Just Cases | Season 3 | Episode 1 | He knows how to operate in the shadows

The corruption case against former South African president Jacob Zuma has begun. Zuma’s case lifts the lid on the influence of weapons companies on governments worldwide.

“It’s not a story of a corrupt guy, Jacob Zuma,” says Hennie van Vuuren, the director of Open Secrets, a South African organisation that investigates economic crimes and abuses of power.

“[Instead] it’s a story of a network of players around the globe - in corporations, arms companies, intelligence agencies - who have been working with accountants and lawyers and others who have facilitated this corruption. As we zoom out we start to see the links spread across the globe.”

Hennie van Vuuren (www.twitter.com/hennievvuuren) is the author of 'Apartheid, Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit', which shows how a secret global network of banks, governments and big business dodged international sanctions to supply the last Apartheid regime with weapons, and how this legacy of corruption, which resulted in the gutting of democratic institutions and the murders of those who attempted to expose it, still survives to this day.

More information:
- Open Secrets: www.opensecrets.org.za
- Podcast series: They Killed Dulcie www.opensecrets.org.za/they-killed-dulcie-podcast-series/

Music in this episode: 'Alum Drum Solo' by Blue Dot Sessions‘Melodramatic’ by DJ Ollie J

Explore more Monash Law podcasts

Transcript | Just Cases | Season 3 | Episode 1 | He knows how to operate in the shadows

[00:00:00] Jacob Zuma: I have therefore come to the decision to resign as President of the Republic with immediate effect.

[00:00:13] Speaker 2: Jacob Zuma's most challenging days as president involved protest like these, demanding his resignation. It's 15 months and Zuma succumbed following months of public dissatisfaction and pressure from within his own party, the African National Congress.

[00:00:27] At the hearts of his fall from grace were hundreds of corruption allegations. Zuma was charged specifically in a corruption case going back more than a decade, Zuma once the charges dropped, because of what he describes as a political conspiracy, Jacob Zuma's due to appear at this court where it's expected.

[00:00:45] His lawyers will argue that it's been more than a decade since the case against him began, and it should be thrown out. The former president also says there've been irregularities ahead of the trial, including that he's been spied on by the government.

[00:01:03] James Pattison: The corruption case against former South African President Jacob Zuma began this week. His case is the tip of the iceberg. According to Henny Fen, Henny is the director of Open Secrets, a South African organization that investigates economic crimes and abuses of power amongst other things. He's the author of Apartheid Guns and Money, A Tale of Profit.

[00:01:24] Which shows how a secret global network of banks, governments, and big business dodged international sanctions to supply the last Apartheid government with weapons. And this legacy of corruption, which resulted in the gutting of democratic institutions and the murders of those who attempted to expose it still survives to this day.

[00:01:42] Henny, welcome to Just Cases.

[00:01:44] Hennie van Vuuren: Good to be here. Thank you very much.

[00:01:46] James Pattison: Jacob Zuma, who is he? How much of a big deal is this man? And how much power? Has he wielded in South Africa?

[00:01:54] Hennie van Vuuren: So when some people think about South African politics, they think of Nelson Mandela, the country's first democratically elected president.

[00:02:01] Um, after, after centuries of colonialism, after years of apartheid, which separated the country along racial lines of. Brutal system in the 20th century. In 1994, the country had its first democratic elections, and Mandela was this towering figure, um, who represents the country's new constitutional order.

[00:02:19] He was the person embodied in a way, perhaps too much so for one man to carry this one person, the, the spirit of what might be possible in South Africa, of imagining a more just, uh, democratic future. Um, and his party, the African National Congress, was one of the. F you know, the forefront of the country's liberation struggle.

[00:02:41] Um, but it's a party in many ways, which is described as a very broad church. It holds many competing contesting forces. There are those Democrats and, and those who believe in constitution, but there are folks from both a left and not necessarily right wing, but you know, conservative economic view that are, are bound into this.

[00:03:02] Some of the people. Uh, you know, and there's a group within the, the African National Congress, um, who had developed a very powerful network within the party, um, felt excluded, um, from some of the, the party's decision making processes, particularly around the trade unions and others. And they needed a man, a somebody who.

[00:03:22] Put forward as their potential candidates for, uh, a leadership contest within the party, uh, in 2007, and they assembled themselves around one man. This is Jacob Zuma, and within two years he was elected president of South Africa and had been president, um, until only, uh, well, until, uh, 2018. So it was almost, he was nine years in office.

[00:03:46] Comes from the eastern, one of the eastern provinces of South Africa, of Kal, regarded as a traditionalist by many. Um, I guess some liberals and others would immediately paint him with a brushstroke of just simply being this polygamist a man with many partners and, and, uh, uh, many wives and see him in, you know, in that sense.

[00:04:04] But of course, he's a, you know, a man who spent up to 10 years in prison fighting the apartheid system. Um, he has for many years seen someone who's. Close to the people and is able to bring that message across in campaign speeches and, and draws a massive crowd. But he's a populist in many ways. He's a populist in the mold of, of the populist politicians we see today in countries like Australia and elsewhere.

[00:04:28] Professor Melissa Castan: And did that bring with, it was that coalition and that network, a source of strength for.

[00:04:33] Hennie van Vuuren: So Zuma had important to mention while Zuma was in, in exile with the African National Congress, he was the head of the A C'S Intelligence Services. Mm. So this is, so he's, this is

[00:04:44] James Pattison: during the apartheid regime? You mean?

[00:04:45] Hennie van Vuuren: During the apartheid regime. He's the head of the A C'S Intelligence Services and he knows how to operate in the shadows. It's actually the space in which he's most comfortable. And while he enjoys immense support, particularly in the first years of his presidency, um, he's seen as a hope as somebody who will deliver on change in the country.

[00:05:04] Um, he's also a man who's extraordinary vulnerable, so he embodies both these, you know, these ideas. On the one hand, he has the popular support base. But the problem is the law is about to catch up with him. He's implicated in massive corruption scandals, and in fact, as we now know, he is not only implicated in in a number of corruption scandals, but has a pretty incestuous patronage network is built up around him who are involved in corruption.

[00:05:31] And as long as the rule of law is firm, as long as the Constitution holds and the Democratic. Institutions hold. He's a politician who's vulnerable to pressure and possibly, um, to FaceTime in jail.

[00:05:43] James Pattison: So let's have a look at this particular corruption allegation against Jacob Zuma. Enter French Weapons Company Les in the 1990s.

[00:05:52] Who were they?

[00:05:53] Hennie van Vuuren: So Tyler, you know, is one of those companies we should all know about. Um, and, and, uh, I don't, I've never heard of them in my life. Have

[00:06:01] James Pattison: you, Melissa?

[00:06:01] Professor Melissa Castan: I don't know. Uh, do you need a lot of French weapons in your life?

[00:06:04] James Pattison: That's true. Beyond the, um, the French soccer team? Um, no, the football.

[00:06:10] Hennie van Vuuren: Football, um, France, like many other countries, um, industrial countries has a sophisticated domestic, um.

[00:06:19] Arms sector, and they've relied on state subsidies. Often the states like France and others have shares in them. Um, and so they rely on government contracts and they rely on governments to leverage that network globally to sell those weapons. Mm-hmm. I mean, it's an, it's an it extraordinary industry of all the industries in the world.

[00:06:39] Before we look at tireless, the industries in the world, uh, the arms industry is seen as. Probably the most corrupt industry in the world. It's in fact, it's, it's built around the notion of, of corruption. For many years, it was standard in every single weapons contract, while it was legal to do so in many countries.

[00:06:58] For bribery to be built in of 10 to 15% of bribing politicians, primarily to sell weapons.

[00:07:03] James Pattison: Who were they? Bri. And who's doing the bribing?

[00:07:06] Hennie van Vuuren: Well, just about everybody. I, I, I mean, I think where you see an arms deal, I think it's fair to say, and very clearly we shouldn't believe in conspiracies, but the evidence is there, whether you're in Czech Republic or Thailand, whether you're in Tanzania and Brazil, whether you're in Sweden or South Africa, I mentioned all those countries and if we had time, we could unpick recent.

[00:07:26] Cases of corruption at the top level in all of those governments involving arms companies that were either selling bribe, uh, selling arms, or, or, or, or, or, uh, you know, or based in some of the countries that, that are in fact selling, selling weapons. Um, the. Precisely because you know, the kind of technology that is often being supplied is the stuff that countries don't need.

[00:07:48] Um, countries don't often need all of this equipment. You know, we are not, many of our countries aren't in states of war, including Australia, South Africa, you know, we haven't been in war at war for 25 years, but we've got submarines. And, you know, fighter jets. Why do we need all of this stuff?

[00:08:06] Professor Melissa Castan: So take us back to the end of the apartheid regime.

[00:08:08] Why do they need weapons and who is supplying those weapons?

[00:08:12] Hennie van Vuuren: South Africa, I think, you know, one and many young South Africans also forget that was at war in the last years of apartheid. It was a, it was a military state, almost one out of every $3 in our budget went straight to the military in one way or the other large corporations.

[00:08:27] Um. Were geared towards supplying that military machinery. The, the powers were rested in the military, military intelligence, and the country had occupied the neighboring state of Namibia. Uh, the South African troops were deep into. Uh, Angola, uh, and which is many thousands of kilometers away from the south, close to South African border.

[00:08:49] Uh, and South African troops were attacking liberation movements from the A NC and elsewhere in neighboring states. So, so you've got this extraordinary military industrial complex in South Africa, um, and we broker this deal, which is called democracy. Peace is to arrive with the election of of Nelson Mandela and one of the first things that Democratic government does in the mid 1990s in South Africa is identifies the, identifies the need to change the way in which the military works.

[00:09:19] To support peacekeeping operations in terms of our own obligations on the African continent. I mean, we would, I think we'd all agree this is exactly what needed to be happening there. You know, lest we forget, there were conflicts brewing and the Democratic Republic of Congo Wars in West Africa at the time.

[00:09:34] There was a need for this and civilians were losing their lives. What had started a process of trying to buy troop carriers, you know, to take troops on, on civilian, uh, on peacekeeping, uh, missions rather. It was very soon subverted, and we were able to show how a group of relatively small group of European arms companies, but some of the most influential arms companies in Europe, British Aerospace, one of the biggest arms companies from Britain today.

[00:10:02] Um. Tireless from France, uh, aero today. Leonardo in, in Italy, Saab who don't only produce, you know, nice, nice cars, slightly unreliable cars. Um, these are companies that produce fa fighter and trainer jets. Uh, and a range of German companies were selling submarines, fighter jets, trainer jets to South Africa and had subverted that process to tell the government, in fact, we think you need submarines and Corvettes.

[00:10:28] And that was a process of both changing the idea of what. What was needed by the country, and that meant bribing. We believe certain politicians who held the levers around that process, and then secondly, steering them directly towards these particular corporations. Just to add, I mean, you know, we forget South Africa at that stage was facing a crisis of hiv aids.

[00:10:49] So in the late 1990s when we spent 7 billion Australian dollars on weapons, 300,000 people had lost their lives, mostly children and and women as a result of hiv aids and people not getting access to anti antiretroviral medication. There's a direct human rights linkage to us buying weapons corruptly from these European arms companies that go into the pockets of politicians and wealthy folks elsewhere.

[00:11:15] And the suffering that this helped exacerbate,

[00:11:17] Professor Melissa Castan: you're saying choices were economic choices were made, and they were made in what seems precisely the wrong direction for the building up of a new state

[00:11:26] Hennie van Vuuren: with, with fundamental consequences for, for many people's lives.

[00:11:29] Professor Melissa Castan: So then, uh, Zuma. How is his role integral in this kind of transition period and, and the role of the, the weapons companies?

[00:11:39] Hennie van Vuuren: So at this point, Zuma's still a relatively low level politician in, in, uh, the country's eastern province in Ulu Nael. Uh, but he does have important support there, and he's already been tipped as a potential future deputy president of the country. Mandela's administration comes to an end after the first five years, and he indicates that he is no longer in, he's not interested in continuing politics, and that's fair enough.

[00:12:02] After spending 27 years in prison and the new administration led by a man called Tao and Becky, uh, Becky. Brings in Zuma effectively as his deputy president. After the, the ruling party, uh, governing party also, uh, elects him. And Zuma's role is crucial because he isn't the person who made the decision to buy the particular weapons.

[00:12:25] In fact, the evidence shows in the argument made by the South African state in court cases right now is that zoom is. We see relatively small amount of money. Uh, you know, it's a, it's a couple of hundred, a hundred thousand dollars at most, but the intention was for him to ensure that the companies weren't held to account, so to disrupt the processes that could.

[00:12:48] Lead to accountability. Um, and this made him vulnerable because, uh, you know, it was clear that there was a, it was a mutually beneficial relationship that developed between Zuma and the Arms company. And crucially, in the early two thousands and 2000 and. The state started an investigation. We had had a incredible, you know, really important anti-corruption agency, which is independent, looking at high level corruption, doing great work called the Scorpions.

[00:13:15] So the scorpions went in right driving blackjack, leather jackets and black cars, and, uh, raid the homes of politicians and, and, and wealthy folks who are involved in corruption. And imperfect as model as it was, it worked by and large. Um, and, um, they started investigating. Zuma's financial advisor, in fact charged him with corruption and it went to court and a man by the name of Shabi Sheikh, who was working with.

[00:13:39] Tireless and, uh, Sheikh was found guilty of, uh, of, of corruption. And, and what

[00:13:45] Professor Melissa Castan: was the nature of the corruption there?

[00:13:47] Hennie van Vuuren: Well, Sheikh had been the, uh, as, as Zuma's financial advisor had effectively been helping to pass the money onto Jacob Summa. So he was the middleman who's helping to broker those deals.

[00:13:57] He's prosecution set the scene. It should have set the scene for. A really big next step that would be the potential prosecution of the country's deputy president at that time. In 2005, 2006, Jacob Zuma and Ali

[00:14:15] James Pattison: Shaikh was sentenced to 15 years in prison in 2005. He then made attempts to appeal. In the meantime, Jacob Zuma stood down as deputy president. By 2007, Zuma was elected by the A NC as its new leader, and in 2009 he became president of South Africa. Shaik spent a short time in prison before being released in 2009 due to being diagnosed with a terminal illness.

[00:14:44] A decade later, Shaikh is still alive. You're listening to Just Cases from Monash Law. Today we're speaking to Henny Fan Fen from Open Secrets Henis in Australia as a guest of the Caston Center for Human Rights Law at Monash University.

[00:15:09] So as director of Open Secrets, Henny, you, um, have uncovered just systemic corruption in South Africa and globally. What form does this corruption take and what have you uncovered?

[00:15:24] Hennie van Vuuren: So, you know, firstly, perhaps just to say that, um, South Africa is a country of many contradictions of, uh, of inequalities of power and, um, of resources.

[00:15:35] But it's also a country where very many people believe in the society of democracy. It's, I mean, for, for, for myself and many, I think young South Africans, um, we're inspired to try and change our. Our world. And that requires a certain imagination. And, you know, we rely on, we rely on brave whistleblowers.

[00:15:55] We rely on, um, on using our country's access to information laws to get documents, investigative work by investigative journalists in particular, um, on the courts that produce records, which are, you know, are. Are boring in their length, but so juicy in their detail. They tell us about who you know, who the people are and who the networks are, and we use that to piece this together.

[00:16:18] The puzzle doesn't land like one wat of documents in your lap. You've gotta constantly be pulling together all of these details. Um, and so it is very much, I see this as a collective collaborative effort. It involves. Lawyers and investigators and, and brave public officials and, um, you know, our private sector official who's had enough of what they've seen around them.

[00:16:40] You know, it's that mix, which is so important, but the story it tells is a, a story of complexity and I think that that's often why we shy away from some of those stories. It's not a story of a corrupt guy, Jacob Zuma, this corrupt South African. Politician. Um, it's a story of a network of players around the globe in corporations, um, in arms companies, intelligence agencies, um, uh, who have been working with accountants and lawyers and others enablers that have facilitated this corruption.

[00:17:13] Um, so in, it's, it's, you know, as much as these become very much, you know, they can be reduced to courtroom dramas. Right now in South Africa. But as we zoom out, we start to see that this actually is, you know, the links spread across the globe, certainly in terms of the players that are involved, the type of corporations and governments that are linked to this.

[00:17:35] Um, you know, and I think that is why. Cases like these are really important because they don't only tell us about South Africa, they help us to understand some of those machinations we can all feel that are going on in the world that some folks immediately reduce to, you know, kind of frankly crazy conspiracy theories.

[00:17:52] But actually when we look at the facts, it's much starker than any kind of conspiracy theory. The stuff is there and it's, you know, it is real in its nature of how power is abused and how it takes a network of interest to make that happen.

[00:18:06] James Pattison: As you do explain it. In my mind, it shows itself more or less as a conspiracy theory.

[00:18:12] I can't help but picture it in, you know, as an an international network, I immediately go to a web of spies and people in, in suits, in boardrooms, cutting deals. And how do you tell this story, which it once exposes a web of corruption globally, but without. At the same time also saying it is not a conspiracy.

[00:18:38] Professor Melissa Castan: It almost to me seems like you're describing a kind of viral adaptive network that sort of moves and reshapes itself constantly, and then moves into these positions or moments where there's opportunity and the, what you're describing in South Africa, whether it's during the apartheid regime or the end of it, or the transition to democracy or the contemporary moment, there's these sort of opportunities for this.

[00:19:03] N network of interest to kind of infiltrate, recombine itself or realign itself and, and gain power or gain economic advantage. From being in those moments.

[00:19:17] Hennie van Vuuren: Yeah. So, you know, I mean, I think it may, it certainly may seem viral, but I, you know, I, I equally worry that, um, it does end up, when we describe it that way, sometimes it's feels like something that could be potentially outside of our control.

[00:19:32] And in fact, this is what these folks do rely on and they are. The spies and the guys in the, and they're mostly men and they're the guys in boardrooms and, um, and they are the crooked politician. And it's everything of that kind of network that we could imagine. Um, and I think it does, you know, it, it functions in the same way that many old boys networks have operated around the world.

[00:19:56] What do we have? What do we have on our side? I think there are, we have, well there, let me say, there are three things that I can immediately think of. Firstly, we have the facts. We've gotta focus on the evidence, um, through our work as an organization, but the work of many others, it's all about making sure that we have the evidence that we can back up.

[00:20:15] We live in this, in a world which is consumed by, you know, not only, it's not consumed, but people push a narrative politically of fake news for their own agendas. And, and the, the most, I think the most powerful force against that in part, is telling truth, telling through, through facts. Secondly, I think it's.

[00:20:33] It's the fearlessness of of, of doing that kind of work and making sure that we will name those corporations, we should be able to talk about tireless right here. Whereas very often we don't mention the name of corporations like this 'cause we fear the power that they have and they are powerful organizations economically, uh, politically, uh, and, and you know, and it's, it can be really hard work in many ways.

[00:20:55] And I think thirdly is collective action. Um, we don't. Change these systems, um, through the ego of one or two people. It's systems only change through collective action. We need lawyers to be working with civil society organizations. Um, we, you know, who work with, with the information from investigative journalists who, who use the courts and the law to change that system.

[00:21:17] James Pattison: To that end, a commission was set up in South Africa in 2013 to look at these networks of armed dealers and of the corruption of politicians. What happened there? It's not a happy tale, is it?

[00:21:31] Hennie van Vuuren: Not at all. Not for, for, for, for many of us. And well, it is a happy tale. Let me correct myself. It's a happy tale if you're in an arms company and you're a corrupt politician.

[00:21:40] Um, you know, one of the things maybe that I should mention is. That Jacob Zuma's legal counsel famously described his strategy to deal with the corruption allegations, his legal strategy as the Stalingrad strategy. So you would, you would fight your way, you would fight the advancing forces outta Stalingrad Street by street.

[00:22:02] And that's precisely what he has done over a period of 10 to 15 years. And an important turning point came in civil society organizations had. Working through the, gone to the Constitutional court and effectively, um, the court was about to make a decision that a commission of inquiry needed to be set up to deal with this like a Royal Commission to focus on this big arm mega arms deal.

[00:22:26] Of the late 1990s, um, and Zuma acceded to this request, he knew he would fail in court, and, and eventually the, the commission was set up. And so while we thought this might be a victory, this could be a moment for openness, um, headed by a relatively respected justice of the Supreme Court. Willy ti, um. Uh, and I should disclose right up front, myself and colleagues were called as witnesses and not because I was part of any arms deals, but because we had written books to expose and investigated some of these things.

[00:22:58] Um, and working together with civil society organizations, we soon realized that in fact this was, uh, an attempt to shut the. Any, any, any efforts at Probity do The commission started its work and very soon we, you know, we had key members of this commission resigning, suggesting that there was a, a second political agenda in the commission.

[00:23:20] And we found ourselves as witnesses being told by, in, in extraordinary, you know, moments by the, by the head of the commission, ju Justice Rii, that we can't bring evidence if we were not. Party to the decisions. That means we were effectively either the corrupt ee or the corruptor, our witnesses in the room.

[00:23:39] That means there's a very small group of people who can speak to this wha

[00:23:42] James Pattison: that's extraordinary. South Africa's courts have, um, played the role of being a, a real check on government overreach and private sector overreach. H how was it that you started to realize that they had an effect, a political agenda?

[00:23:57] And what was the, what was the feeling? Was it a feeling of disbelief? Was it a feeling? Did it take you a while to realize what was going on and how, how did that quite sink in with you?

[00:24:06] Hennie van Vuuren: It was pure disbelief in the beginning. And, and I, and I say that as somebody who, I mean, my, many of my colleagues and I fundamentally believe that we can use the law and we believe in the country's uh, um, justice system.

[00:24:20] It's been used during part. To fight apartheid, but during apartheid, equally, the courts, many of them were also sites of struggle for, against the repression of the state. But during, in a democratic society, we had imagined, um, we couldn't imagine this to be possible. And um, you know, and at the first. At, at first we thought these were just pure missteps that, you know, we would just continue making the point.

[00:24:46] We would argue the points, but we were represented by great human rights lawyers, um, and council acting pro bono for us in, in, in this commission. And the more, you know, the more work we did, and these were hundreds and hundreds of hours of work collectively that went into this commission involving many people from civil society, we, so we, we realized that when we even.

[00:25:10] Took, I mean, I'll give you an example. Um, Rista is one of Germany's big. Arms companies and, um, it's implicated in this arms deal and, uh, you know, on, on other weapons systems. So, um, and we had a leaked report that Risto had produced, uh, in, not itself, but it had brought in a US firm of attorneys, a dev Ofir, Plimpton, a big, uh, US firm to look into their own practices and tell them if they're corrupt and it confirmed their corruption.

[00:25:39] This report was elite. We tried to take this to the commission. We said, look, this is our view. This isn't hearsay. This is what the company commissioned and it confirms the corruption, you know, in, in one of these cases. In another case, we went to the commission. We said British Aerospace struck a deal with the US Department of Justice in a plea bargain agreement in which they confirmed that they'd acted corruptly in a range of countries.

[00:26:04] Tanzania, South Africa, uh, and elsewhere. And, um, they'd reached a settlement in the United States worth hundreds of millions of dollars. And we try to bring the evidence from that, you know, from, from those that pe, that agreement, which was public. The commission said, sorry, we're not interested in hearing this from you.

[00:26:20] James Pattison: Did they laugh you off as conspiracy theorists, even though you had the evidence? Did they seek to discredit you or did they instead say via technicality, you are not allowed to. Um, submit that evidence.

[00:26:32] Hennie van Vuuren: They, they responded with, I mean, I think I would argue with, you know, some very hollow legal arguments and we realized it's really hard.

[00:26:41] So one of the ta, one of the strategies we'd considered was in fact taking the commission to court while it was sitting right to challenge us and our lawyers said to us, um. You know, you could consider this approach, but you would have to basically bring the other judge to sit in front of another judge and ask, you know, the judge in another court to rule on a process that's ongoing.

[00:27:02] And they would obviously argue, let the process complete. Mm-hmm. There is not, there isn't yet any finding. You may not like the process, but let it run its course. And so, you know, the decision for us was either we. Continue to participate, but we then become part of a process of legitimizing something, um, that certainly isn't.

[00:27:22] And so after, um, you know, two, it was almost three years of work on this commission, we took the decision to withdraw and, and face potential criminal charges, um, for refusing to. Comply, we were required to come and give evidence. It wasn't an invitation and the commission had threatened that they, you know, they were going to look at a potential prosecution, myself and my colleagues.

[00:27:47] Um, and we were fortunate that up to 40 civil society organizations in South Africa and internationally supported us in this call commission, I think could see that while they had the power potentially to send myself and others to. To prison through a legal process. This wasn't something they were gonna do, and they backed off.

[00:28:03] Um, and it then finally produces its reports. Judges ti produces a report, and the politicians are overjoyed. The arms company's overjoyed because effectively it says, well, you know, you may not have been the best deal, uh, that any country could have struck, but the, you know, the, everybody who has power, you are absolved of any responsibility of corruption.

[00:28:25] James Pattison: But this is not all over yet. Right. There's, there's been some developments, some very positive developments since then. Can you take us down that path alongside this recent court case involving Jacob Zuma? There's now some hope for the findings of the commission. I.

[00:28:42] Hennie van Vuuren: So, you know, in, in many countries, I think we look at commissions of inquiry or royal commissions as opportunities for us to, uh, effectively but not only as coverups, but opportunities to distract us with a huge amount of information.

[00:28:55] But they also have a power because they are precedent setting. They can be used by corrupt politicians and arms corporations, and they're waived in their hands around the world to say, no, I went through the good courts of South Africa and they've cleared me of corruption. Um, and equally they set a precedent of.

[00:29:10] Conduct for future commissions and there will be other instances of abuse power in countries like South Africa. And so a group of two civil society organizations in South Africa, the right to know campaign and corruption watch. Um, working together with other partners in civil society and ourselves, um, made it.

[00:29:26] Decision, they made a decision to challenge these findings and effectively asked the courts to overturn them because the, the commission had not considered the evidence, as I've pointed out. Um, and that's been a, that's been a, a, an almost three year slug.

[00:29:44] Jacob Zuma: In the presence of everyone assembled here and in full realization of the high colleague, I assume, as president of the Republic of South Africa, I

[00:30:02] swear that I'll be faithful to the Republic of South Africa.

[00:30:09] Hennie van Vuuren: We've reached this extraordinary moment where the New South African president, a man by the name of Raza, uh, has decided recently not to oppose this case brought by civil society groups. Um, and what that in effect means is that the findings of this.

[00:30:28] Commission of this Royal Commission that's sat for, for four years that cost us the, the, the taxpayer probably between 15 and 20 million, uh, Australian dollars is going to be overturned and nullified. It means that people like Jacob Zuma, who in their current wrangles around the court cases that seek to hold them to account for corruption in an aspect of this arms deal, can no longer use this as some kind of a veil of protection.

[00:30:56] It's gone

[00:30:57] Professor Melissa Castan: honey. Is Matt Damon gonna play you in a blockbuster movie?

[00:31:01] James Pattison: Matt Damon's not ripped enough.

[00:31:03] Professor Melissa Castan: Yeah, exactly. There you go. That's the answer. He's not good enough to play you in this role. Um, Henny, can you tell us what's happening with these issues? Right now. Yeah. I mean the ca, the case against Zuma is underway.

[00:31:16] What's your hope for this case? That's, that's before the courts now.

[00:31:21] Hennie van Vuuren: So there's an amazing moment happening right now in South Africa after 15 years roughly, of trying to hold Jacob Zuma and Tallis to account. Both are in court. Um, the prosecutors originally let the case have been brought back in, and they have the skills and the understanding of the case.

[00:31:36] The, the courts seem, um, open, uh, certainly are open to ensuring that this is given a, a proper airing. But it's pretty extraordinary. You've gotta, you know, given all of the stories of corruption you have in South Africa, given the power of these, you know, very powerful man like Jacob Zuma, who's outside of the court every day right now in Durban, uh, with.

[00:31:57] Hundreds of supporters around him. And let's not forget you have the power of Tyler. So this Global Arms company, um, where, you know, we organized the people's tribunal on economic crime together with partners in civil society last year. And this was to bring evidence of, you know, of economic crime, including around this arms deal.

[00:32:15] And one of the witnesses we had at the, the commission in fact was an informer. Tireless Fixer who had been paid by tireless to support Sumer. And he tells the story of him being in meetings with, uh, the, the South African President Beck and, and Jacob Zoomer, where they had met, um, uh, uh, president, uh, Shira, uh, France and Sarcozi, um, who had.

[00:32:40] Asked the South African government to ensure that these matters aren't investigated. I mean, it is extraordinary. And, and there are very few cases where arms companies are held to account for their crimes in other countries, nevermind in the countries where they stamp where they come from. The stakes are, are, are really high, um, and.

[00:32:58] You know, for us owning to reach this point is an important validation of the work of so many people over time and, and this quest for justice. This isn't the world versus Jacob Zuma. This is ordinary folk against the power of this corner of the military industrial complex, and I think it's really important that.

[00:33:17] The corporation and the politician have been charged together. We need to see where this heads. We know that there's an enormous amount of, uh, pressure being placed on by Zuma's legal team and tireless to, um, to have a case Unter overturned. They argue that there's been no. Conspiracy against them and it's, you know, it's the most amazing defense because these are the corporation and the politician who's done everything to stop accountability over a period of 10 or 15 years.

[00:33:46] Although one who turn around now in this. Boldface manner through the council and argue that the state is launched a conspiracy. The conspiracy is real. It's out there. And the conspiracy from what we at least know from the evidence and the evidence shows I, I believe, unless there's anything to the country, that the corporation and the politician were involved in a corrupt relationship, and frankly, the head of the corporation and the politician probably need to go to jail for this.

[00:34:11] James Pattison: Henny f Fran's book, apartheid Guns and Money. A Tale of Profit is out now. You can get it from well anywhere. And, uh, you can also find Henny on Twitter. Uh, Henny, where are you available?

[00:34:25] Hennie van Vuuren: Yeah, please join the conversation. So, I'm, uh, open Secrets is at Open Secrets ZA and, uh, if you wanna reach out to me, it's, uh, Heni, H-E-N-N-I-E-V-V.

[00:34:38] U-U-R-E-N at uh, Twitter,

[00:34:41] Professor Melissa Castan: and you can find us on Twitter at Just Cases Show. And you can find our website@justcasespodcast.com.

[00:34:49] James Pattison: And if you found today's episode particularly interesting, make sure you check out the podcast. They killed Dulce. It's an eight part podcast by Sound, Africa, and Open Secrets, and it looks into the bankers, politicians, and arms companies who profited from the murder of South African activist Dulce September.

[00:35:09] Henny Fern Fon. Thank you so much for speaking to just Cases today. Thank you.