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Strategic climate change litigation can take a number of different legal forms, involve a range of public and private actors and pursue various objectives. While it is generally framed as a tool to achieve policy or social change, it can also be thought of as a tool to help address and remedy the injustices associated with climate change. Climate injustices involve highly contested questions of distributive justice(eg who should take responsibility for reducing emissions and financing adaptation considering wealth and capacity?),compensatory justice (eg how should historical contributions to climate change impacts be taken into account and who should compensate victims?) and intergenerational justice (eg to what extent should future generations bear the brunt and cost of managing climate change impacts caused by the actions and decisions of past and present generations?). Strategic climate change litigation can help to establish, recognise or clarify legal responsibilities of public and private actors, shift social norms and public discourse and thereby the decision-making of both private and public actors, including by pressuring governments to introduce new laws and policies to address climate justice and responsibility.
The correct analysis of proof of causation of loss in securities market nondisclosure class actions (referred to as "shareholder class actions") is hotly disputed. As well as being a matter of doctrinal significance, it has substantial relevance to the practicalities and costs of prosecuting these actions and to the related issue of court efficiency and case management. Traditionally, reliance-based causation is required but market-based causation was considered arguable at an interlocutory stage by the Full Federal Court in a class action. It has also been accepted by the NSW Supreme Court in a non-class action. It is suggested that final judicial acceptance of market-based causation in a class action at trial could be balanced by safeguards that would allow rebuttal of causation in some situations and some limiting of the class. This may allay somewhat the fears of those who see market-Truth based causation as contrary to policy and principle.
Following the Future of Financial Advice (‘FoFA’) reforms, the ‘suitability’ and ‘appropriateness’ focus for financial advice has been relocated and supplemented by a ‘best interests’ focus in s961B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Yet, as the Royal Commission into Banking and Financial Services has pointed out, structural issues may often work against best interests being paramount. Further, moves to make the statutory obligation replicate a fiduciary obligation have been resisted in the consultative process that developed the sections and any replication is far from clear. Another key issue is the extent to which aspects of the obligation are satisfied by a ‘box ticking’ approach. This aspect of the section is said to provide ‘safe harbour’ for advisers yet has been criticised by the Royal Commission as overly procedural rather than substantive. Yet removing the safe harbour altogether may create more problems than it solves. It may be that a catch all provision in s961B(2)(g) preserves substantive flexibility, and caution is needed in relation to any reform that leaves no procedural guidance for financial advisers to anchor their behaviour in fulfilling the best interests duty.
Thousands of years ago, Roman businessmen often ran joint businesses through commonly-owned, highly intelligent slaves. Roman slaves did not have full legal capacity and were considered property of their co-owners. Analogously, now business corporations are looking to delegate decision-making to uber-intelligent machines through the use of artificial intelligence in boardrooms. Artificial intelligence in boardrooms could assist, integrate, or even replace human directors. However, the concept of using artificial intelligence in boardrooms is largely unexplored new and raises several issues. This Article sheds light on legal and policy challenges concerning artificial agents in boardrooms. The arguments revolve around two fundamental questions: (1) what role can artificial intelligence play in boardrooms?and (2) what ramifications would the deployment of artificial agents in boardrooms entail?
Archaeology of corporate law excavates ancient laws and language in order to illuminate salient issues in contemporary and future corporate debates. This research employs an archaeological approach to corporate law by analysing three intertwining legal and organizational technologies. First, it sheds light on the origins and nature of the corporate form. Second, it reckons with the extension of personal rights, such as free exercise of religion, to business corporations. Third, it discusses separation of ownership and control as the feature that characterizes the essential formula of the business corporation model
The Malaysian Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016) provides that an auditor of a company may be removed from office by an ordinary resolution at a general meeting of which special notice has been given, but not otherwise. Thus, the power to remove auditors can only be exercised by the members of the company and not the directors. Nonetheless, directors who have majority voting power may misuse the power to the disadvantage of minority members for their self-benefit. This may occur in cases where auditors are removed if the auditors have detected fraud by the directors or in cases where the directors are not in agreement with the auditors’ findings. Cases have sparked of the need to carry out a study which examines removal of auditors and how the power can be misused by the management of the company. Thus, if the office of auditors is strengthened i.e. a company is not easily empowered to remove auditors, auditors will carry out their role effectively without fear or favour.