CHE Seminar Series: Profit pressures in nonprofit care - Executive responses to financial incentives in hospitals
This paper examines how executive backgrounds shape organizational responses to financial incentives in mission-driven settings. Using U.S. nonprofit hospitals, I study whether clinically trained executives influence behavior under pay-for-performance policies. Hospitals led by non- clinical executives respond more strongly to quality-based financial incentives than those led by clinically trained leaders. This difference reflects active management rather than organizational objectives and operates through two mechanisms: clinically trained leaders prioritize patient- centered care and possess expertise that lowers the cost of quality improvements. These findings highlight the role of leadership in firm objectives and suggest incentive design should account for managerial heterogeneity.
Speaker profile
Hanna Glenn is a Lecturer of Economics at the University of Queensland in Brisbane. She recently relocated to Australia after completing her PhD at Emory University. Her research focuses on health economics, exploring how healthcare policy, hospital governance, and technology adoption shape outcomes for patients and providers.
Weekly seminar series
As part of our Centre's vibrant research culture, we host a weekly seminar series. Visiting and invited researchers present current research relating to the economics of health and wellbeing, and the healthcare sector. Visitors are welcome to join these sessions where discussion and debate is encouraged.
For further information on our seminar series, please contact Trong-Anh.Trinh@monash.edu .
Event Details
- Date:
- 29 April 2026 at 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm
- Venue:
- Caulfield campus, Building C, level 1, room C1.21
- Categories:
- CHE Seminar; General
Description
This paper examines how executive backgrounds shape organizational responses to financial incentives in mission-driven settings. Using U.S. nonprofit hospitals, I study whether clinically trained executives influence behavior under pay-for-performance policies. Hospitals led by non- clinical executives respond more strongly to quality-based financial incentives than those led by clinically trained leaders. This difference reflects active management rather than organizational objectives and operates through two mechanisms: clinically trained leaders prioritize patient- centered care and possess expertise that lowers the cost of quality improvements. These findings highlight the role of leadership in firm objectives and suggest incentive design should account for managerial heterogeneity.
Speaker profile
Hanna Glenn is a Lecturer of Economics at the University of Queensland in Brisbane. She recently relocated to Australia after completing her PhD at Emory University. Her research focuses on health economics, exploring how healthcare policy, hospital governance, and technology adoption shape outcomes for patients and providers.
Weekly seminar series
As part of our Centre's vibrant research culture, we host a weekly seminar series. Visiting and invited researchers present current research relating to the economics of health and wellbeing, and the healthcare sector. Visitors are welcome to join these sessions where discussion and debate is encouraged.
For further information on our seminar series, please contact Trong-Anh.Trinh@monash.edu .