Just Cases | Season 3 | Episode 5 | Rolls-Royce's worldwide network of corruption

Earlier this year the UK's Serious Fraud Office (SFO) announced it had shut down a long-running investigation into corruption at Rolls-Royce. What did the UK authorities have to trade in exchange for Rolls-Royce’s money and cooperation?

Between 1999 to 2013, the SFO and a joint BBC/The Guardian investigation revealed that Rolls-Royce - which manufactures aircraft engines and defence systems, as well as their famed luxury cars - engaged in systemic criminal activity on a global scale.

In 2017, Rolls-Royce came to an agreement with the SFO, in which the company agreed to pay £671 million in return for avoiding prosecution on bribery and corruption charges.

This type of agreement - referred to as a deferred prosecution agreement (or DPA) - is gaining popularity.

What exactly are DPAs? Do they pull the teeth out of the criminal justice system, which already struggles to convict people for white collar crime?

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Transcript | Just Cases | Season 3 | Episode 5 | Rolls-Royce's worldwide network of corruption

[00:00:00] Media Release: This is an extremely difficult day for all of us at Rolls Royce. The behavior uncovered in the course of the investigations by the serious Fraud office and other authorities. Is completely unacceptable and we apologize unreservedly for it.

[00:00:19] Journalist: Among the accused, according to court papers are politicians, senior business leaders and foreign companies, including Rolls-Royce, which provides infrastructure for Petrobras oil platforms, the central accusation against Rolls Royce and other multinationals. Is that it paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to officials here in Brazil in order to secure much bigger multimillion dollar oil contracts from Petrobras.

[00:00:49] James Pattison: The name Rolls Royce is just about as luxe as you can get. It's Britain's ultimate luxury export. But in recent years, whistleblowers have revealed that Rolls Royce has been exporting corruption on a global scale, a joint investigation by the BBC. And the guardian revealed that between 1999 to 2013, the company engaged in staggering levels of bribery and corruption.

[00:01:15] Professor Melissa Castan: The cases raise many questions, not only about the influence of corporate giants on our political decision makers, but also about the role of the courts and the criminal justice system in holding criminals to account. This is just cases.

[00:01:32] Professor Liz Campbell is a corporate crime expert at Monash Law. Liz, welcome to Just Cases. Thanks, Melissa. Can you take us back to 2016 when the Revelation started to come out about Rolls Royce? What did we learn at that point?

[00:01:47] Professor Liz Campbell: Well, if I can take us back, maybe even slightly earlier to 2012, what was emerging at that stage online from a whistleblower?

[00:01:55] Um, a guy called Dick Taylor, a very loyal employee of Rolls Royce, was some concerns that he had about the use of intermediaries and other individuals. In a variety of jurisdictions overseas to, um, pay bribes in an effort to, to gain contracts essentially for, for Rolls-Royce. So the story really starts almost a decade ago, and it starts online with a, I suppose, a very well intentioned if, uh, concerned employee of Rolls-Royce.

[00:02:25] James Pattison: We heard in the intro montage corruption taking place in Brazil. But there are a number of other countries that took place in as well.

[00:02:33] Professor Liz Campbell: Absolutely. So, um, I suppose in the first instance, it's important for us to remember that even though Rolls Royce is seen as the kind of quintessential luxury car in, in, in Britain, it was actually the aerospace and engineering components of Rolls Royce that were under scrutiny in respect of bribery and corruption.

[00:02:51] And yes, indeed there were suggestions that bribes had. Been, uh, offered in, in Brazil in respect of Petrobras contracts. But in fact, the whistleblower report that I alluded to there in 2012, related to seven separate jurisdictions including India, China, Indonesia, Thailand, uh, Russia, uh, and a number of others.

[00:03:13] Um, so it really was, uh, very extensive. And even though this is a British company, none of the alleged bribes took place in the uk. It was all overseas.

[00:03:21] James Pattison: So when the whistleblower starts to reveal. This corruption from Rolls Royce and its intermediaries. What's Rolls Royce's response?

[00:03:30] Professor Liz Campbell: Rolls Royce, as you said, had been involved in using a network of intermediaries, some acting in good faith and acting within the, um, both letter and spirits of the law.

[00:03:39] Others, it became a clear, were using really rather dubious and corrupt practices to gain these contracts. So when this, um, whistleblower, uh, had. Um, revealed the details online. His concern that Ro was that Rolls Royce wasn't acting sufficiently, swiftly, so continued with his postings. Um, rolls Royce did, uh, initiate an internal investigation, but I think what's even more striking is the fact that, that these online postings came to the attention of the Serious Fraud office in the uk.

[00:04:08] Um, so the Serious Fraud Office is the main prosecuting and investigating agency in the UK that takes responsibility for serious and sophisticated fraud. Uh, economic and corporate crimes. And so the Serious Fraud Office, uh, to put it mildly, its interest was peaked by virtue of these whistleblower reports.

[00:04:27] And so it initiated its own investigation, um, that then was, I suppose, matched by a, an investigative journalism investigation by the BBC and the Guardian. So it was a, I suppose, kinda a multi-pronged approach really, to get to the bottom of what was going on here.

[00:04:43] James Pattison: Some of these revelations are just extraordinary.

[00:04:47] Um. It, you know, in, in preparing for this interview, I went down the rabbit hole of, um, the s FO's investigation to Rolls Royce, and all I can say is I understand why this is your practice area, Liz. It's fascinating. So in, in Indonesia, for example, rolls Royce was found to have. Given a couple of million pounds and a Rolls Royce Silver Spirit car to somebody, uh, in exchange for, quote, a favor to roll Rolls Royce on a contract.

[00:05:18] Things continue along those sorts of lines in different countries. C can you give us an example of, uh, of some of the other things that Rolls Royce was found to have engaged in?

[00:05:27] Professor Liz Campbell: Sure. I suppose I, um. I made an effort earlier to distinguish between Rolls Royce in terms of its car manufacturing, as well as then its aerospace and, and engineering expertise.

[00:05:38] But you can certainly see that in respect to the bribes, there was some degree of overlap in terms of deploying Rolls Royces as a, as sweeteners. Essentially. I've gotta say,

[00:05:46] James Pattison: if I was, uh, a foreign official, I would choose and had the option between a Rolls Royce or a uh. Or a jet engine. I think I'd probably choose a rolls.

[00:05:56] Roy, what do you think?

[00:05:56] Professor Melissa Castan: Because both are really easy to justify in your normal everyday life, aren't they? Right. Got a new car. What a Mazda. No,

[00:06:03] Professor Liz Campbell: it's a Rolls Royce. Absolutely. And I think, again, that's what is really striking is the level of bribes that we're being, um, both offered and given are really just astronomical in terms of the amounts.

[00:06:14] It really was ongoing. It was sophisticated in so many different jurisdictions as we've spoken about, but also over. About three decades. So this involved a network of intermediaries involved in a variety of different types of practices, giving different levels and forms of bribes to both private and public officials in a number of different jurisdictions.

[00:06:37] Um, and so how this was not. Raised earlier, I suppose is, is a matter maybe for discussion. Um, but it really just shows how endemic it was within Rolls Royce, how pervasive the practices were and how the use of these intermediaries, um, as I suppose the brokers or the Go-Betweens between Rolls Royce and, and, uh, public officials that were making particular and contractual decisions and how fundamental those intermediaries were really in this, um, sophisticated criminal enterprise.

[00:07:08] James Pattison: The guardian reported that there were other things, such as in Thailand, uh, there was $36 million paid, uh, by Rolls Royce, um, over the course of about 14, 15 years to secure a few different contracts with tight airways in Russia. Rolls Royce won a contract with, uh, G Prom, which is a state owned energy company in India.

[00:07:30] As you mentioned before, I mean, this is staggering and it sounds so. It sounds glamorous when you talk about. You know, rolls Royce and you talk about all these millions and millions of dollars, but what's the impact on the ground? What's the impact of corruption in the countries that this takes place in?

[00:07:48] Professor Liz Campbell: So, as you said, it's, it sounds rather glamorous and it really, it is a case where truth is stranger than fiction. You know, we, we watch, um, various fictional accounts of, of bribery and corruption and high level criminality, but here it's just, as you said, it's. The, the, the facts are so gripping. Um, yeah, you can see the screenplays kind of writing, writing themselves in, in, in some respects.

[00:08:09] Um, but really this isn't glamorous. This is really grubby. You know, these are, um, state officials in a variety of countries. Um, oftentimes jurisdictions that have major economic divisions, um, are cer certainly great, um, disparities in terms of wealth. So you have individuals breaching public trust lining their own pockets to the detriment of.

[00:08:33] Socioeconomic conditions in their own country, um, for the benefit of, uh, yes, a private entity. But something that very much came through in, in subsequent judgements in the UK is the fact that Rolls Royce is seen as a quintessential British company. That it's important in a, an economic sense, but it's also important in a symbolic sense.

[00:08:51] You know, it's seen as innovative cutting edge while still being traditional and conventional. And I suppose that's a big part of the kinda British psyches that it's, it's a country in which development and innovation happen. But that's all predicated on something that's very, um, very much, uh, established.

[00:09:08] And, and so this is really problematic criminal behavior that has impacts both on the ground in, in those overseas jurisdictions as well as within the uk.

[00:09:16] Professor Melissa Castan: So the UK prosecuting authorities then decide to charge. Those Rolls, rolls Royce officials with this corrupt behavior, how does that

[00:09:25] Professor Liz Campbell: unfold? Well, so the crux of the matter is what did the investigating agency decide to do?

[00:09:32] So if I can, again, roll things back, maybe a step or two. So rather than talking or thinking about charging what the serious fraud office. Did was to investigate Rolls Royce to see what was going on here. Um, and so the prosecutorial discussions and decisions will have to be based on well is action taken against the entity.

[00:09:51] And or the individuals that are, that are likely to be involved. Um, and what we've seen is while action was taken against Rolls Royce in the uk, no action has been taken against any individuals. Um, and that differs from the approach that was taken in the US for instance. But in the UK just earlier this year, the SFO announced that it is not pursuing action against any individual within Rolls Royce for these behaviors.

[00:10:17] Professor Melissa Castan: So it's as if a company does things autonomously and there's no actual human actor involved in those. Decisions and those actions. Yeah.

[00:10:25] Professor Liz Campbell: Yeah. And, and this is something that, um, I reflect on in my own academic research and it's something that I think is an inevitability. Um, where's the kind of pendulum swing to, in respect of pursuing a corporate entity, uh, as opposed to individuals?

[00:10:40] And it's not to say that there is a kind of a, a precise or. Um, ideal balance between the two, but sometimes what we see is an overemphasis on pursuing the corporate to the neglect of the individuals and, and then vice versa. 'cause I think here what you had certainly was something that was, it was bigger than individuals.

[00:10:59] It was structural, it was endemic, it was within the corporate, um, culture, the corporate practice in so many different countries. Um, but the fact then that there was such egregious, sophisticated criminality going on and no individual. Has been pursued, or indeed, of course, then convicted to my mind is really problematic as well.

[00:11:22] James Pattison: You're listening to just Cases, introducing our One question survey. We are wanting to know a little bit more about our listeners. There's a $50 Amazon gift card up for grabs. All you have to do is answer one simple question. That's right. It's a one question survey. Thanks for your responses. So far, we've learned a number of really helpful things about what you like and what you don't like, and we're gonna keep the survey open for another couple of weeks.

[00:11:48] Just head to. Just cases podcast.com/survey. That's just cases podcast.com/survey. Now back to professor Liz Campbell. Liz is talking about a controversial new approach to whether or not to prosecute corporate offenders.

[00:12:10] The decision to not prosecute. Individuals is basically the reason you're here today because this is a very special just cases. This actually is a just cases that doesn't involve a court case. What is a deferred prosecution agreement?

[00:12:27] Professor Liz Campbell: So a deferred prosecution agreement is an agreement between a prosecuting entity and someone or something that could be prosecuted, but a decision is reached between the two parties.

[00:12:43] That there will not be a prosecution as long as the individual or entity which could be prosecuted agrees and conforms to certain requirements.

[00:12:51] James Pattison: So this sounds like a good behavior bond.

[00:12:53] Professor Liz Campbell: Yeah, and I suppose that, that's a good analogy to draw. So what we have is, um, in the UK now since 2013, is the possibility for either the serious fraud office.

[00:13:03] Or the crown prosecution service. So the two prosecuting entities to, um, initiate discussions with a corporate entity to reach an agreement to say, well, these are certain criteria that need to be satisfied. Um, as long as that is the case, um, we will suggest that it's in the public interest for a prosecution not to be pursued, not withstanding the fact that there's evidence or potential evidence of a crime having been committed, essentially.

[00:13:28] James Pattison: A key part of the DPA was the financial penalty. How much did, uh, Rolls-Royce have to cough up

[00:13:35] Professor Liz Campbell: Indeed. So, um, Rolls-Royce had to disgorge the profits that were made, which were about 250 million pounds. Such a great bear, by the way. Disgorge had to disgorge indeed. Um, and then also was fine. Just a little bit over that.

[00:13:50] So we're looking at somewhere between 500 and 600 million in respect of the financial pounds. Pounds consequence for, for Rolls Royce. Um, and I think that's one important dimension of deferred prosecution agreements that we haven't spoken about yet, which is the fact that, well, we can't imprison a corporation.

[00:14:09] And so even if we were to go down the prosecutorial route. The stick that the state has to wield essentially is a financial penalty, and a deferred prosecution agreement can include a financial penalty.

[00:14:19] Professor Melissa Castan: Well, Liz, why is it in the public interest to not prosecute a company when you have the evidence available to you?

[00:14:25] Professor Liz Campbell: So this is a really tricky question. Um, so what. The associated code of practice in the UK does is to outline, well, what are the criteria on which a prosecutor would make this decision that it's in the public interest to go down the DPA route rather than the prosecutorial route. And there are a variety of different factors, such as whether this is a, a one-off, um, maybe perceived to be slightly outlandish behavior on the part of a corporate entity that up until now had been.

[00:14:53] Very much com compliant. Um, on the other hand, if you had a corporate entity, which had a culture that was seen to encourage wrongdoing and the kind of cutting off corners that would lean us towards prosecution rather than towards a DPA, are there a variety of individuals involved in this? Su, um, suspected criminality or is this a kinda an aberration, lone wolf, one bad apple, whatever, uh, metaphor we want to use.

[00:15:18] Um, whatever analogy we want to draw, that, that, again, would lead us towards a deferred prosecution agreement rather than away. Other components and, and these have been particularly controversial in the US, is the idea of collateral consequences of prosecution. While our instinctive reaction might be go in all guns blazing in respect of a wrongdoing, uh, corporation, prosecution could have repercussions for employees who are.

[00:15:44] Acting in good faith, well-meaning, and certainly not impugned by virtue of the corporate behavior. Um, you might have shareholders, individuals whose pensions are tied up with particular corporate entities. So those particular collateral consequences, again, would steer us away from DPAs rather than. Um, towards prosecution.

[00:16:02] Professor Melissa Castan: So

[00:16:02] Professor Liz Campbell: was Rolls Royce

[00:16:03] Professor Melissa Castan: too big to

[00:16:03] Professor Liz Campbell: prosecute? Um, so this is a, a, a really, um, fascinating question, and Professor Brandon Garrett in the US has written a book that, uh, is entitled Too Big to Jail. So we speak about corporate entities being too big to fail too, too big to jail, too big to to, to prosecute.

[00:16:22] Certainly Sir Brian Levison in the judgment that approved the DPA in respect of Rolls Royce. Did allude to the critical economic and symbolic role of Rolls-Royce. So it made it more difficult to pursue Rolls-Royce by, by virtue of its its economic status and its, um, symbolism in, in the UK for sure.

[00:16:43] James Pattison: So Brian Levison qc, who is the president of the Queen's bench division of the high court, when he was deciding whether to approve the DPA or not, he wrote this.

[00:16:54] My reaction when first considering these papers was that if Rolls Royce were not to be prosecuted in the context of such egregious criminality over decades involving countries around the world, making truly vast corrupt payments and consequentially even greater profits, then it was difficult to see when any company would be prosecuted.

[00:17:16] But he approved the DPA a. What the hell is going on here?

[00:17:20] Professor Liz Campbell: So I think that's a really, uh, helpful and quite pithy quote from Sir Brian Levison, um, with which I agree entirely, but I think, um, it's after that quote in his judgment that we diverged somewhat in so far as I think there's some, um. Mental gymnastics going on in respect of his, uh, I suppose acknowledgement of the gravity, the breadth of the criminality that that went on.

[00:17:45] But then not withstanding all of that, his approval of the deferred prosecution agreement,

[00:17:50] Professor Melissa Castan: even with a financial penalty, with a mega huge transnational, almost company. I mean $600 million. Wow. That's probably just their advertising budget for a year or two. So is it really making an impact and really able to change the behavior of both that corporation and other corporations that might be engaging in similar kind of conduct?

[00:18:10] Yeah.

[00:18:10] Professor Liz Campbell: So. For sure this is the transnational company, and that's an interesting point, which is how do domestic legal systems grapple with transnational companies that have a FA global footprint essentially, and as you said, have the capacity to absorb huge financial penalties. Um. I think what is, uh, striking about deferred prosecution agreements, that means they have potential for corporate change, both within the particular corporate entity as well as in a wider sense, is that a deferred prosecution agreement will generally include a financial penalty.

[00:18:46] It may include discouragement of profits, it might include compensation, so that could be of victimized communities or individuals overseas. Uh, but then critically it will also. More than likely include a reflection on and amendments to compliance programs. Mm. So anti-bribery and corruption compliance programs that are so common nowadays within large companies that that would need to be reflected upon and audited and likely beefed up.

[00:19:13] So Rolls Royce had already started to do this, and that's something that Sir Brian Levison alluded to in his judgment as saying this was evidence of progress and you know, our movement in the right direction essentially. But a monitor might be imposed through a deferred prosecution agreement, um, and particular criteria that need to be adhered to.

[00:19:30] And what we've seen in the UK in respect of the five deferred, um, DPAs that have been approved, um, is that they're usually lasting between three to five years. So the company needs to pay a particular amount. It might be required to pay the S FO's costs, and that's happened in the majority of the DPAs to date.

[00:19:47] And then it also needs to do something to pull its socks up in the compliance sense. Is there

[00:19:51] Professor Melissa Castan: something about changing the corporate culture and turning over the senior management or the people that were involved in the decisions? Because otherwise everyone sort of nods and you know, says we'll be better next time, but there's.

[00:20:03] You know, we don't really have much insight to what happens inside a company, so how do we know they're actually

[00:20:07] Professor Liz Campbell: changing? Absolutely. So, so again, um, one of the criteria, um, on which, um, the SFO makes its decision as to whether to go down the DPA or prosecutorial route. Is the extent to which there's already been some shift within the corporate entity.

[00:20:24] Um, and certainly if years have passed, if the company is in essence a different organization than, than it was in the past. So again, this is something that Sir Brian Levison alluded to in his judgment, that there had been a great shift both within the personnel as well as within the attitude within Rolls Royce.

[00:20:39] So again, that was something. Leaning him in favor of the deferred prosecution agreement. And that gets to a point, again, I don't think we've alluded to this just yet. The British statutory scheme really sought to demarcate itself from the US scheme, which is prosecution led and does not involve judicial oversight to any great extent.

[00:21:00] Um, what is a prerequisite under the British legislation? That the SFO and the corporate entity reach an agreement that that is put before the court. And in four of the five DPAs it's been Sir Brian Levison in the Crown Court in Southern and London, um, that he needs to approve that the DPA is in the interest of justice and that the terms are fair, reasonable, and proportionate.

[00:21:24] And so, um, what we've seen to date, um, is five DPAs being approved and for a variety of different forms of corporate misconduct. What were those

[00:21:33] James Pattison: five cases or the other four I should say?

[00:21:36] Professor Liz Campbell: So the, the first case was, um, standard bank. Um, and that involved overseas bribery. Um, but again, like in Rolls-Royce, there had been a wholesale revision of the corporate entity.

[00:21:47] It was a subsidiary, um, that had been involved in bribing officials in Tanzania. Um, so there was both active bribery as well as failure to prevent bribery. And that, so that was the very first one that was agreed and indeed, that concluded, um, it was resolved successfully just last year. Um, and that means then there will not be a prosecution pursued in respect of the, the problematic behavior, um, that that went on.

[00:22:13] Uh, second DPA in the UK was in respect of a small to medium enterprise called X, Y, Z, which is still anonymized because of ongoing criminal proceedings. Um, again, this involved bribery but of a, of a lesser scale. Um, the third was in respect of Rolls Royce. Um, the fourth in respect of Tesco, which is akin to Woolworths.

[00:22:37] You know, again. A household name. This wasn't a bribery case though. In contrast, this was a scenario involving false accounting, and just a couple of weeks ago, we had a case involving A DPA for a subsidiary of a company called cco. CCO are involved in the provision of private security arrangements. Um, in a variety of forms, but this involved the falsification of, um, details relating to the tagging and electronic monitoring of, of prisoners.

[00:23:08] So we had a situation whereby accounts were falsified and individuals were allegedly being monitored, when in fact those prisoners had either been legitimately released or indeed some of them had died. So this again, was, uh, deeply problematic corporate behavior. Um, and this was involving, uh. Corporate entity that was involved in a lot of public private partnerships and private contracts with the, um, ministry of Justice, uh, within the uk,

[00:23:34] James Pattison: including some contracts with, I believe the Australian government, uh, indeed squeaky clean reputation.

[00:23:40] Professor Melissa Castan: So did DPAs pull the teeth out of the criminal justice system?

[00:23:44] Professor Liz Campbell: Goodness gracious. Okay. Yes. Um, so. Were the traditional prosecutorial route to be adopted in respect of a company and that company to be convicted. As I said earlier, the financial penalty that results is not dissimilar to that which accrues because of A DPA and indeed, A DPA might be more interventionist because of the compliance.

[00:24:05] Components. So you think, well, that seems on a par and indeed might have more teeth in a deterrent sense in a, uh, restorative sense than the conventional process. But one key differentiating factor between the conventional process and DPAs is that conviction for. Bribery or a corruption type offense in a variety of contexts would preclude the company from getting particular contracts.

[00:24:32] So whether that's within the EU or in relation to certain world Bank contracts, for instance, there are procurement rules that preclude a company that has a particular conviction from going for such contracts. Um, and so some would say that, well, that is. Part of the armory of the state, that that very fact should be a deterrent for corporate entities.

[00:24:55] Um, and so a corporate entity that's involved in wrongdoing should have to face the, those particular consequences. But what we saw in Sir Brian Levinson's approval of Rolls Royce and in wider commentary is the fact that DPAs are seen as preferable. Exactly. Because they ensure that a company can keep going for such contracts.

[00:25:14] James Pattison: Think about this from a public opinion sort of perspective. When you're, when you are. An individual who is charged with an offense and you're convicted for it, that conviction stays with you for the rest of your life and often has major implications for things like travel and for your prospects of getting a job for the rest of your life.

[00:25:33] So I could understand that the public would see something like a DP. As letting a corporation off the hook in the way that they wouldn't let an individual off the hook. What does that do to trust in our justice system?

[00:25:44] Professor Liz Campbell: Well, I suppose in, in the first instance, it's important to recall that DPAs don't let companies off the hook.

[00:25:51] They do involve state intervention, um, just in a, in a different form. So. We can maybe debate the level of penalties involved, but the intervention that is required through the compliance program is not insignificant. Um, essentially. So it's not that there is an, uh, an uh, an avoidance or an evasion of justice by these particular companies, but there is a degree of negotiation.

[00:26:14] And settlement that is enabled by virtue of the company's size, by virtue of their clout that just isn't available to, to, to individuals. So I think it's really important that we have a, you know, a, a measured debate and discussion about the content of deferred prosecution agreements. But I can share the misgivings that.

[00:26:30] You know, people on the street might have about the idea that Rolls Royce, which had, uh, reached an agreement in respect of other criminality in Brazil, for instance, in relation to Petro Bra, um, had ongoing proceedings both at the corporate level as well as guilty pleas from individuals in the US and now has a DPA in respect of multimillion um, pounds.

[00:26:52] Corruption in a variety of jurisdictions within the uk that that company can still avail, if not of the benefit of A DPA, certainly of the framing of the settlement in a way that gives a lot of power and shifts the dynamic towards the corporate entity for sure.

[00:27:09] James Pattison: So the DPA started the United States, move to the uk.

[00:27:14] Any plans to introduce G DPAs? GPAs? God, we come from a law school. Any plans to introduce DPAs in Australia?

[00:27:23] Professor Liz Campbell: Yeah, so there's been a discussion for the past few years in Australia about the introduction O of DPAs. Um, there was a public consultation in 2017 and the crimes legislation amendment combating corporate crime bill.

[00:27:38] Clack as it's otherwise known. It's a name, isn't it? Just, I'm getting used to all the acronyms. So clack. The clack bill of, of 2017 also introduced a number or was to introduce a number of provisions relating to corporate misconduct, including offenses relating to failure to prevent foreign bribery, but then also encompassed the potential introduction of DPAs.

[00:28:00] So there was a public consultation. Both on the content of the bill as well as on the content of the associated code of practice. That's very much measure, um, mirroring the, um, the, the British measures. Um, but there are some critical differences. So the scheme in Australia, um, if it is to be introduced, will mirror to some extent that in within the uk in so far as, um, the, uh, DPA must be in the public interest, the terms must be fair, reasonable, and proportionate.

[00:28:30] The. Uh, conditions that might be imposed by A DPA are very much comparable. Um, rather than having judicial oversight because of the constitutional arrangements in Australia, it's likely to be a, an approving officer is how the, um, bill phrased it. And so that would be a former. Um, senior judge who would be involved in approving the, the terms of, of the DPA, um, and then confirming its finalization or being involved in any concern about its breach, for instance.

[00:29:03] So that was in 20 17, 18. Um, but what we've seen now, um, because of the recent election. Is, um, well the, the bill had not been approved prior to that election, and so it's in some somewhat of a parliamentary limbo, um, at the moment. Um, what we have also seen now in the past few months is the Australian Law Reform Commission initiate, uh, um, a review of.

[00:29:28] Corporate misconduct and the extent to which the criminal law is equipped to deal with corporate wrongdoing. Um, and so the discussion about DPAs in Australia is, is rumbling on, but it's part of a broader review of the, of the landscape essentially.

[00:29:43] James Pattison: Uh, so the Rolls Royce. Case, if we can come back to it.

[00:29:45] Is that all finished now?

[00:29:47] Professor Liz Campbell: So within the uk, the DPA, um, has been approved, but it's still still ongoing. So we're still within the, the timeframe of the deferred prosecution agreement. Um. Whether Rolls Royce remains compliant, remains to be seen. What the SFO did announce earlier this year is that its parallel investigation in individuals has been dropped, and that was met with a great deal of concern and, and disappointment, um, by myself and other individuals that work in this space.

[00:30:16] Um. In the US there have been guilty pleas by individuals and, uh, settlement in the US as well as in, in Brazil. So in respect of the, um, the whistleblower reports and the wrongdoing that's going on, there's no maintained concern essentially in respect of that, or there's no open investigation.

[00:30:35] Professor Melissa Castan: Professor Liz Campbell, thank you very much for joining just Cases.

[00:30:38] Professor Liz Campbell: My pleasure. Thank you very much, James. Thanks, Melissa.

[00:30:40] Professor Melissa Castan: By the way, what's your Twitter handle?

[00:30:43] Professor Liz Campbell: So it's Liz j Campbell.

[00:30:45] Professor Melissa Castan: Oh, that's complicated. It is, isn't it?

[00:30:47] James Pattison: And you can follow us on Twitter. We love hearing all your story suggestions and would love even more for you to click through to our one question survey.

[00:30:56] Our handle is at just Cases Show. And also check out the back catalog of just Cases episodes. At the Just Cases website. Just cases podcast.com.

[00:31:07] Professor Melissa Castan: You just said just cases about just about 700 times. It's like I'm on the take.

[00:31:16] There's another episode on corruption in the Just Cases series. Episode 11. He knows how to operate in the shadows. The corruption trial of former president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma exposes the influence of weapons companies on governments worldwide. Have a listen. To it if you enjoyed this one,

[00:31:32] James Pattison: and to make sure that we're giving this podcast in front of like-minded people, uh, here's four ways that you can support just cases.

[00:31:38] Number one, subscribe or follow just cases in your podcast app. You might be listening to it, but subscribe and you'll make sure that you are getting notified when the latest episodes drop. Number two, uh, rate just cases. We, of course, love five star ratings. Number three, write a review and four. Share the podcast with your friends and family.

[00:32:00] A combo of all of these four things works to push just cases up on the charts and get it in front of more people so that we can keep on making great episodes for you. Thanks in advance for all your help and all your support.