Blockchain Security by Incentives
Blockchain Security by Incentives
The security of blockchain protocols critically relies on incentive compatibility. This talk will review the basic principles of game-theoretical analysis of blockchain protocols and recent results. It will focus on our novel protocol, Colordag (link below), which achieves a strict Nash Equilibrium with high probability.
Ittai Abraham and Danny Dolev and Ittay Eyal and Joseph Y. Halpern. Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain. https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/308
About the speaker
Senior Lecturer, Technion
Ittay Eyal is an Senior Lecturer (Assistant Prof.) in the Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty at Technion. Eyal completed his PhD at Technion, followed by a post-doctorate at Cornell University. Eyal was awarded a 2018 Alon Scholarship and a 2022 Krill Prize. His research focuses on performance and security in decentralized systems.
Monash University values the privacy of every individual's personal information and is committed to the protection of that information from unauthorised use and disclosure except where permitted by law. For information about the handling of your personal information please see Data Protection and Privacy Procedure and the relevant Data Protection and Privacy Collection Statement that applies to you depending on the nature of your interaction with us.
If you have any questions about how Monash University is collecting and handling your personal information, please contact our Data Protection and Privacy Office at dataprotectionofficer@monash.edu.