large younger cohorts in our sample.

Whilst it is not possible with the dataset to determine whether the length of participation in youth movements inspires aliyah, or whether those intent on aliyah attend youth movements, one thing is evident: the youth movement and gap-year program participation of Australian olim is higher than that of the Gen17 participants. Habonim Dror's Shnat Hachshara program was attended by 12% and only 8% participated in yeshiva/seminary programs. When comparing Gen17 participants with substantial and minimal Israel engagement, gap-year program participation contrasts are striking (46% versus 4%) as are those for yeshiva/seminary programs (33% versus 4%). Participation in gap-year programs is a common denominator of both the Australian olim and Gen17 participants with substantial Israel engagement, differentiating them from the remainder of Australian Jewry. Whilst it was beyond the scope of our research, given the inspirational impact of gap-year program, the Australian Jewish community may wish in future to consider investigating the extent to which finances constitute an obstacle to gap-year program participation. Scholarships such as the Rabbi Boruch Abaranok Scholarship for Torah study in Israel have supported dozens of Modern Orthodox students over the past decades in participating in yeshiva/seminary programs. Other organisational support might enable more Australian Jewish youth to participate in gap-year programs, an investment in the community's future leaders.

COMPARING OLIM ALUMNI OF BNEI AKIVA AND HABONIM DROR

The high proportion of Australian olim who indicated they were Bnei Akiva and Habonim Dror alumni motivated the analysis appearing in this section. The years of Jewish education received by these olim are compared in Table 13. Three quarters of olim who were Bnei Akiva alumni received the highest level of Jewish day school education (10-13 years), close to twice the proportion of olim who were Habonim Dror alumni (44%). This certainly reflects an age cohort effect as among the older olim, Jewish day school was a less available option for the Habonim Dror demographic and thus the youth movement then offered critical added value independent of the absent Jewish day school education. Among the younger olim from both movements, Jewish day school education and youth movement participation appear to be strong predictors of aliyah and substantial Israel engagement.

Table 13: Australian olim, comparing Bnei Akiva and Habonim Dror attendees by years of Jewish education (percentage)

YEARS OF JEWISH EDUCATION	BNEI AKIVA	HABONIM DROR	NEITHER YOUTH MOVEMENT	ALL OLIM
None (N=110)	10	36	47	28
1 to 6 years (N=28)	4	10	9	7
7 to 9 years (N=35)	11	10	6	9
10 to 13 years (N=213)	75	44	38	55
Total (%)	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	157	122	107	386

Complex socio-demographic changes over the seven decades of Israel's existence have shaped patterns of aliyah in terms of numerical size and the kinds of Australian Jews most likely to immigrate. Whilst in the years prior to 1990, Habonim Dror had the highest aliyah rate of the youth movements, that rate dropped significantly in subsequent decades. In contrast, in the last couple of decades an increase in Bnei Akiva olim is evident. Whilst further qualitative investigation could shed light on possible systemic catalysts of these patterns, it is reasonable to assume that the changes emanate from the youth movements, changes in Australian and well as Israeli society.

Table 14: Australian olim, comparing Bnei Akiva and Habonim Dror attendees by decade of aliyah (percentage)

	BNEI AKIVA	HABONIM DROR	ALL OLIM
2010 to 2018 (N=176)	44	38	46
2000 to 2009 (N=60)	18	10	16
1990 to 1999 (N=47)	15	9	12
1980 to 1989 (N=48)	13	16	12
1970 to 1979 (N=32)	8	12	8
1960 to 1969 (N=17)	2	11	4
1950 to 1959 (N=5)	0	4	1
pre-1950 (N=1)	0	1	0
Total (%)	100	100	100
Total (N)	156	122	386

OLIM AND THE ALIYAH PROCESS

HEBREW FLUENCY

The high proportion of Australian olim who received a Jewish education raise the question of whether their Hebrew language education prepared them well for life in a Hebrew-speaking country. Interestingly, only a small proportion (15%) indicated they encountered no language difficulties when they first arrived in Israel. Whilst it might be argued that Hebrew fluency is most effectively developed in an immersive Hebrew-speaking environment, nevertheless it is striking that such a small proportion felt prepared, presumably as a consequence of their Jewish day school Hebrew language education.

Figure 7: Australian olim, 'Did you experience language difficulties when you first arrived in Israel?' (percentage)



The impact of living in an immersive Hebrew language environment is evident from Figure 8, where the Hebrew fluency of olim between aliyah and the time of their survey participation is compared. Looking at current olim, 85% report they can understand Hebrew whereas at aliyah only 46% did so. 78% of olim report they can speak Hebrew well whereas in the beginning only 33% could. Finally, a high 51% of olim report they could read at aliyah, while 81% report they can read well now.

Overall, on arrival a higher proportion of olim have reading skills than comprehension or speech. While the deficit in Hebrew fluency on aliyah is largely overcome *among those who remained in Israel*, nevertheless after 12 or 13 years of Jewish education a large percentage of current olim reported that they had considerable difficulties with language, an issue that warrants consideration by the Jewish day schools. Nevertheless, it is impressive how quickly Hebrew fluency improved once olim were living in Israel.

Figure 8: Australian olim, Hebrew fluency prior to aliyah and currently (percentage)



ECONOMIC STATUS

Altruism, as was mentioned earlier, was a strong motivator of the immigration of Australian olim. Economic security was revealed as a strong predictor not only of satisfaction with life in Israel, but also critical to decisions on remaining or returning to Australia. It is striking, therefore, that the majority of olim (75%) indicated they regard their financial circumstances as comfortable or better. To establish whether this proportion enjoying high economic satisfaction is within expectations, comparison was made with Gen17 respondents. A similar proportion (80%) of Gen17 indicated that their financial circumstances are comfortable or better.

Table 15: Australian olim, 'Which of the following best describes your financial circumstances?'

	PERCENT
Prosperous / Living comfortably	75
Just getting along	21
Poor	5
Total (N)	386

It is beyond the scope of this report and available Australian data to identify conclusively former olim who have remigrated to Australia, nor is it possible to conclude that those who had lived in Israel for a lengthy period returned to Australia primarily due to poor economic circumstances. The olim did, however, respond to a series of questions regarding their satisfaction with life in Israel, as well as the degree of likelihood of their remaining in Israel long-term, which provides the basis for the following analysis.

RESIDENCE

Places of residence of olim changed between their arrival and the time of their survey participation (Figure 9). Whilst more than three-quarters (78%) lived in cities when they made aliyah, there was a shift with 58% remaining in cities whilst the remainder moved to small towns and kibbutzim. More than a quarter (27%) are currently living in small towns which include smaller yishuvim, moshavim or moshavot. Finally, indicative of the youth movement background of many of the olim, a relatively high proportion (15%) live today on a kibbutz. Considering that currently less than 2% of Israelis live on kibbutzim, the relatively high proportion among olim is noteworthy.

Figure 9: Australian olim, comparing residence upon aliyah and currently



OLIM IN NATIONAL SERVICE

National Service is mandatory in Israel, being vital to national security as well as a hallmark of social integration. Among the Australian olim, however, only 30% undertook any form of National Service, 25% in the IDF and another 5% in other forms of National Service. Further analysis indicates that of the 272 who reported that they did not do any National Service, 70% were female, 30% male. When examining olim who undertook National Service, older people are more likely to have served: 30% among olim aged 50-59, 26% aged 60-69, compared to 15% of olim aged 30-39 and 20% aged 40-49. (20%).

Table 16: Australian olim, 'Have you served in the army or Sherut Leumi?'

	PERCENT
No	70
Yes, in the army	24
Yes, in Sherut Leumi	3
Other - Specify	3
Total (N)	386

These findings are connected to age on arrival; almost all the recent arrivals come after university and thus are older than the average Israeli recruit just out of high school. Moreover, women who are married receive a complete exemption and can also obtain exemption on religious grounds, which is reflective of part of the sample. Men who get married soon after arrival can also get a shortened term of service, but our survey indicates that non-participation in National Service is now the norm. In view of the fact that a large proportion (62%) of current olim came as young and single immigrants, this still leaves cause for concern and suggests that together with push factors of economic hardship, conscription may also be a driver of return migration of Australian olim. Neither this survey nor Gen17 can give us an answer to these questions. There were no differences in these patterns between the two largest youth movements, Bnei Akiva and Habonim Dror, which may indicate that the participation rate in National Service is related to factors beyond Jewish education.

JEWISH IDENTIFICATION AND ATTITUDES

Contemporary Jewish social science utilises denominational affiliation as a measure of the intensity of Jewish identification. However denominational affiliation is not an exhaustive criterion of Jewish belonging, nor is it necessarily permanent or static throughout the lifecycle or within Jewish communities over time. Nevertheless, denominational switching, discussed in detail in the Gen17 Preliminary findings report (Graham & Markus, 2018), captures some of the complexity of change in the ways people change the way self-identify and engage with Jewish people, community, ideas and values.

Given the choice of seven main denominational categories as well as a verbatim option, Gen17 reported that those raised as Traditional constituted the largest denomination in Australia (36%). When compared with those currently identifying as Traditional, however, a slight loss was evident (30%). Each denomination was found to have retained and lost members to other denominations; each with different rates of denominational movement and stability. What is evident from the analysis is that of those who elect to embrace a different denominational identification in adulthood, proportionately more identify as Secular than Orthodox. While among all Traditional Australian Jews only 60% remain Traditional, among Modern Orthodox only 55% remain Modern Orthodox. Which choices then, have Australian Jews made in adult life? The general trend reported by the researchers is that of the 40% Traditional Jews who have changed, 63% have moved in the direction a more secular/progressive self-definition while 37% have chosen more Orthodox streams. At the same time, 19% of Australian Jews raised Orthodox now regard themselves as Traditional, while only 2% as Strictly Orthodox. (Graham & Markus: 23).

Whilst similar terms of Jewish self-definition might be found in Jewish communities across the world, their meaning of those terms to the Jews living in those communities is local. Australian Jews who immigrate soon discover that the categories of Jewish self-definition are understood differently in Israel, as is the case in many countries, from the ways they described themselves in Australia. Socio-demographic differences in populations, their migration history, as well as a range of religious and political issues impact upon these subgroups and the way they enact their Jewish identification. A case in point is the Australian denominational group whose members describe themselves as Traditional. In Israel, the term Traditional means something substantially different. Whilst a degree of movement was found in all the denominations when the denomination of upbringing and adulthood were compared, among olim raised Traditional, denominational movement was more substantial. Lacking a comparable group of likeminded people who saw themselves and expressed their Jewish identification similarly, the olim raised Traditional mostly adopted different denominational self-definitions and when responding to the survey, different patterns emerged among olim than the one evident among Gen17 respondents. Whilst among Gen17 respondents, there was on the whole greater movement towards the Secular, among olim, there was a greater move towards the Modern Orthodox; a higher proportion of the Traditional, for example, elect to identify themselves among the Orthodox than Secular once living Israel. Aliyah places Australian olim in a population with a different denominational composition which, at a life-stage when change is normative, appears to shape their trajectories differently, their lives ending up different – at least in a denominational sense – from the way they might have lived had they remained in Australia.

THE CONTEMPORARY ISRAELI CONTEXT OF JEWISH IDENTIFICATION

In their recent book, *Jewraelis*, Rosner and Fuchs (2018) describe a cultural revolution that they have observed in the Judaism of Israelis. Based on an analysis of 3000 Israeli Jews, the authors developed a four-group typology based on the two intersecting dimensions of tradition and nationality. The *Jewraelis* (55%) are the largest group, characterised by Jewish religious observances as well as Israeli cultural practices. The *Jews* (17%) are mostly Hareidi (Ultra-orthodox), characterised by Jewish religious observances but much fewer Israeli cultural practices. The *Israelis* (15%) are mostly secular, characterised predominantly by Israeli cultural practices. Finally, the *Universalists* (13%) are mostly left-leaning Israeli Jews, who largely practice neither Jewish religious observances nor Israeli cultural practices (Rosner & Fuchs, 2018, pp. 18-19).

Using Australian Jewry's denominational terminology, Israeli society may be broken down into three main categories (as per Rosner & Fuchs, 2018), 40% defining themselves as Traditional (or 'Secular-but-somewhat-Traditional'), 28% defining themselves as Secular and the remainder defining themselves as Orthodox (10% Orthodox, 9% Hareidi, 7% Zionist-Hareidi and 5% Liberal Orthodox). Israel's denominational landscape is different to that of Australian Jewry in terms of the relative size of the groups. On closer analysis, however, certain common patterns are evident.

Rosner and Fuchs report that among Israelis raised in Traditional homes, whilst many maintain denominational stability, 36% describe themselves as more secular and 17% describe themselves as more religious in adulthood. Roughly similar patterns are evident among Israelis raised in Orthodox homes. Whilst more maintain denominational stability, 38% describe themselves as more secular and 20% describe themselves as more religious in adulthood. As is the case in Australia, there appears to be a secularising trend in Israeli society, religious Jewishness supplanted by a more national Jewish consciousness in broad segments of the population, leading to the rise of a new form of Israeli Judaism which is more nationalist but also less universal.

In both Israeli society and among Australian Jewry, change is evident across the lifecycle, reshaping denominational composition and the Jewish collective. Interestingly, whilst secularising trends are evident in Israeli society and among Australian Jewry, the olim raised Traditional diverge from that trend, more appearing to embrace a Modern Orthodox rather than Secular lifestyle. Patterns of the denominational groups are presented in Table 17.

Table 17: Australian olim, denominational affiliation (percentage)

	DENOMINATION RAISED	CURRENT DENOMINATION
Masorti/ Conservative	3	3
Progressive/ Reform	3	3
Strictly Orthodox/ Hareidi	3	4
Modern Orthodox	41	53
Traditional	33	14
No denomination – just Jewish	6	8
Non-practising (Secular/Cultural)	7	9
Mixed religion (Jewish and another religion)	3	7
Total (%)	100	100

The impact of aliyah on Australian olim may be examined by focusing upon the extent of stability and change among the denominational groups. Focusing upon the two largest groups within the olim sample, of those raised Modern Orthodox, 81% remain so today, whilst of those raised Traditional, only 28% remain so today, 48% defining themselves as Orthodox and 16% defining themselves as Secular. The Traditional category in Israel has different meaning than in Australia and is overlaid with Mizrahi ethnic connotations, something that is unfamiliar to the Australian context. Australian olim may not easily find a community of self-proclaimed Traditional Jews with whom to identify.

The olim were asked to define themselves using both the denominational categories of Australian Jewry as well as those which are normative in Israeli society. Discrepancies between these are illuminating (Figure 10), the largest proportion identifying as Dati (57%), followed by Secular (26%) and Traditional (13%), the remainder identifying as Reform or eschewing popular categorisations. Almost all (90%) of those who identified (as per Gen17 categorisations) as Modern Orthodox identified as Dati (as per Israeli categorisations). However, of those who identified as Traditional (as per Gen17 categorisations), less than half (48%) identified as Masorati and most of the remainder (40%) identified as Secular (as per Israeli categorisations). Further qualitative research would be required to tease out the meaning of these denominational disparities, however it is possible that a significant proportion of these olim would have lived different Jewish lives had they remained in Australia.

Figure 10: Australian olim, current Israeli-Jewish identification (percentage)



As per Rosner and Fuchs's (2018) typology, it appears the vast majority of Australian olim, Orthodox and many of the Traditional, would be defined as *Jewraelis*, the mainstream of contemporary Israeli society.

DENOMINATIONAL MOVEMENT AND RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

Denominational movement is a product of identity formation and reformulation, life-stage and, in the case of the olim, immigration.

Across the entire olim sample close to half (46%) reported that their religious observance was the same prior to aliyah as it was at the time of their survey participation (Figure 11). Whilst worded slightly differently, it is interesting to note that when Gen17 participants were asked whether their religious observance was the same at the time of their survey participation as it had been five years earlier, a higher proportion (57%) indicated similar religious observance, suggesting greater stability. In an age-related comparison younger olim (aged 18-39) reported they were less religiously observant today compared with older olim (aged 40 and older). Age-related contrasts with Gen17 are also illuminating, younger participants (aged 18 to 39) having similar proportions indicating stability of religious observance (42%), however roughly equal numbers indicating they were more (24%) or less (23%) religiously observant compared with five years prior. Gen17 participants aged 40 and older had far greater religious observance stability (60%) compared with other Gen17 participants as well as similarly aged olim, much smaller proportions indicating they were more (12%) or less (16%) religiously observant. Whilst these patterns challenge the literature asserting that religiosity increases with age (Bengtson, 2013), they are supported by migration research that suggests disruptions in family and social networks associated with immigration are associated with diminished religiosity (Katz, 2001).

Figure 11: Australian olim, comparing religious observance prior to aliyah and currently (percentage)



While Figure 11 reflects changes in the proportions reporting religious stability and change, a Sankey flowchart (Figure 12) in which the width of the arrows reflects the rate of change visualises those changes in a more detailed way, offering a more granular insight into the denominational stability and change of Gen17 participants and Australian olim.

The Sankey diagrams visualise denomination identification as a journey, tracing participants from the denomination of the families in which they were raised to the Jewish self-descriptions they have currently adopted. Whilst close to two thirds (61%) of Gen17 participants retained in adulthood the denomination of their upbringing, retention levels across denominations varied. Gen17 participants raised Hareidi had the highest denominational retention (82%), followed by the Modern Orthodox (64%) and Traditional (61%). The secularising trend reported in the Gen17 initial findings (Graham & Markus, 2018) are also evident in this Sankey flowchart, wherein lines leading to the Secular are overall thicker, reflecting greater numbers than those leading to the Traditional and Orthodox denominations.

When examining the olim Sankey flowchart, different patterns were evident. Only half of the olim retained in adulthood the denomination of their upbringing. olim raised Modern Orthodox had the highest denominational retention (84%), followed by the Progressive (67%) and Secular and Just Jewish (48% respectively). As was noted earlier, those raised Traditional had the greatest degree of denominational change, with 30% denominational stability, 23% identifying as more secular and 48% indicating they were more Modern Orthodox or Hareidi.

The problem is not that Traditional Judaism is not a popular Israeli form of religious identification and expression, as Rosner and Fuchs indicated above 40% of Israelis so self-identify, but that the Australian new olim do not see themselves in that image. This is so because on the one hand, Australian Traditional Judaism is closer to being non-practicing Orthodox rather than being ideologically secular, while on the other hand in Israel, Traditional expresses a proud Mizrahi ethnic heritage which these olim do not share. This lack of a cultural peer group and framework explains the high degree of their change.

Figure 12: Australian olim and Gen17, Sankey diagrams comparing Jewish identification in upbringing and current





COMPONENTS OF JEWISH IDENTITY: AUSTRALIAN OLIM AND GEN17 COMPARED

There were 18 questions in Gen17 that asked people to rate extent to which different values were essential to how they saw themselves as Jews. The denominational composition of the olim and Gen17 samples are worth recalling here. Whilst among the Gen17 sample 18% are Modern Orthodox with an additional 5% as strictly Orthodox, and 30% identify as Traditional. Among the current olim on the other hand, 53% identify as Modern Orthodox with another 4% as strictly Orthodox and only 14% now identify as Traditional, with an additional 17% secular or non-denominational.

In the bar charts presented in Figure 13 below, the three columns represent (from left to right) the Australian olim, the Gen17 participants with substantial Israel engagement and the Gen17 participants with minimal Israel engagement. Each individual bar is colour-coded, the darkest shaded portion indicating the percentage of participants indicating a value was 'fairly important', whilst the lighter shaded portion indicates the percentage of participants indicating a value was 'very important'.

Moral and ethical behaviour elicited the largest proportion of responses indicating it was important or higher to participants' sense of being Jewish. With respect to Jewish peoplehood belonging, all three groups of Australian Jews *strongly* agree that feeling part of a worldwide Jewish people is important to their own sense of Jewish identity, with the olim (69%) expressing this to a similar higher degree with the substantially engaged (65%) and both slightly higher than the remainder (61%). In addition, there were minimal differences between these three groups with respect to the importance of morality, social justice, philanthropy, Jewish culture

Figure 13: Comparing Australian olim, Gen17 participants with substantial and minimal Israel connectedness by Jewish identity markers. 'How important or unimportant are each of the following to your sense of Jewish identity?' 'Important' and 'very important' responses (percentage)



Looking at other components of Jewish identity found in Figure 14, differences across the three groups are apparent. When the examining questions related to celebrating festivals, learning about history, living or visiting Israel and belonging to a community, Australian olim regarded these as important with the greatest frequency, Gen17 participants with minimal Israel engagement regarded these as important with the lowest frequency, with Gen17 participants with substantial Israel engagement falling between the two.

Figure 14: Comparing Australian olim and Gen17, 'How important or unimportant are each of the following to your sense of Jewish identity? 'Important' and 'very important' responses (percentage)



The four items in Figure 15 asked participants to rank the importance of issues which are distinctively religious in nature. The difference in the perceived importance of these items including studying Jewish texts, prayer, Halakha (Jewish law) and believing in God, appears reflective of the denominational composition of each group.

Figure 15: Comparing Australian olim and Gen17, 'How important or unimportant are each of the following to your sense of Jewish identity?' 'Important' and 'very important' responses (percentage)



The final two questions reported in Figure 16 below, elicited responses diverging from patterns observed above, where fewer Gen17 participants with minimal Israel connectedness ranked items as important to their sense of being Jewish. Focusing upon 'very important' responses only, these two questions about the importance of remembering the Holocaust and combatting antisemitism were the only ones wherein olim responses were proportionately smaller than those of the Gen17 participants with minimal Israel connectedness. Both Gen17 sub-groups rated Holocaust memory 68%, 75%, and antisemitism 55%, 66% more highly than the Australian olim 65% and 47% respectively. It may be that these two values are distinguishing characteristics of Australian and perhaps diaspora Jewry, but they resonate less for olim.

Figure 16: Comparing Australian olim and Australians living in Australia, 'How important or unimportant are each of the following to your sense of Jewish identity?' 'Important' and 'very important' responses (percentage)



COMPARING ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL: AUSTRALIAN OLIM AND GEN17

This final section focuses upon attitudes towards Israeli society of olim and the Gen17 participants. These questions were sourced from the Gen17 survey, to enable comparisons with Australian Jewry. Questions were also sourced from the Pew Research Center's study of Israel Jews (Sahgal & Cooperman, 2016), to enable comparisons with mainstream Israeli society.

The Gen17 preliminary findings (2018) noted that the question drawing the highest consensus across Australian Jewry was "I feel a sense of responsibility to ensure that the State of Israel continues to exist", with 88% agreeing with this proposition (Figure 17). However, if we compare the three groups looking only at the strongly agree response, an interesting pattern of variation in *intensity* of agreement is revealed. Looking again at this most consensual question we find that 81% of olim *strongly* agree and 71% of the second group, long term visitors to Israel, however among the group of Australians who had spent far less time in Israel this rate of strong agreement drops to 64%. This last group is the largest section of Australian Jewry.

The most critical proposition regarding Israel about which there *is* substantial agreement is *there is too much corruption in Israel's political system*. Here too, the comparison across the three groups on *strongly* agree only, is dramatic, among olim 46% strongly agree followed by 24% for those who have spent over a year in Israel and only 13% for the remaining largest group of Australian Jews. On other measures the degree of differences between groups is far less, though generally it follows the same pattern described above, namely those who were in Israel for a very small time agree less with their peers. Thus around 40% of Australian Jewry strongly agree that 'Democracy in Israel is alive' and well, although the Australian olim in Israel are the *least* sure of this at 36%. At the same time, it should be noted that in response to a separate question 'In your opinion can Israel be both a Jewish and democratic state?' an overwhelming 86% of the olim affirmed it could be both. About a third in all three groups strongly agree that Orthodox Judaism has too much influence in Israel's society, while the olim agree to a higher degree that Israel needs to control the West Bank for security reasons (41%), among the Australian residents this strong agreement drops to 35% and 31% respectively.

It is important to take into consideration media-related coverage of Israel and its impact upon attitudes. In response to a Gen17 question about the extent to which Australian Jews keep up with Israel-related events, it was found that those with minimal Israel engagement are much less likely to keep up with the news 'a lot' compared with respondents with substantial Israel engagement (28% and 42% respectively). Familiarity with current events, including reportage of the Israeli political context, is likely to shape the differences in views about the extent of corruption in Israel's political system.

There is a greater degree of uniformity in responses to the remaining three questions in Figure 17. There is similar proportion in agreement that 'democracy in Israel is alive and well' and that 'Orthodox Judaism has too much influence in Israeli's society'. Whilst a greater proportion of the olim agree that 'Israeli control of the West Bank is vital for Israel's security', there is uniformity in the views of the two groups of Gen17 respondents.

Figure 17: Australian olim and Gen17, 'To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following?' 'Strongly agree' and 'tend to agree' responses (percentage)



The lowest proportion in agreement for all three groups, meaning that these propositions are largely rejected by the respondents, were on the issues of discrimination against non-Jews in Israel and peace negotiations with the Palestinians and Hamas (Figure 18). Whilst strong agreement is generally low on all three dimensions, regarding sensitivity to discrimination *within* Israel society, a greater proportion of olim indicated they 'strongly agreed' or 'agreed', compared to both other groups in the following order: olim 58%, then 45% and 33%.

Figure 18: Australian olim and Gen17, 'To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following?' 'Strongly agree' and 'tend to agree' responses (percentage)



MIGRATION AND REMIGRATION

To understand the nature of Australian Jewish aliyah and remigration, it is important to frame the Australian Olim Survey and Gen17 research within the scholarship of elective Western migration. The migration literature reveals that voluntary transnational migration is always accompanied by remigration to countries of origin, return rates being shaped by a range of contextual factors. Voluntary migration is differentiated from that of refugees, the former characterised by agency and the option to return to their countries of origin. Western Jewish olim currently migrating to Israel are not refugees and just as immigration is easier, so too is remigration.

Decisions to emigrate from the West are functions of monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits. With respect to Western olim, however, rather than simply economic considerations, primary motivators include religious, political and cultural values derived from Jewish identity and education. Re- migration is an outcome of difficulties faced by sub-groups of migrants (DellaPergola, 1984: p. 300)

Israel's population data – in particular, the inter-census calculation by country of birth – enables an investigation of factors associated with remigration. The inter-census calculation is the percent 'missing' among persons born in given country when comparing two consecutive Israeli censuses and after taking into account new immigrants and estimates of mortality. Analysing this data, DellaPergola (1998) found that single people were more likely to remigrate than families who made aliyah together. In addition, males were more likely to remigrate than females. Ease of return was also found to be influential, with remigration higher among North American and Western European Jews, compared with olim from Asia, African and Eastern Europe. Finally, remigration was slightly more frequent for those entering Israel as potential versus actual immigrants.

When Australian olim elect to remigrate, however, they do so as Israelis. DellaPergola points to six factors that drive emigration from Israel. These include:

1. Economic indicators, such as employment prospects and cost of living.
2. Unsuccessful social integration.
3. Incompatibility between immigrant characteristics and socio-economic and employment opportunities.
4. Greater availability of employment opportunities abroad.
5. Events affecting security in the country.
6. An expression of the 'level of cultural and/or emotional identification with the State of Israel and its society.' (DellaPergola, 2011:13)

Looking at our Australian sample of olim and the Gen17 sample with which we have compared them, we have demonstrated above that the expression of cultural and emotional identification which we have identified as altruistic motivations for aliyah was equally high for olim and those Australian Jews who had prior substantial engagement with Israel. It seems therefore that this shared altruism cannot account for patterns of remigration.

Remigration has policy implications for a Zionist community that derives pride from its olim. A range of questions asked in the Australian Olim Survey enables an exploration of factors which may be associated with remigration. One of these questions asked, 'How satisfied are you with your life in Israel?' The second question asked, 'Thinking of the next 5 years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel?'

Of the total olim sample (Table 18), a large majority (82%) indicated they were satisfied with their lives in Israel, 15% indicated they were dissatisfied and 2% indicated a neutral position.

Table 18: Australian olim, 'How satisfied are you with your life in Israel?' (percentage)

Very/ Somewhat satisfied	82
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	2
Very/ Somewhat dissatisfied	15
Total (%)	100
Total (N)	381

* 'Prefer not to say' (N = 5) was omitted from this table

In response to the question about the likelihood of continuing to live in Israel (Table 19), whilst almost all (90%) indicated the likelihood of continuing to live in Israel, 6% indicated the likelihood of leaving and 4% were uncertain or did not know.

Table 19: Australian olim, 'Thinking of the next 5 years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel?' (percentage)

Definitely/ Very / Fairly likely to continue	90
Definitely/ Very/ Fairly likely to leave Israel	6
Don't know	4
Total (%)	100
Total (N)	381

* 'Prefer not to say' (N = 1) was omitted from this table

The extant literature does not clarify whether age is a factor influencing remigration. The following analysis presents satisfaction responses focusing upon the 18 to 49 demographic (Table 20), which comprise more than half of the olim in this sample.

Table 20: Australian olim aged 18 to 49, 'How satisfied are you with your life in Israel?' (percentage)

	VERY / SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	NEITHER SATISFIED NOR DISSATISFIED	VERY / SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	TOTAL
18 to 29 (N=77)	86	0	13	100
30 to 39 (N=82)	78	6	15	100
40 to 49 (N=56)	82	2	14	100

From this age breakdown, it is evident the youngest olim (age 18 to 29) have the highest proportion of satisfied respondents, whilst those aged 30 to 39 have the lowest proportion.

Continuing to focus on young adult olim, their intentions with respect to remaining in Israel were then considered (Table 21).

Table 21: Australian olim aged 18 to 49, 'Thinking of the next five years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel?' (percentage)

	DEFINITELY / VERY LIKELY TO CONTINUE LIVING IN ISRAEL	VERY LIKELY TO LEAVE ISRAEL	DON'T KNOW	TOTAL
18 to 29 (N=77)	79	8	13	100
30 to 39 (N=82)	85	11	4	100
40 to 49 (N=56)	89	5	4	100
All participants	90	6	4	100
Total (N)	346	23	15	384

* 'Prefer not to say' (N = 2) was omitted from this table

The largest proportion of olim who were dissatisfied were aged 30 to 39, they are also the age group with the highest proportion indicating they are likely to remigrate (Tables 20, 21). Whilst the proportion indicating they are likely to continue living in Israel is high, the change within a minority is an important issue for consideration.

Cross-tabulating the two above questions, it is possible to identify patterns in olim attitudes towards remigration (Table 22). Among those who indicated they were dissatisfied with their life in Israel, three quarters nevertheless indicated they were likely to remain in Israel regardless, whilst 18% indicated that they are very or fairly likely to leave Israel. Interestingly, by a small margin the highest proportion indicating they were likely to leave Israel or were uncertain ('don't know response) were those who indicated that they were 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' with their lives in Israel, although this finding rests on a very small number of respondents.

Table 22: Australian olim, 'Thinking of the next five years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel?', cross-tabulated with 'How satisfied are you with your life in Israel?' (percentage)

	VERY / SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	NEITHER SATISFIED NOR DISSATISFIED	VERY / SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	TOTAL
Definitely/ Very likely to continue living in Israel	**94**	56	**75**	90
Very/ Fairly likely to leave Israel	3	22	**18**	6
Don't know	3	22	5	4
Total (%)	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	315	9	55	380

* 'Prefer not to say' (N = 6) was omitted from this table

Whilst the numbers indicating the likelihood that they would leave appear negligible, when one considers this proportion of olim possibly returning to Australia, year upon year, the numbers of people who attempted aliyah but remigrated become sizable. The policy implications are sharpest for the olim aged 30 to 39 who, like their Australian counterparts, are living through a life-stage of financial and other struggles. For those committed to promoting and supporting aliyah, it is this group that appears most likely to remigrate.

GENDER AND DISPOSITION TO REMIGRATE

DellaPergola (2013) noted that remigration is influenced by demographic factors such as gender, with males being more likely to remigrate than females. Female motivation for aliyah is enhancing occupational mobility and income, forgoing social attachments to their family in their country of origin in the process (Lev Ari, 2015). The implication is that if this occupational mobility is not attained then attachments to family in country of origin is likely to prevail. Table 23 presents the likelihood of remigration question, comparing responses by gender.

Table 23: Australian olim, 'Thinking of the next five years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel?' cross-tabulated with gender (percentage)

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Definitely/ Very likely to continue living in Israel	**94**	**87**	90
Very/ Fairly likely to leave Israel	4	8	6
Don't know	3	5	4
Total (%)	100	100	100
N	166	220	386

Male olim indicated that they were definitely or very likely to continue living in Israel (94%) at a higher rate than the females (87%). Notably, female olim indicated double the likelihood that it was very or fairly likely that they would leave Israel compared with male olim (8% and 4% respectively).

Other variables might also be associated with a greater likelihood of remigration, including work satisfaction, income, and general economic situation.

With respect to work satisfaction (Table 24), there was a correlation between work satisfaction and likelihood of remaining in Israel. Interestingly, the highest proportion indicating that they were likely to leave Israel were those who were 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' (17%), compared to 11% who were 'dissatisfied'. It follows that work satisfaction contributes to the likelihood of remaining in Israel and conversely that those who did not indicate that satisfaction were more likely to consider remigration.

Table 24: Australian olim, 'Thinking of the next five years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel?' cross-tabulated with 'Generally speaking, are you satisfied/ dissatisfied with your work?' (percentage)

	VERY / SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	NEITHER SATISFIED NOR DISSATISFIED	VERY / SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	TOTAL
Definitely/ Very likely to continue living in Israel	91	78	85	90
Very/ Fairly likely to leave Israel	5	17	11	6
Don't know	4	4	4	4
Total (%)	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	289	23	27	339*

* 'Prefer not to say' (N = 47) was omitted from this table

Satisfaction with work-related income (Table 25) indicates a similar pattern of response. Those who were dissatisfied with their income were most likely (14%) to indicate that they were likely to remigrate.

Table 25: Australian olim, 'Thinking of the next five years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel? cross-tabulated with 'Generally speaking, are you satisfied/ dissatisfied with your income?' (percentage)

	VERY / SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	NEITHER SATISFIED NOR DISSATISFIED	VERY / SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	TOTAL
Definitely/ Very likely to continue living in Israel	94	90	82	90
Very/ Fairly likely to leave Israel	3	4	14	6
Don't know	3	6	4	4
Total (%)	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	179	50	108	337*

* 'Prefer not to say' (N = 49) was omitted from this table

The third and final factor investigated here is satisfaction with economic situation (Table 26), where those dissatisfied with their economic situation had the highest proportion (17%) indicating the high likelihood they would leave Israel. Of the three factors, economic situation appears to lead to the largest proportion indicating intention to remigrate.

Table 26: Australian olim, 'Thinking of the next five years, how likely are you to continue living in Israel?', cross-tabulated with 'Generally speaking, are you satisfied/ dissatisfied with your economic situation?' (percentage)

	VERY / SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	NEITHER SATISFIED NOR DISSATISFIED	VERY / SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	TOTAL
Definitely/ Very likely to continue living in Israel	**96**	87	76	90
Very/ Fairly likely to leave Israel	3	6	**17**	6
Don't know	2	7	6	4
Total (%)	100	10	100	100
Total (N)	235	54	82	371*

* 'Prefer not to say' (N = 15) was omitted from this table

Returning to the disturbing finding on the differential role of gender in the propensity for remigration reported in Table 23, it does not surprise that consistently in response to these three questions women indicate more dissatisfied than men, particularly in the dimension of income. Looking at each question in turn, women are more dissatisfied than men with their work (9% compared to 6%), with their income from work (41% compared to 20%) and in their general economic situation (23% compared to 18%). It follows that women who have neither achieved occupational mobility nor socio economic security and remain distant from home, family and friends are likely to be at higher risk for remigration from Israel to Australia.

This finding of higher risk is not related to Jewish education, given that among the 1,682 Gen17 respondents who live in Australia today but had lived in Israel and the olim who currently live in Israel, the survey did not find any major differences in ideology or Jewish education or youth movement participation that would explain why some stayed and others left. To the authors this finding demands serious consideration and future research both in Australia and in Israel. Further qualitative research with former olim currently living in Australia would shed light on the reasons for their remigration.

In Gen17 there are no questions that consider the motives of people for return migration. For example, respondents were not asked 'If you lived in Israel for more than a year what were the challenges that you faced *there*, what were the crises, what did you like, what didn't you like?' If those questions had been asked in Gen17 there would have been scope for more direct consideration of the motives for remigration. Our point here is to say that our research effort is not completed, we must continue. We would strongly recommend that the community which invests so generously in its Jewish and Zionist education to encourage aliyah should invest resources to examine the factors supporting and obstacles impeding successful aliyah.

DISCUSSION

In this final section we engage in a discussion with the data, but it is important to stress at the outset the limitations of this enterprise. First of all, as we pointed out in the methodology, our sample of 386 Australian olim is not a probability sample and therefore cannot represent all Australians currently living in Israel nor for that matter, the even larger population who at any point made aliyah in the last 70 years. Because of the small sample, caution is required when pointing out differences between groups. While we are confident that the data reflect patterns and directions of relationships, the findings are primarily suggestive and invite future research for corroboration or modification.

As we have outlined at the outset of this report, the story of Australian olim can only be fully understood within the broader context that includes Australian Jews who have not made aliyah and those who made aliyah but subsequently returned to Australia. To this end we have tried to sketch and explain the commonalities and differences between these groups. We have been able to do so based on common questions asked in our own survey of olim and the earlier Gen17 survey of Australian Jewry.

As we have reported above, in 2017 out of the 8,621 Australian Jews sampled in Gen17, 1,682 (20%) indicated that in the past they lived for more than a year in Israel. At the time of the survey 11% were considering migrating to Israel on aliyah. A significant minority of Australian Jewish households thus reside in a transnational world, moving to and fro, Gen17 confirming they have families and close friends in both countries. The notion of permanent residence is fluid, a possible eventuality in an individual's life. In the global world, the factors that influence decisions on residence include employment prospects, sometimes within transnational corporations, the marriage market and economic forces that generate or deny individual prosperity and social security, all bound together within the fabric of family solidarity and mutual responsibility.

It is from this perspective that we seek to identify the factors amongst current olim living in Israel that are correlated with predisposition to return to Australia. The overall finding is that economic factors, including inadequate income and lack of access to satisfactory housing are powerful drivers for return.

A key finding of the survey is that amongst Australian olim currently living in Israel, 82% indicated a very high level of satisfaction with their lives, 15% were dissatisfied and 2% didn't know. There was a positive correlation between life satisfaction and satisfaction with income, work, and finances. Conversely, while a high 90% of the olim indicated they were likely to continue to live in Israel, 6% were considering remigration while 4% were uncertain or did not know. Critically, amongst the olim aged 30-39, 11% were considering remigration and a further 4% did not know if they were likely to continue to live in Israel, 15% in total. Amongst current olim for whom current employment satisfaction is relatively low, 11% indicate that they are considering remigration, compared to only 4% of those who are satisfied.

An additional push factor for remigration might be the challenges of mandatory National Service encountered by contemporary younger olim. This hypothesis is suggested by the low rates of National Service of younger olim compared to older olim that was observed in our data. Among olim aged 50-59, 30% reported that they had served in the IDF, among those aged 60-69, 26%. In contrast, of olim aged 30-39 only 15% served in the IDF and of those aged 40-49, only 20%. It must be stressed that neither this olim survey nor Gen17 can give us an answer to these questions.

A major message of this report is that it is not enough to simply encourage and assist people to make aliyah, it is also necessary to generate the conditions which will facilitate successful settlement. Immigrants everywhere need support in their resettlement; perhaps it is assumed that Western olim do not need support, an assumption with which we disagree. Support is required from the Australian Jewish community for the olim's first five to ten years in Israel. We maintain this because we have identified that the population most at risk of remigration to Australia are those aged 30 to 39, among whom 15% reported they are very likely to leave Israel or do not know if they will stay, compared to 10% in the full sample.

Over the age of 40, it appears the olim are in a more settled life-stage. Under the age of 30, they appear to still be in the process of establishing themselves. But between 30 and 39, our data suggests that if they have not generated the conditions for economic survival, built or brought a house and established good careers, then the conditions for considering remigration are generated. The issue of brain-drain, which is a serious challenge for Israeli society at large, holds for Australian olim.

Finally, it would be a mistake in our view to understand the return migration in terms of educational background since those who go on aliyah, and those that go but return to Australia, have benefited from a similar degree of Jewish education; in both groups 55% had attended a Jewish school. So, what does explain first migration and subsequently for some, return migration? In our reading of the data the factor that comes closest to explaining migration is participation in a one-year Israel program, itself in most cases the apex of intensive youth movement involvement. Australian olim had far higher rates of gap-year program participation (70%), compared to Gen17 respondents reporting substantial (46%) and minimal (4%) Israel engagement. It seems therefore that participation in a one-year programs is the variable that demarcates the olim from the large remainder of Australian Jewry. Regarding remigration, we have probed this question through an analysis of the predisposition to remigrate of current olim, not actual returning migrants, and as will be discussed below, prior education or ideology does not differentiate between those tending to return from those who have done so. This report cannot further this hypothesis but recommends future research with those who have returned to Australia to better understand their motivations.

JEWISH EDUCATION AND JEWISH COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

As has already been demonstrated in the analysis of the Gen08 study of Australian Jewry (Mittelberg (2013), Jewish educational intervention has a direct impact on the degree of belonging to the Jewish people *independently of home religious background*, whether religious, traditional, or secular. Indeed, while day schools do indeed serve as drivers of enhanced Jewish ritual practice and probably other cognitive measures, such as learning Hebrew (Jewish cultural capital), youth-movement participation and visits to Israel are the principal drivers of Jewish community activism (interpersonal attachment) and ultimately Jewish commitment and belonging (Jewish responsibility) (ibid: 87-88).

As argued above, among Australian olim and their peers, Jewish day schools as well as youth movement activism seem to have made an important contribution to their decisions to make aliyah and engage with Israel. Gen17 respondents with substantial Israel engagement were nearly twice as likely as those with minimal Israel engagement to have received Jewish schooling (48% compared to 25%). Australian olim were close to three times more likely (70%) than those with minimal Israel engagement to have received Jewish schooling. A question to be explored further for the youth movements is the nature of the contributions of their alumni to the local Jewish community. This present survey report is focused on aliyah. Future research might ask in what way, for example, a youth movement like Habonim Dror, which boasts the highest ratio of alumni in Gen17, contributes to the Australian Jewish community and its leadership.

The shared impact of youth movements and Jewish day schools in different intensities and different modalities is that they transfer to their participants both Jewish and social capital. They transfer knowledge and skills about maintaining a symbolic and Jewish life in whatever form of ideology a school has adopted, and it fosters social relationships with Jewish peers. That is the combined impact of the youth groups, all the engagement in those social networks around social symbols, social events, social rituals, social customs and social behaviour, which serve as a foundation of Jewish communal engagement.

Given the widely acknowledged impact of Jewish education both formal and informal on the attitudes and behaviours of its alumni, what might be the impact of possible declining Jewish Day School enrolment (understood as a proportion of the total school age population), both on future aliyah rates as well as the vitality of the local Jewish community?

Without in any way challenging the imperative of sustaining enrolment in Jewish day schools, the scope for Jewish education beyond Jewish day schools needs to be considered. In both America and Australia there is a growing civil movement to introduce Hebrew instruction into selected state schools. Perhaps Jewish parents

will be willing to assume the task of increasing the intensity of the Jewish education of children in the state system.

However the issue of Jewish Day School enrolment rates is resolved, the community will have to ensure that there is accessibility to all forms of Jewish education. One aspect of this education is a meaningful experience in Israel. A child attending a Jewish day school has an easier path to an Israel experience than one attending a government or independent school and this situation warrants consideration of the rationale that determines the allocation of philanthropic funding, given the importance of the Israel experience as indicated by our survey's findings.

We believe that *every* Jewish child in Australia should be assured the same access to a meaningful *educational experience in Israel*, and not only if he/she has the good fortune to benefit from an Australian Jewish day school education. That is one challenge for Australian Jewry and its future, but it is not the only one.

We have seen that the youth movements are a major conduit to gap year programs in Israel which in turn enhances greatly the possibility of longer term stays in Israel and then aliyah. Indeed, as noted 70% of the olim surveyed here had attended a year-long gap year program. Australian Jewry and Israeli Jewry must find a way to *open the ranks of all the youth movements and open access to year-long Israel programs.*

BEING JEWISH IN ISRAEL AND AUSTRALIA AND ITS RECIPROCAL IMPACT

Understanding what it means to be Jewish requires recognition that Jewishness is fundamentally imprecise (Graham, 2014). It is about self-concept and engagement with others and with ideas, amongst other things. We are fascinated by the process of transformation of an Australian diaspora Jew into an Israeli Jew; what is feasible to hold onto and what becomes less relevant for each person. This was exemplified in our comparison of the role Holocaust memory and antisemitism in the self-concept and the identity of those living in Australia compared with those Australians living in Israel; both Gen17 sub-groups rated Holocaust memory (68%, 75%) and antisemitism (55%, 65%) more highly than the Australian olim (65% and 47%). This is not to say that antisemitism and Holocaust are unimportant in Israel. They are still important, but perhaps other aspects of Israeli Judaism become more all-consuming.

In the same vein, how are Australian Jews returning from Israel different to those for whom the Israel experience is unfamiliar? The former have a unique set of life experiences, an alternative perspective on their Jewish self and the way in which they might re-integrate in Australia. How are those with an intensive Israel connectedness impacting upon the leadership and the culture of the Australian Jewish community? This is an important issue and is one that may be explored, given the large sample in the Gen17 study with immersive Israel experiences. Such knowledge is important for local Jewish community organisations if they are to work with this group, who may have established close links to Israel.

The broadest question relates to evolving Jewish identity in both Australia and Israel. How are Australian and Israeli Judaism changing? Neither are static, rather they are dynamic in their relationship to each other. Of interest is not only the impact on individuals as they move from one society to the other, but also the ongoing changing environments into which they move.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL: OLIM AND GEN17 COMPARED

Concern for Israel's security unifies all Australian Jews but as we have shown, the intensity of the concern varies. Moreover, there is substantial agreement across the Australian Jewish community on some propositions that are critical of Israel regarding perception of corruption and the state of Israeli democracy. Our olim sample has a plurality of Orthodox Jews, but a greater proportion of olim (88%) held critical views about corruption in Israel than Australian Jews (47%). In other words, an Orthodox Jew from Melbourne who lives in Israel will likely be more critical and agree that there is too much corruption in Israel than one living in Melbourne.

Regarding views on democracy in Israel, Australians in Israel are less sure of its vitality than their peers in Australia. Thus around 40% of Australian Jewry strongly agree that 'democracy in Israel is alive and well', while the Australian olim in Israel are marginally *less* sure of this at 36%. Australian Jews living in Israel in our view

have an incredibly difficult task. The data tell us about the choices that must be made by the Australian oleh, but we may say that some of these can be agonising choices. How does one resolve and fight against the inherent polarisation of Israeli society, the black and white, the all or nothing, the Hiloni–Dati. These are challenges for Israeli society and our personal interactions lead us to conclude that many Australian Jews generally do not like the polarisation and try to find a middle ground.

One way to look at these differences is through consideration of the different hierarchies of values that each Jewry holds or even more so the different hierarchies within each society. A fundamental question in Israel is its ability to be a state of all its citizens while retaining a special status as a Jewish state or the State of the Jews. Many Israelis on the political right believe that Jewishness or Zionism is so important that it is necessary to diminish the primacy of democracy. On the left, the universal value of democracy is championed, but not in equal measure by all. For the present Israel maintains a tense marriage between being a Jewish state and preserving the inclusive and universal values of democracy as enshrined in its Declaration of Independence.

These are fundamental, existential conflicts in Israel, in contrast with Australia where the established political system is less challenged, and most Jews live a comfortable and peaceful life.

The young olim from Australia evidence a healthy and critical attitude to Israeli society, more so than their contemporaries in Australia, because in Israel they are concerned about the vitality of Israel and not about the image of Israel, whereas in Australia there is more attention to image than its vitality. But almost nine out of ten (86%) of the olim in our survey affirm their confidence that Israel can be *both* Jewish and Democratic.

The insights of the work of Rosner and Fuchs with respect to the emergent group of *Jewraelis* in Israel today invites us to analyse the impact of Australian Jews on Israeli Jewishness and by the same token the impact of Australian Jews who have been in Israel on Australian Judaism. One possibility is that we are witnessing the evolution of a more pluralistic Jewishness that is shared both by Israeli Jews and Australian Jews.

In other words, both communities, although not in the same measure, recognise the importance of the reconciliation between democracy and Judaism. But Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora face different existential challenges and that is why those in Australia are more worried by antisemitism and seek security through political advocacy and self-protection through the Community Security Group. Jews in Israel live in a sovereign Jewish state, they have an army for protection but face relentless hostility from confrontation states on some of its borders and other states in the Middle East.

So, each side faces different existential challenges, but we can contribute to each other's Jewishness and to each other's Jewish survival through dialogue and evidence-based understanding of our communities through research.

As we stated at the outset, this study has determined its empirical unit of analysis to be the Jews of Australia, with reference to those who have made aliyah and live in Israel today, those who have lived in Israel for an extended period in the past, and those who live in Australia today without ever having lived in Israel for an extended period. The Jewish peoplehood paradigm allows us to engage productively with the meanings that these groupings of Jews attribute to their collective belonging and in so doing, allows us to understand the differences between them and between the communities within which they choose to build their lives.

What is it then that Australian Jews living in Australia have in common with Australian olim living in Israel? It is a shared sense of belonging to the global Jewish people wherever they may be currently residing, together with a commitment to their welfare. Global Jewish peoplehood belonging is a shared outcome both of aliyah and return migration of olim, enriching simultaneously Jewish communities in Israel and the Diaspora, in this case the Australian Jewish community. The future patterns of this enrichment remain to be articulated and researched, something that we leave for scholars in years to come.

RECOMMENDATIONS

FUTURE RESEARCH

One of the areas for future research is that population of Australians who once made aliyah and then re-immigrated to Australia. There is inadequate understanding of the circumstances that compelled return, of the factors that differentiate them from those Australian olim who remained in Israel.

To take an example, one factor could be the difficulty of mastering Hebrew. Further analysis of Gen17 data may, however, provide understanding of the ability of return migrants to reintegrate in Australia and how they might they best be supported by the community.

Similarly, we have a larger question regarding the impact of return migrants on the leadership and culture of the Australian Jewish community? Both Australia Jewry and Israel are encountering substantial change, so how do the olim and the return migrants' impact on their societies?

In the field of Jewish education, future research should focus on young adult opportunities for promoting Israel connectedness, *post* youth movement. From the standpoint of aliyah to Israel, the finding reported here that 70% of the olim surveyed have attended a year-long gap year program indicates that a decline in the rate of gap year participation may threaten future aliyah rates.

It is important that Australian Jewry conducts robust research into the Israel experiences it promotes and finances. Recent reports describe decline in year-long gap year programs to Israel coupled with rising enrolment in short term programs such as Year Ten programs and post high school Birthright programs. This research is essential to inform responsible and effective funding prioritisation in the future.

Finally, future research could track the transformation of Australian Jewish (diaspora) identity of its olim into Israeli Jewish identity in its manifold forms, facilitating sustainable social and cultural integration of Australian olim into Israeli society.

In addition, much more work is needed to understand the obstacles in the way of occupational mobility and economic sustainability of Australian olim. The Israeli labour market provides limited opportunities for absorbing the human capital that olim bring to the country, just as it has difficulties with its own children, as indicated by the literature on brain drain emigration of Israeli born from Israel.

POLICY

Australian formal and informal Jewish education generates a high degree of altruistic Zionist commitment that drives the aliyah process with both permanent and temporary outcomes. Continued investment in the quality of teaching of the Hebrew language in the Jewish schools, as well as within selected state schools, together with the enhancement of youth movement educational programs are self-evident policy imperatives indicated by our data.

BEYOND THE DATA: THINKING OUT OF THE BOX

Jewish peoplehood rests on the mutual interdependence between Jewish communities in the Diaspora and Israel and this invites consideration of the relationships between them at the institutional level, not just at the individual or societal level.

Australian Jewry should consider abandoning the exclusive philanthropic model that transfers financial capital to Israel in favour of a model that synchronises the transfer of financial, human, and social capital. A new model would not only facilitate aliyah, but also sustain the lives of the olim and in so doing contribute to the economic vitality of Israel.

To this end, what is required is to build transnational frameworks of enterprise and social capital, linking Israel to broader markets. The Israel–Australia Chamber of Commerce and the Zionist Federation of Australia should work together to intensify the synergistic interaction with each other on the ground (not just in the boardroom), within the aliyah decision making process itself and later in *the socio economic integration process of the olim* within a framework of community building in Israeli society.

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