Main supervisor Jakob Hohwy, associate supervisor Jennifer Windt
Stephen Gadsby conducts interdisciplinary research, working at the intersection of philosophy, psychology and psychiatry. His PhD focuses on how anorexia nervosa patients cognitively represent their bodies. More specifically, how their body representations become distorted, what kinds of experiences arise from these distorted representations and what this tells us about body representation cognition in general. He also conducts research related to delusions, psychiatric taxonomy, the sense of bodily ownership, mental representation and Bayesian models of cognition.
Stephen submitted his thesis in February 2021.
Gadsby, S. (2021). Imposter Syndrome and Self-Deception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: 1-15.
Gadsby, S., & Hohwy, J. (2021). Why use predictive processing to explain psychopathology? The case of anorexia nervosa. In The Philosophy and Science of Predictive Processing (Eds.) S. Gouveia, R. Mendonça, & M. Curado. Bloomsbury
Gadsby, S. (2019) Body Representations and Cognitive Ontology: Drawing the boundaries of the body image. Consciousness and Cognition 74: 102772.
Tappin, B., & Gadsby, S. (2019). Biased belief in the bayesian brain: a deeper look at the evidence. Consciousness and Cognition, 65, 107-114.
Gadsby, S. (2019). Manipulating body representations with virtual reality: clinical implications for anorexia nervosa. Philosophical Psychology, 32:6, 898-922.
Gadsby, S. (2018). How are the spatial characteristics of the body represented? A reply to Pitron & de Vignemont. Consciousness and Cognition, 62, 183-168.
Gadsby, S. (2018). Is the sense of bodily ownership related to pre-reflective bodily awareness? A reply to Kuhle. Philosophical Psychology, 31(4), 629-637.
Gadsby, S. (2018). Self-deception and the second factor: How desire causes delusion in anorexia nervosa. Erkenntnis. 1-18
Gadsby, S., & Williams, D. (2018). Action, affordances, and anorexia: body representation and basic cognition. Synthese. 1-21
Clutton, P., & Gadsby, S. (2018). Delusions, harmful dysfunctions, and treatable conditions. Neuroethics, 11(2), 167-181
Clutton, P., Gadsby, S., & Klein, C. (2017). Taxonomising delusions: content or aetiology? Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 22(6), 508-527.
Gadsby, S. (2017). Explaining body size beliefs in anorexia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 22(6), 495-507.
Gadsby, S. (2017). Anorexia nervosa and oversized experiences. Philosophical Psychology, 30, 594-615.
Gadsby, S. (2017). Distorted body representations in anorexia nervosa. Consciousness and Cognition, 51, 17-33.
- Taxonomising Delusions (with Colin Klein & Peter Clutton) – Blog post on Imperfect Cognitions
- A Two-factor Account of False Body Size Beliefs in Anorexia Nervosa – Blog post on Imperfect Cognitions
- Biased Belief in the Bayesian Brain (with Ben Tappin) – Blog post on Imperfect Cognitions http://imperfectcognitions.blogspot.com/2019/02/biased-bayesianbrain.html